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America is a nation founded on rule by the people, yet the federal system designed to
protect individual power paradoxically contributed to the concentration of power in business
corporations.  Nineteenth century corporations had been owned and controlled by proprietors.
After 1900 corporations became much larger, with ownership separated from management,
and with managers in control. The new system of corporate capitalism required a new set of
legal rights.  Existing scholarship claims these rights were constructed via judicial
interpretation of antitrust law.  However, there are two ways to regulate the corporation:
antitrust law and statutory law.  The second is arguably the stronger of the two, and in
America it was crafted in the several states.  Elements of state law included provisions for
vii
corporate creation, internal governance, liability, and consolidation.  I argue that federalism
shaped corporate capitalism, and led to the concentration of corporate power in America.
Because there is no extant systematic data on state corporation law, I construct a dataset
tracing development of these provisions in 35 states over 35 years.  I analyze the provisions
according to section, time, level of economic development, and degree of capital
concentration.  Minutes of state constitutional conventions provide evidence of the arguments
for and against the various provisions.  Results show variation between and within sections.
States sought to preserve their authority to regulate their local economies, and yet also
promote development.  They promulgated laws specific to the industrial structure of their
state: those with capital concentrated in a few firms were more likely to lift restrictions.  This
places the well-known New Jersey innovations of the 1890's in a new light.  New Jersey drew
from provisions already existing, but not assembled in one place.  Richard Bensel argues that
national market building was protected by the most insulated branch of government, the
Supreme Court.  Yet state legislatures, the least insulated branch, acted as well.  As states
liberalized their laws to accommodate the national market, they lost regulatory capacity.  This
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Chapter 1
Corporate Capitalism and the States
America is a nation founded on rule by the people, yet the federal system
designed to protect individual power paradoxically contributed to the concentration of
power in business corporations.  Federalism, along with separation of powers serves to
disperse power among institutions.  It decentralizes many functions of government.  In
the American system the state governments are generally considered to be closest to
the people.  Yet the very system of that James Madison thought would help protect
against the concentration of power set states in competition with one to develop their
local economies.  The system of state chartering of business corporations led to a
monumental concentration of wealth and power.
At the dawn of the twentieth century the American political economy was in
transition.   Nineteenth century corporations had been proprietary, controlled by
majority shareholders, and run largely as family operations.  Now a massive merger
movement transformed the structure of corporate ownership.  Industrial firms joined
forces, merging into much larger enterprises.  The merged companies often controlled
up to, or even over, 70% of their industries.  Ownership consisted of large number
shareholders, with the shares sold on stock exchanges.  Management took effective
control of the firm, recasting the role of the shareholder to a relatively passive
investor.1  The new form of organization, corporate capitalism, created a new
1 Martin Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916 (New York:
1
relationship of the worker to his employer.  It thus also prefigured a transformation in
the relation of the citizenry to the state.  The transformation was predicated on changes
in the law.
Corporate capitalism required a new set of legal rights.  Existing scholarship
claims these rights were constructed via judicial interpretation of antitrust law.  Yet
there were two ways to control the corporation: via antitrust regulation or via state
incorporation law.  The second was arguably the stronger of the two.2  Further, in
America corporations are chartered in the states, and not by the federal government.
Federalism shaped corporate capitalism.  Legislatures in the states constructed the
various attributes of the business corporation.  They did so both in response to the
needs of their local economy, but also to the pressures and innovations of other states.
 The construction of American corporate capitalism has great significance for
economic and industrial development more generally.  British corporation law up to
1860 was the most advanced in the world.  Great Britain was the first nation to
industrialize, and her corporation law deeply influenced American corporation law and
corporate practice.  Following the Civil War, America industrialized, and American
corporation law changed, gaining ascendancy by the century's end.  American
corporations, and corporation law, stood at the leading edge of economic development.
The innovations in both were essential elements of American system of corporate
Cambridge University Press, 1988).  Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in
American Business, 1895-1904 (New York: Cambridge University Press), 18.
2 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 162; and Charles W. McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar
Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869-1903”, Business
History Review, 53:3, (1979).  
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capitalism.  
Despite its obvious importance, statutory corporation law in the late nineteenth
century has been understudied and underappreciated.  Corporations are entities created
in law.  Their attributes and rights are hence political.  The legal document creating the
corporation is its charter; in the United States general business corporations are, and
have always been chartered in the states.  The state, in enacting a charter, exercises
what in the abstract (at least) is one of its most awesome acts, the creation of
something out of nothing.  By declaration an association of persons is granted the
corporate right to form a body politic, distinct from the right of any one individual (and
also distinct from a partnership.)  Without the state, there can be no corporation.  
Most studies on the development of corporate capitalism focus on national-
level antitrust regulation and enforcement.  The Federal Government only began to
attempt antitrust regulation in the 1890's, and even then the Supreme Court severely
restricted Congressional action.  However, the states adjusted virtually all attributes of
corporate existence in the period of this study.  This included the extent of limited
liability for shareholders, the right to pursue business objectives for any legal purpose,
and the right to own any amount of  real estate.  States granted corporations the right to
purchase the stock of other corporations, and to merge.  They removed limits on
capitalization and granted innovative forms of ownership organization, such as the
multiple classes of stock.
While existing theories attribute the appearance of liberal corporation laws to
social efficiency or private power, I suggest that the legal basis of corporations was
3
heavily influenced by the dynamics of American federalism, and that we must look at
the profile of economic activity within each state in order to explain the legal
development of corporation law.  The American states varied in terms of types of
economic activity and  level of industrialization.  States responded to the economic
needs within their state, to developments in other states, and to efforts by firms to
build national market systems.  States with high degrees of capital concentration in
manufacturing were more amenable to liberal incorporation law than states with
widespread small-scale manufacturing.  This deep rooted practice of adjusting
corporate rights in an individualistic legal system is indicative of an American
tradition of corporate rights.  Deep and prolonged state innovations of corporate rights
resulted in an “American System” of corporate capitalism.  Federalism in 19th century
America shaped corporate capitalism of the 20th century world.  
The construction of corporate capitalism has broad significance.  With the rise
of corporate capitalism, the relation of the worker to the economy changed.  This
involved not merely the replacement of skilled crafts with unskilled labor in mass
production, but also the creation of a middle class and a stratified business class.  All
would have a new relation to the economic system, and thus also to the state.  As
Martin Sklar notes, the construction of corporate capitalism was also the construction
of a new ideology.3  
Karl Marx's theory of historical development was predicated on class struggle
at defined stages of economic development as the central motor of historical change.
3 Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 4-9.  
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A central insight of his was that consciousness is determined by one's relationship to
the means of production.4  Preferences are formed by individual's means of garnering
their livelihood.  This element of his theoretical structure both preceded his analysis,
and survived scholarly evisceration of much of his theory.  For those more inclined to
mainstream American thinkers, James Madison made the same point in Federalist 10.
“The latent causes of faction” Madison suggests, “are thus sown into the nature of
man.”
Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct
interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall
under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a
mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of
necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated
by different sentiments and views.5
Madison's concern with faction is built upon an astute observation about  preference
formation.  One's relation to the economic system determines ones preferences.
Despite this insight, Madison (unlike Hamilton) was not an apostle of industrial
development. He was not enamored with proprietary capitalism, and could not have
foreseen the rise of corporate capitalism.  He thus was not in a position to evaluate the
changing relationship of American laborers, employers, and middle level managers to
the means of production, and thus to the state.  As these classes of persons grew, they
4 In The German Ideology, Marx argues that the ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling class, and that
the ruling idea in a feudal society are duty and obligation, while the ruling ideas of capitalism are
freedom and equality. These ideas are held irrespective of class position, as if within each system the
ideas are universal and transcendent.   In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, he more actively
ties interests to class position.  Karl Marx, Selected Writings (Lawrence H. Simon, ed.)
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994).  For treatments of Marx's theory of historical
materialism see William H. Shaw, Marx's Theory of History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1978) and G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978).
5 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: The Modern
Library, 1938).
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would impact preferences manifested in political preferences of the electorate.  With
the development of corporate capitalism, much else follows.
Corporate Rights and Economic Development
Economic development in industrializing 19th century America was predicated
on the proprietary corporation.  Corporate capitalism in 20th century America was
predicated, for better and for worse, on large integrated corporation.  The
transformation from the first to the second impacted economic development more
generally.  However, existing theories of economic development do not address nor
explain how and why the legal environment altered corporate rights.  This is an
essential task to the construction of a political economic theory of economic
development.  While this work I do not offer an alternative theory of development, I
do suggest that a viable theory of development must account for changes in legal rights
of economic actors.  
That the modern corporation requires the sanction of the legal system
challenges several tenets of neoclassical economy theory.  Neoclassical theory views
the market as natural, preferences as exogenous, and the state as external to markets.
The neoclassical formulation inevitably subordinates the role of the state in
establishing favorable economic conditions, and often relegates legitimate state action
to designing remedies for externalities.
The classic theory of development is take-off theory.  W. W. Rostow defines
takeoff as the “increase in volume and productivity of investment in a society such that
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a sustained increase in per capita income results.”6  This can result from a sustained
increase in yields as a result of technological advance, or from an increased propensity
to invest.  This requires that a society respond to an impetus (usually short lived) with
a change in productive enterprise, encompassing “political, social, and institutional
changes.”7  Although the conditions for take-off include political change, precisely
what these changes are is underspecified in Rostow's analysis.  He regards the 1850's
as the key to takeoff in the United States, but in doing so underplays the importance of
legal changes undergirding rapid development from the end of the Civil War to 1900. 8
Further, his treatment of developing nations as hermetically sealed from political and
economic developments outside of the given nation's boundaries is untenable.  
More recently, New Institutional Economics has sought to develop a general
theory of economic change.  Douglass C. North seeks to incorporate political and
economic institutions, demographic change, technological change, and ideology into
such a theory, while largely accepting the neoclassical postulate of utility
maximization.9  North argues that the essential ingredient for economic growth is that
property rights be both clear and stable.   Clear and stable property rights allow
individual returns to more closely approximate social returns.  The primary function of
the state from this perspective is to specify and enforce individual property rights.  A
6 W. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, 2nd ed., (New York: Norton, 1962), 103-4.
7 Ibid., 275.
8 The perspective I adopt here acknowledges the role of politics in the creation and regulation of
markets.  In that regard I am in sympathy with Karl Polanyi, who asserted that markets are
constructed.  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957 [c. 1944]).
9 Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981).
In North's view, Marx's theory of historical materialism is merely a special case of North's more
general theory.
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state geared towards development can engender the stability of contracts with secure
but low enforcement costs.  An efficient property rights regime will thus reduce
transaction costs and maximize economic performance.10   
At the end of the day, beyond a vague injunction for the protection of private
property, North does not tell us what the law should look like.11   Just as important for
our purposes, he does not address the constitutive powers of the state to create the
corporation.  North recognizes the efficiencies of managerial coordination of
throughput, and also suggests that these have the effect of lowering transaction costs.12
In his critique of neoclassical economics, North seems to regard monopolies as
inherently inefficient.  They are, in his view, necessary payoff by the ruler to potential
adversaries for stability.13  The role of the state in creating political entities, and their
constituent rights is not discussed.  He does not address which of these rights are most
conducive to economic success. 
In this regard North is aligned with Ronald H. Coase.  Coase maintains that
once clear and stable property rights are secured, the content of those rights will not
affect the overall social product (although it will impact the allocation of resources).14
I maintain that, when it comes to corporation law, this is not correct.  Corporate rights
are, among other things, a state-structured form of property rights.  If we accept Alfred
10 Ibid.,  7, 15-18.
11 See, for example, Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York:




14 R. H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. III, (Oct.)
1960: 1-44.
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D. Chandler's argument that managerial coordination is more efficient than market
transactions,15 then the designation of property rights that promote centralized control
will in fact affect overall social output.16  The property rights designated via
corporation law leads to an increase in overall social wealth.  North rightly directs
attention to the state, but underspecifies the importance of the content of the state
policies.
The increase in overall social wealth is, of course, generally regarded as the
sine qua non of economic existence.  The question of who can make a legitimate claim
on that increase of wealth directly follows.  Some individuals will have endowments
position them to take greater advantage of the positive law that will others.  This is not
the entirely the result of a neutral market, but also a result of positive law. 
Claims to the increase of wealth are typically made by incorporators and
investors, the initiators of the business endeavors.  Neoclassical theory asserts that
rents belong to entrepreneurs and shareholders.  This assertion is made with the
implicit (or explicit) assumption that the state is and should be a neutral arbitrator of
market relations.  However, such assumptions are problematic when the state becomes
enabler of rents.  In enabling corporate existence the state is more than merely a
15 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1977.)
16 It is important that we distinguish the Coase Theorem from Coase's theory of the firm. The Theory
of the Firm asserts that the firm will exist when it can reduce transaction costs relative to market
transactions, while the Coase theorem states that with clear and stable property rights, social output
will not be impacted by the content of those rights.  Yet the Coase Theorem and the Theory of the
Firm are part and parcel of the same approach; both derive from radical individual maximization in a
world of market exchanges.  Further, the critique of the Theorem implies a critique of the Theory of
the Firm.  Firms will derive advantages as a result of positive law: the law will make for the
possibilities of selective advantages for some and not for others.
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neutral arbiter of property relations.  Rather, the state has a direct role in the increase
of overall social wealth.  Further, when it does so, it increases inequality.  The
corporation is, after all, a vehicle for the concentration of wealth.  
States and The Corporation
Several disciplines study corporate development, including business history,
sociology, legal studies, and studies of political development.  They have varied
significantly in their assessment of the role of the state in shaping the corporation.
Thus they have also varied in their attention to the impact of the subnational states in
developing corporate capitalism, and concomitantly in seeking to explain why the
states changed their policies.  
The most comprehensive study from business history is Alfred D. Chandler,
Jr.'s Visible Hand.  Chandler argues that at advanced levels of industrialization, the
“visible hand” of managerial coordination is more efficient than the “invisible hand”
of market transactions.17  According to Chandler, the central dynamic of
industrialization in the second half of the nineteenth century was the separate
development of systems of production and distribution, and the joining of these
systems in vertically integrated firms.  This development followed the building of the
transportation network, primarily railroads and telegraphs, from the 1830's to the
1880's.  These provided the capability to transport agricultural and extracted natural
17 I select Chandler because his is the most comprehensive account, he is clear in his scholarly
commitments, and because, except for his treatment of the necessity of legal change, I find his
account to be persuasive.  Further, in constructing a standard for what is necessary for business, it is
useful to seriously take into account the perspective of business.  Chandler, The Visible Hand.
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resources from the American West to cities in the East.  The network created the
possibility of a sure supply of raw materials to manufacturing firms.  This allowed for
an increase in throughput in conjunction with more efficient use of manufacturing
plants, and the selling of branded products to a national market.  
The large industrial business corporation combined mass production with mass
distribution in a single firm.  It rose via two methods: either vertical integration
financed by internal growth that built purchasing and marketing networks, or by
horizontal merger of individually owned firms (of course vertical or horizontal
expansion could occur internally as well.)  Vertical integration of the large industrial
corporation involved managerial coordination of activities from material extraction
though the final sale.  Firms moved upstream into raw material procurement, and
downstream into marketing.  This integration occurred in industries that were able to
introduce economies of scale and speed, particularly with continuous process
manufacturing. 
Almost absent from Chandler's analysis is a discussion of the law.  It is the
thesis of this work that changes in corporation law were an essential element to the
transformation of the corporation, and thus corporate capitalism.  In particular,
changes in statutes at the state level were essential for the development of the
American system.  
An alternative approach, by William G. Roy, does by contrast emphasize the
role of the state.18  Roy emphasizes the importance of statutory law, but sees the state
18 William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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as responsive to the demands made by business.19  Thus he adopts a “power theory”
based on class analysis, where the corporation controls the law.  Drawing on Karl
Polanyi, Roy argues that property relations are defined and enforced by the state.  In
his view, the rise of the large corporation involved a fundamental shift in the nature of
corporate “rights, entitlements, and obligations.”  These favored a new corporate class
over proprietary industrial owners.  Capital was "socialized" and markets were
constructed.  In the United States this involved three basic changes.  First, ownership
became more liquid.  Second, new capital and value was created by social agreement
(capitalizing the promise of future earnings).  Third, capital was mobilized from
outside the original owners and promoters.20  According to Roy the most important
merger was the joining together of industrial capital with finance capital.  European
investment banks influenced the form of American investment banks; these in turn
shaped the deployment of American industrial capital.  The resulting state policies
were shaped to meet these needs.   Management was separated from ownership, and
power was concentrated in the former.  Many directors were responsible to (or were)
investment bankers, and sat on boards of multiple firms.
Roy and Chandler point to New Jersey's change in law in 1889 as a
transformational event.  Roy asserts it instigated a “race to the bottom,” whereby states
lowered their standards to attract capital.  But whereas Chandler nevertheless largely
ignores the role of the state, Roy views the state as essentially derivative of the
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 248;  The constructions of markets is derived from Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation,
(New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944). 
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business class.  Chandler quite simply does not explain legal changes, while Roy
explicitly treats changes in the law as an independent variable.21 
Functionalist and power explanations of these type might seem like polar
opposites, but  here, at least, they do have one thing in common.  Both focus on the
demand for political outputs.  However, they do not consider why a state legislature
(and governor) might see fit to supply a preferred policy, or to resist.  An explanation
rooted in political contestation is called for.   
There are important works by scholars of political economic history on the
relation of the state to the economy, but not in the period under question.  Thus there
are significant studies of state policy before the Civil War, but surprisingly few
investigations of state policy after the Civil War.  In the 1940's the Social Science
Research Council sponsored studies by Oscar and Many Flug Handlin on antebellum
economic policy in Massachusetts, and by Louis Hartz in Pennsylvania.  Each stressed
deep state involvement (and investment) in economic development until the 1830's,
followed by state withdrawal from infrastructure investment, and the rise of a laissez
faire ideology.22  More recently, several other works on antebellum state policy have
follow this tradition.23  
21 Roy, Socializing Capital, 148.
22  Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth; A Study of the Role of Government in the
American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1860 (New York: New York University Press, 1947);
Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania 1776-1860, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1948).  A third such study, on Virginia, appears not to have been
published.
23 Ronald E. Seavoy, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 1784-1855: Broadening the
Concept of Public Service During Industrialization, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); L.
Ray Gunn, The Decline of Authority: Public Economic Policy and Political Development in New
York, 1800-1860, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988);  David A. Moss and Sarah Brennan,
“Managing Money Risk in Antebellum New York: From Chartered Banking to Free Banking and
13
Legal historians have produced significant studies of national level corporation
policy after the Civil War, but generally these downplay state statutory corporation
law.  Morton J. Horwitz places corporation law within a “crisis of legal orthodoxy,”
whereby classic notions of the corporation as  an artificial entity gave way to a “natural
entity theory.”24  Herbert Hovenkamp argues that corporation law depended on a
classic political-economic ideology.25  Martin Sklar argues that the success of the large
corporation must be understood in terms of a transformation in social relations.26  This
transformation was a political result of conflict in the courts and in Congress over
more than two decades.  In all these cases, changes occur at the national level.  J.
Willard Hurst, in tracing the development of the legitimacy of the corporation as an
entity, does point to the general trajectory of corporation law in the states.  Yet he does
not distinguish variation in state policies.  He takes the trajectory of development
corporation laws in the states as a unified whole that was functional and thus
functionalist.  The dynamics of federalism do not enter into his analysis.27
These dynamics must be integrated into a theory of economic development.
The exercise by the state of the charter power was commonplace in the nineteenth
Beyond,” Studies in American Political Development 15:2 (2001), 138-62.  
24 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, 1870-
1960, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
25 Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1991).
26 Martin Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction.
27  J Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-
1970, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1970).  Elsewhere Hurst does detail state action
in Wisconsin regarding the development of the states timber industry, and timber policy. We can
surmise from it that states must have varied in the legal provisions based on the industries within
each state.  However, Hurst does not more develop this idea further, and it does not inform
Legitimacy.  James Willard Hurst: Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber
Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1964).  See also  Charles W.
McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision,” 304-342.
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century.  It was often used as a substitute for more direct state power.  The variety of
entities chartered can be distinguished based on degree of public character, and
whether they were created for a profit. A first category includes cities, towns, villages,
and other government entities.  These are entities to which states granted a measure of
sovereignty over a geographic area.  A second category includes non-profit entities
organizations. This included colleges and educational institutions, as well as such
associations as Masonic lodges, gymnastic and athletic purposes, or societies for the
prevention of cruelty to animals.   Profit making entities can be usefully divided into
those of a public character, those that required close regulation, and those that required
less regulation.  Public utilities, for water, sewer, gas lamp, and electrical purposes fit
into the first of these categories.  They provided essential local (municipal) services.
States also had an interest in closely regulating other companies that were not quite so
closely tied to the infrastructure.  This included banks, savings and loans, and
insurance companies (including life, fire, property, marine, and others).  Profit making
private entities that required less regulation included firms chartered to build bridges,
roads, turnpikes, canals, railroads, or other transportation facilities, as well as other
useful services such as cemetery associations.  Logically distinct from these are firms
that are not so closely affected with the public interest.  The most important such
category was for laws authorizing manufacturing and mining.  
The public and private areas of charter law came from a common origin.  Many
states situated charter law for the various types of corporations, public and private,
under the same title.  For several states this persisted to the middle of the nineteenth
15
century. Thus cities and villages were in the same title as railroads or manufacturing
companies.  Some general provisions applied alike to businesses as well as towns and
villages.  The trajectory of the liberalization of the industrial business corporation
grew from this (these) category (categories).  As the century progressed, states
increasingly distinguished between types of corporations.  This is reflected in the
complexity of their codes, and most particularly in the promulgation of different titles
and sections of the state code for the different types of entities.  
 States typically created sections of their code for corporations affected with
the public interest before they wrote code for manufacturing companies.  Innovations
in the charter law thus were often set in the former areas before being implemented in
the latter.  For example, some states allowed non-competing railroad lines to merge
before writing similar laws provisions for manufacturing firms.  However, the
manufacturing law was distinct, and would come to be the section of the code to
govern most large industrial companies.  
In order to explain the provision of incorporation law for manufacturing firms,
I draw on a central insight from Catherine Boone's Political Topographies of the
African State.28  Boone argues that we must examine the preexisting structure of
authority to explain colonial and post-colonial state administrative strategies.  Most
importantly, we must examine whether the preexisting administrative structure was
hierarchical or decentralized, and whether class structures were relatively more
stratified or horizontal. This runs counter to prior explanations that suggested that
28 Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and
Institutional Choice, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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French colonies would be set up with hierarchical administrative structures and British
colonies would be set up with decentralized structures, or that structures were set up
based on the ideology (often Marxist) of newly ascendant leaders.  She shows areas
that cut across political boundaries (part British, part French) but have the same
administrative structure, and areas within one political boundary (all British or all
French) where the administrative structure varies. She asserts that this can be
explained by the profile of precolonial political authority.  The key insight for my
purposes is that we must look to the “conditions on the ground” (the political
topography) to understand state strategies for administrative organization. 
Although my concern is not administration, this logic is useful for analysis of
late nineteenth century corporation laws.  Rather than the structure of administration,
we must look to the profile of industrial activity.  Here, Martin Sklar's distinction
between  proprietary capitalism and corporate liberalism is useful.  Sklar shows that
from 1890 to 1916 small producers and large manufactures contested in the political
area over the shape of an emergent corporate liberal ideology.  The “Corporate
Reconstruction of American Capitalism” was the transition from competitive
capitalism featuring proprietarily owned firms to corporate capitalism featuring large
integrated firms.29  This transformation was not smooth, but the result of a political
conflict in the courts and in Congress over more than two decades.   The United States
in the late nineteenth century is notable for the limited, mainly negative, role of the
national government.  Federal regulation of the economy was largely restricted to two
29 Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction.
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major acts, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the Sherman Act of 1890.  The
Interstate Commerce Act gave the federal government some powers for regulating
railroad rates, power that was contested and extended over the following three
decades.30  The Sherman Act restricted combinations in restraint of trade, but was
largely eviscerated by a series of Supreme Court decisions.  The Supreme Court made
sure that there would be strong impediments to federal regulation of corporations.31
Sklar notes that small manufactures were more militantly opposed to exempting labor
from the Sherman Act, a position that hardens after Loewe v. Lawler (1908) made
secondary boycotts illegal.32  He regards the evolution of the political battle as
ultimately an accommodation of large and small manufactures, rather than strict
opposition to one another.  
Sklar's analysis concerns antitrust regulation at the federal level.  This was a
crucial area of regulation.   However, before the federal government passed the
Sherman Act, states sought to create and control corporations through statutory law.
The states were the sites of parallel political battles over the place of the corporation in
the American political economy.
States had different profiles of economic activity.  Industry in a state can
consist of large numbers of small producers that control the bulk of industrial output in
a state, or it can be controlled by relatively few firms.  This profile can take many
30 Among the most important changes were the Elkins (anti-rebating) Act of 1903, the Hepburn Act of
1905, and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.
31 Arnold M. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of the Bar and Bench, 1887-
1895, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969).  See also Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate
Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916 (New York: Cambridge, 1988).
32 208 U. S. 274 (1908); Martin Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 223-6, 228.
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shapes, but can be thought of as a continuum from broadly owned to relatively
concentrated.  The profile of economic ownership will determine the amenability of a
state legislature to laws that will favor greater concentration.  States with centralized
industrial profiles were more likely to offer liberal charter laws.  States with already
developed and widespread small manufacturing economies, but an absence of large
centralized firms, were less likely to liberalize their incorporation law.  This is because
the small producers would be threatened by concentrated economic power.33  
The division of proprietary and large corporate interests impacted state laws.
The states varied in their profile of economic development, and of ownership
concentration.  What matters is not merely the relative shape of the industrial sector,
but also the degree of concentration relative to all economic activity in the state.
States responded to the needs of economic actors within the profile of industrial
activity in relation to the whole of economic activity within the state.  This suggests
that small agriculture can join with small manufacturing against laws that permit
corporate consolidation. This explains why New York, for example, was reluctant to
some liberalize many of its provisions restricting the size and scope of corporations.
New York was home to over 2000 separate textile firms; sugar was the only major
industry that was tightly held.  Thus New York was not hospitable ground for
wholesale charter liberalization.  One argument about why New Jersey liberalized was
that it was a small state near the center of the metropole.34  Yet Connecticut was also a
33 Accommodation is understandable in one important sense.  Many small scale firms often obviously
sought to become large.  Thus their interests might merge over time with large industrial firms.
34 Christopher Grandy, New Jersey and the Fiscal Origins of Modern Corporation Law (New York:
Garland, 1993).
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small state, and arguable roughly as convenient to downtown Manhattan.  But the
profile of Connecticut included well-developed small manufacturing.  By contrast,
New Jersey was characterized by more concentrated industries.
This suggests that alliances were formed outside of the otherwise most salient
class and sectoral cleavages. Small agriculture combined with small scale
manufacturing to oppose centralizing tendencies in their states.  This is different from
alignments that merely pit agriculture against industry. It also suggests that labor of
small scale industries might oppose labor of large scale industries, and that labor of
large scale firms might support laws dedicated to large scale industry.  If so, we can
expect to see political support fall on this axis rather than on a division between the
business class and the working class.
I treat changes in the law as the dependent variable.  This places the focus of
inquiry directly on factors that induce a state to supply a desired (or undesired) policy.
In this regard, at least, I am in agreement with J. Willard Hurst.  He writes that
“Corporation law has always been an instrument of wants and energies derived from
sources outside the law; it has not been a prime mover.  However, means can
materially affect the content of ends to which they are put, and the kind of tools men
can obtain may decide on the jobs they can do.”  Further, he suggests that “the kind of
structure, procedures, and privileges which corporation law made available
significantly channeled the expression of men's wants and energies and significantly
affected the responses which other interests made to these drives.”35  However,
35 Hurst, Legitimacy of the Business Corporation.  
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whereas Hurst favors functionalist explanations, I seek structural economic and
political determinants of state policy, which themselves shape future actions.
Although I treat corporation law here as a dependent variable, I do so at the same time
with the larger cognizance that the law has tremendous impact as a mediating variable.
It impacts the trajectory of business and economic organization, and thus ultimately
also impacts the political process as well.  
The Case For Federalism
The political economy of corporation law in America is rooted in federalism.36
State policies had a profound impact on the political economic development of the
nation.  This, of course, is hardly new.  V. O. Key Jr.'s seminal Southern Politics in
State and Nation depicted individual state cultures that offered significant variations
on the main theme.37   Daniel J. Elazar argued that states have individual civil
societies, and that administration of most policies is a non-centralized partnership that
involves contestation and cooperation between the state and national units.38  Elazar at
the time was arguing against the dominant paradigms of his day, which subordinated
the importance of federalism.  
Despite these efforts, scholars of American political development have
36 One can think of other some cultural issues where there may also be a significant impact, such as
variation in state laws on abortion, or the current issue of gay marriage.  In both such instances the
policy of one state may impact the behavior of citizens in the other states, and influence the policies
of the other states.  Thus for example, the principle of comity may lead to the recognition of gay
marriage by a state that otherwise opposes such  marriage. 
37 V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, (New York: Vintage Books, 1949). 
38 Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, (New York: Thomas A. Crowell,
1966).  However, for an interesting collection of essays from major scholars of that time see Aaron
B. Wildavsky, ed., American Federalism in Perspective, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).
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continued the practice of treating the role of federalism as peripheral.  Most of the best
work concentrates on national level political contests.  When the nation is
disaggregated into parts, sectionalism in one form or another has been the preferred
method of analysis.39  
There are works in political development have recognized the importance of
state policies.  Thus Richard Bensel examines state party platforms, albeit in service of
a sectional argument.40  Skocpol draws our attention to the spread of state mothers
pensions in the late Progressive Era as a precursor for the failure of national level
policies in the 1920's, and thus setting the stage for the federal structure of the welfare
programs constructed in the New Deal. 41  Walter Dean Burnham examines state
election returns as constituent elements that are then aggregated into national level
realigning elections.42  
Constitutional scholarship has hardly been able to avoid federalism.  Seminal
cases such as McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873),
Lochner v. New York (1905), Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), Williamson v. Lee Optical
(1955), and New York v. U. S.  (1992),43 span U. S. history, and have all dealt in one
39 See for example a dynamic sectionalism (where the boundaries of the sections vary) in Richard
Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-1980, (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1984); for a static sectionalism (where boundaries of sections do no vary) see Peter
Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
40 Richard Bensel, Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
41 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the
United States, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1992). 
42 Walter Dean Burnham, “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe,” American
Political Science Review, (1965) 7-27;  and also in Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of
American Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970). 
43 McCulloch v. Maryland, U.S. 316 (1819); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873);  Lochner v.
People of th State of New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918);
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way or another with both federalism and economic regulation.  They recognize that, as
Chief Justice Marshall noted in McCulloch, “the question respecting the extent of the
powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as
long as our system shall exist.”44 
The dynamics of federalism can usefully be divided into two types.  One is the
division of authority between state and nation, and the second is the impact of
variations in state policies on the other states.  Both impacted corporation policy.  The
federal government is a limited government of assigned powers, and in those areas
where it has power, it is supreme.  The commerce clause of the United States
Constitution grants the federal government power over economic regulations.  And
although there was a federal law chartering banks since the Civil War, there is still no
similar law for general business corporations.  
Federal regulation of the economy was largely restricted to two major acts, the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the Sherman Act of 1890.  The Interstate
Commerce Act gave the federal government some powers for regulating railroad rates,
power that was contested and extended over the following three decades.45  The
Sherman Act restricted combinations in restraint of trade.  Although it still guides
antitrust principles today, it was subject to contest and interpretation in the 1890's.
Arnold Paul frames the E.C. Knight case as part of a conservative reaction to sectional
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);  New York v. United States (91-543), 488 U.S.
1041 (1992). 
44 McCulloch, at 404.
45 Among the most important changes were the Elkins (anti-rebating )Act of 1903, the Hepburn Act of
1905, and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.
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stresses in the early 1890's.46  Sklar traces in this decision willful judicial disregard of
the common law concepts such as  “restraint of trade,” and “attempt to monopolize.”
The Trans-Missouri case limited antitrust actions both by the federal government, and
also by the states47.  There were two ways to control corporations, by regulation and by
statutory incorporation law.48  Although the common law interpretations were restored
by 1911, the absence of the capacity for antitrust regulation gave space for the
dynamics of federalism to play out in the area of state corporation law.49
The second dynamic of federalism is the impact of state policies on each other.
When the states do have authority on economic policies these policies can transcend
state boundaries, impacting the trajectory of development of the nation as a whole.  In
a vein similar to the “race to the bottom” in welfare policy, states that liberalized their
charter law were more likely to attract charters.  Part of this liberalization involved
passing provisions for corporations with no operations within the state.
The federal judiciary did take cognizance of the sovereign status of the states.
Charles McCurdy suggests that the true reason for the E. C. Knight decision was to
preserve state capacities in terms of state corporation law.50  McCurdy also notes that
state control over corporations was waning by this time.  Intending to preserve state
powers, the Court preserved space for state dynamics whereby states lost charter
activity if they did not liberalize their law. 
46 Arnold M. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of the Bar and Bench, 1887-
1895, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969).
47 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S 290 (1896).
48 Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement.
49 Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 117-154, especially 124.
50 Charles W. McCurdy, “The Knight Decision of 1895  and the Modernization of American
Corporation Law, 1869-1903,” Business History Review, 53:3 (1979: Autumn), 304-342.
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Both the vertical and the horizontal dynamics of federalism impacted the
development of corporation law.  Nearly every state relaxed their incorporation laws
over the thirty-five years following the Civil War.  As the states relaxed their laws,
they ceded more power to corporate entities, and allowed them to concentrate wealth
to a greater degree than previously encountered.  The concentration of wealth
translated into further political power.   The result was that state policies impacted the
policies of other states, and thus also the trajectory of development of the national
political economy.
Richard Bensel argues that building a national market was the most essential
policy of the system of 1896.51  He positions the Supreme Court as protector of this
policy.  Thus the Supreme Court guaranteed space for national corporations to
dominate markets.  As the corporate entities expanded beyond state boundaries, state
control over those entities lessened.  The Republican congresses saw little need to step
into the void left by the states.  Martin Sklar highlights the limit of a federal
corporation policy, even as late as the final year of Theodore Roosevelt's
administration, when a trial balloon for a national law for chartering corporations
failed.52  The interstice between state and national action created space for corporate
consolidation.
The dynamics of federalism impacted the dynamics of national economic
development in a broader sense. Walter Dean Burnham suggests that the realignment
51 Bensel, Political Economy of American Industrialization.
52 Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction.  Note that national charters for Banks date from the Civil War.
Bray Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Banks and Politics in the Civil War (Princeton
University Press, 1970).
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of the 1890's was a battle of the metropole against the periphery.  He argues that when
capitalism and democracy came into conflict, capitalism won.53  To this I would add
that the structure of federalism contributed to this process, not merely by providing
multiple venues for the development of incorporation law, and not merely by
providing for the opportunity for a “race to the bottom.”  It  provided a variety of
subnational economies with distinct industrial profiles.  This variation provided
different forums that would be more amenable or less amenable to the changes that
corporate actors desired.  State corporation policies impacted the building of the
national market.
The late nineteenth is often considered to be the quintessential era of laissez
faire.  This is ironic in the area of corporation law, as the policies actually emphasized
the limits of a true laissez faire.  Of course corporation law is not alone in this regard.
The malleability of economic theory to the needs of economic actors belies a simple
deductive economic logic.  Champions of free markets advocated the tariff to promote
internal development.  A pyramid reserve system funneled money away from the
periphery, and towards New York banks.  The monies were then invested in the
overbuilding of railroads.  As Gerald Berk notes, the judiciary insisted on favoring
management over the rights of bondholders in order to keep a national system
together.54  The northern states imposed punitive railroad rates on the South.  And of
course, state restrictions on opportunities for newly freed former slaves also belied the
53 Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics.  New York: W.
W. Norton, 1970.
54 Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1994).
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notion that the economy was “free”.55  State incorporation law is one of many policies
by which the economy was shaped, and it provides a context for a more complete
understanding of state action in economic development.
A democratic form of government presents the problem of mediating popular
and monied interests.  Burnham notes that the initial stages of industrial development
have been a brutal and exploitative process that requires some form of insulation from
popular pressures.  Bensel argues that in the United States in the late 19th century, the
Supreme Court performed this function.  As the most insulated branch of the federal
government, it defended national market construction from popular pressures.56  In
addition to this, however, I argue that the structure of federalism also facilitated the
creation of corporate capitalism, and thus the building of a national market.  State
corporation law provided structural ballast in insulating corporate development from
mass redistributionist tendencies.  
Plan of the Dissertation
States in the nineteenth century were deeply involved in economic regulation
via statutory law.  The transformation of these laws was essential to the development
of corporate capitalism.  To make this case, the dissertation proceeds as follows.  In
Chapter Two I seek to clearly specify relevant areas of incorporation law that are
55 C. Vann Woodward.  Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1971).
56 Walter Dean Burnham, “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe,” American
Political Science Review, 59 (1965), 24; Bensel, Political Economy of American Industrialization,
3.
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necessary for advanced stages of industrialization.  To do this I examine Alfred
Chandler's Visible Hand.  Chandler provides a comprehensive narrative of the
development of the large corporation from the perspective of business.  Although
Chandler downplays the role of the state, from his narrative we can identify areas of
the law conducive to corporate growth.  I then assess the arguments of some of
Chandler's critics. In their classic 1932 study The Modern Corporation and Private
Property Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means identified legal elements that served to
strengthen the hand of management vis-a-vis shareholders.57  I draw on all of this to
create a taxonomy of legal provisions for the corporation that are conducive to
industrial advancement.  
In Chapter Three I classify the corporation laws of 35 states over 35 years
according to the standard developed in Chapter Two.  These were the states in the
Union at the end of the Civil War.  The war's end signaled an economic expansion and
a rapid increase in industrialization in the American Metropole.  By 1900, many
national market systems had been put in place, and business corporation law had
assumed a modern form.  
The comprehensive study of corporation law during this period reveals deep
and active state regulation of their political economies via statutory law.  States
regulated corporations by limiting the purposes for which they could be organized, the
term of existence, and other elements that constituted the corporation as an entity.
They regulated modes of internal governance of the corporations, the extent of liability
57 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (New
York: Macmillan, 1937).
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for shareholders and directors, and the legal right of corporations to combine with
other corporations.  
 States in the Northeast had more developed corporation law than elsewhere, but even
Southern and Western states granted corporation rights.  New Jersey has been regarded
as the leader of liberal corporation law.  In contrast to the received literature, I show
that New Jersey did not create new provisions for corporations, but rather assembled
her liberal law from elements already in existence. A statistical analysis indicates that
states with high ratios of concentrated capital were more likely to relax their
corporation law, thus supporting my capital concentration thesis.  
An analysis of the statutes tells us what the states did, but does not tell us why
they did so.  Chapters Five and Six are case studies of legislative arguments regarding
corporation law.  To prepare the way for these, Chapter Four examines the
development of corporate doctrine.  The American legal system is founded on
individual rights.  Since corporations are not individuals, granting rights to
corporations presents difficulties.  The problem is whether the corporation itself has
rights, or whether its rights must be reduced  to the individuals that compose it.  Each
approach presented problems.  Treating the corporation as an entity in itself gives the
corporation rights that individuals do not have.   Reducing the corporation to the
individual owners presented, among other things, problems of assigning liability.  It
also did not seem applicable when managers controlled corporations, as they began to
do late in the century.  At the end of the century a “natural entity” theory was
advocated that sought to overcome these difficulties.  Legal scholars have traced and
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debated the prominence of these theories during the period of this study.  However,
they have not examined the influence of legal doctrine on statutory construction.  I
outline the content and development of these theories for use in the chapters that
follow.  
This analysis of corporation theory in the states forces us to consider the place
of the corporation in American politics.  Louis Hartz has argued that American politics
has been dominated by a liberalism based on individualism, while Rogers Smith
argues that there are multiple traditions of hierarchy and ascription that subordinate
individuals in out of favor groups.  I argue that there is also a corporate tradition of
formalized group rights that exists alongside the tradition of individual rights.  The
advocates of the corporate tradition are the lawyers of the businessmen.
Chapter Five examines the promulgation and justification of policies in state
constitutional conventions.  There are few places were detailed arguments of
legislators are recorded.  Most states did not record their legislative proceedings. There
is also a limited record of legislative proceedings in newspapers beyond the mere fact
of bill passage, especially before 1888.  Fortunately, corporation provisions were put
in state constitutions.  A number of states held constitutional conventions where the
corporation question was debated, often heatedly.  In many cases the debates and
proceedings were recorded by stenographer, and this provides a rare look into the
arguments for a variety of corporation law provisions.  
In the debates delegates sought to balance state control over the corporation
with a desire to develop the state economy.  Delegates justified regulatory efforts with
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arguments that treated the corporation as an artificial entity.  Because the state created
corporate rights, they argued, it could adjust those attributes as it saw fit.  Yet the
impact of industrialization was challenging the received conceptions of the law.
Morton Horwitz contends that jurists and legal scholars confronted a crisis of orthodox
conceptions of the law, in such areas as property rights, torts, the private/public
distinction, and agency.   Corporations were at the center of many of these issues.  I
argue that delegates at the state constitution conventions confronted the same
pressures.  In the context of the crisis of legal orthodoxy, and with the building of a
national market, state liberalization of corporation law led to the decline of state
capacities to regulate their local political economies.   
A key element of this research is to identify occasions (if any) where
corporations reached a “ceiling” as regards corporation law, and to examine how the
state responded.  Chapter 6 addresses one aspect of this.  The New York State
legislature investigated corporate abuses on four occasions from 1888 to 1897.  The
debates and proceedings were recorded.  New York was often an innovator in
corporation, was home to the financial markets, but also was predominantly
agricultural with small scale manufacturing.  While the analysis of constitutional
conventions in Chapter Five addresses many key corporation issues, it does not
address the issues of consolidation.  In the New York investigations, by contrast,
consolidation was a major issue, and many legislators sought to limit corporate efforts
to consolidate industries.  Yet the arguments in New York parallel the arguments of
Chapter Five.  Legislators were challenged by the crisis of legal orthodoxy, and found
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themselves increasingly unable to regulate the state economy via statutory law. 
The decline in state capacities was an essential element of building a national
market.  Yet the state legislatures were the branch of government least insulated from
popular pressures.  They were answerable to pressures from their polities, unlike the
Supreme Court, which Bensel rightly argues was entrusted with building a national
market.  Ironically, it was the multiplicity of these least insulated political institutions
that developed legal rules essential for corporate capitalism.  The development of
corporate capitalism depended on developments in the states.  Pressures in a federalist
setting shaped state policies.
Concluding Remarks
Corporate capitalism developed in state statutes and in case law.  The charter
power was a tool for that state's used to control their economies.  This power could be
used to channel economic activity in ways that the states found advantageous.  The
results are manifest in the variation of corporation law in the several states.  Corporate
law thus was dependent on the political process and economic profile of industrial
activity in each state.  
The transformation of charter law in the late nineteenth century prefigured a
loss of state power.  The great irony is that as the states liberalized their charter law,
they lost some control over the direction of economic development within their state.
Eventually the states would compete for corporations charters.  As corporations grew
in size and in scope, the decisions of the states would impact the economies of not
32
only each state, but also national and international economic development.  Yet, as the
states' charter power weakened, the federal government's actions were restricted by the
narrow reading of Sherman Act (1890) via its relative evisceration by the Supreme
Court in E. C. Knight (1895).  This created space for more liberal corporate
development that facilitated the concentration of capital in a few hands.  The
bureaucratic regulatory capacities of the federal government in the early twentieth




A Standard of Evaluation 
This chapter constructs a legal standard for corporate development.  I examine
how Alfred Chandler, in The Visible Hand, defines the organizational needs and
functions of business corporations.  Chandler provides a comprehensive and
sympathetic interpretation of corporate growth and integration from a functionalist
perspective.   My purpose in harnessing Chandler is two-fold.  First, I argue that the
legal basis for corporate organization cannot be ignored.  Chandler’s position
subordinating the importance of the law is thus untenable.  This, of course, is a
common critique of Chandler.1  Second, nevertheless a close reading of Chandler
reveals key instances where legal structures are necessary in order for the large
corporation to succeed.  Although Chandler downplays the importance of legal
developments, we can nevertheless identify those areas of the law that influence
corporate growth and consolidation.  Thus we can identify what might be termed the
“ideal” legal conditions for corporate development.   From this I define six categories
of legal imperatives useful for evaluating the conduciveness of state law to the
accommodation of the large industrial corporation.
There are, however, areas of law that do not appear in Chandler's narrative,
1 See for example, Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization,
1877-1900, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6-8; William G. Roy, Socializing
Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1997), 6-10; Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
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precisely because he downplays legal change.  Therefore I examine the arguments of
three of Chandler's critics on the legal basis of corporation law.  Then, I examine
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means' The Modern Corporation in order to identify laws
that place power in boards of directors.  From these critiques I derive three additional
categories that are not captured by my analysis of Chandler.  These categories
delineate the areas of the law that constitute the object of analysis in Chapter 3. 
The Chandlerian Standard
Alfred D. Chandler Jr. strides atop the field of business history.   The Visible
Hand has come to be regarded as the dominant explanation of the success of the large
business organization.2  In this work Chandler accounts for the organizational
imperatives for business firm success in an initial stage of rapid industrialization.  The
key actors in this narrative are business managers coordinating activities both at upper
levels and middle levels of the organization. 
 Chandler argues that when a high volume of economic activity was reached in
the late 19th century, administrative coordination permitted greater productivity than
possible by market mechanisms alone.  With advances in transportation and
communication came the possibility of mass markets.  Managerial coordination was
better able to exploit the new opportunities than were independent operators relying on
market transactions.  In the process the owner-operator gave way to technically
proficient managers.  This typically involved the separation of ownership from
2 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business,
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977).
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management.  It also involved the division of responsibilities into middle level
management, which coordinated internal activities, and top management, responsible
for strategic planning.  These divisions lead to increased managerial specialization.
“Markets and technology” Chandler argues “determined whether the
manufacturer or the marketer did the coordinating.  They had a far greater influence in
determining size and concentration in American industry than did the quality of
entrepreneurship, the availability of capital, or public policy” (373).    
Legal reasons were, however, of much less importance than business reasons
in bringing administrative centralization.  Whether the motive for forming
legal consolidations had been to maintain and strengthen cartels or to profit
financially from the process of merger, mergers quickly found themselves in
financial difficulties if they merely remained holding companies.  The
depression of the 1890's had demonstrated how hard it was for a number of
small, single-unit enterprises operating under a single legal roof to become
viable business enterprises unless they were centrally controlled (334).
Thus market and technological factors determined whether an industry would
successfully consolidate or not.  The determining factor was whether
managerial coordination lowered production and distribution costs.  This
coordination is the essential element to achieve efficiencies not possible in
market transactions.  Thus the large corporation is a necessary vehicle for
achieving economies of scale.  According to Chandler, it is best to leave
corporations free to experiment with various forms of organization, searching
for that which is most amenable to long-term growth.
Despite this emphasis on the market imperative, there are several
passages where Chandler acknowledges the role of the state.  Some of these
actions he addresses directly, others merely in passing.  The areas were the state
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action impacted corporate growth in his narrative includes legislative grants,
attempts at market coordination, state standards, antitrust regulation, and the
impact of patents and tariffs.
Legislative Grants.  Chandler does recognize how  the selectivity of
legislative grants did shape the market.  He notes, for example, that legislative
action in Pennsylvania granted the Pennsylvania Railroad a charter for a
subsidiary, the Pennsylvania Company, which allowed the railroad to act as a
holding company (155).  From this the Pennsylvania Railroad developed a
decentralized management structure.  In 1871 Pennsylvania issued a catchall
special charter to use in building Pennsylvania's railroad system that permitted
holding stock in companies outside the state.  John Rockefeller and his allies
later purchased the charter to set up a company that consolidated oil pipelines
(323).  Particular charters of this sort indicated the possibilities of corporate
consolidation, but would require liberal general laws to be a general practice
(319).  Chandler notes that New Jersey supplies the needed policy in 1889.
However, he provides no explanation for why it did so. 
Chandler clearly regards general laws for business incorporation as an
improvement over special legislative acts (particularly when the state does not
subsidize or subscribe to the business).  If a special act were required, corporations
would be subject to political forces.   A state could act as a gateway that establishes
significant barriers of entry to a market.  This would likely hinder greater efficiency.
Chandler argues that these political battles explain why Standard Oil did not seek a
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special charter and instead formed a trust (317).   
Standard economic theory emphasizes the benefits of competition to the
economy, and special legislative acts certainly restrict competition.  We might expect
Chandler to make this argument.  However this is not the primary reason Chandler
favors general laws.  Large industrial firms seek to gain first-mover advantages, and
thus the concomitant economic rents associated with that status.  First movers then
have the opportunity to act uncompetitively, using low cost advantages derived from
economies of scale to threaten potential market entrants.  Chandler has no problem
with this.  For Chandler it is the reduced reliance on legislative whim that privileges
general laws over special legislative acts.
Market Coordination.  Chandler notes the failure of attempts to coordinate market
share.  Trade associations that were formed in the 1870's and 1880's sought to
coordinate output and price to prevent ruinous competition.  These agreements were
not illegal, but they also were not enforceable in courts of law.  A party to an
agreement was not engaged in criminal activity, but was also not able to use the
government to hold other parties to their side of the agreement (316-7).  Thus if a party
to a contract exceeded his quota, others had no legal remedy to enforce the agreement.
A similar dynamic occurred with pooling contracts.  These were similar to trade
association agreements, but between individual firms.  The pool set output quota and
price schedules, which members were expected to abide.  Again, these were legal, but
the courts would not enforce them. Chandler notes that in the 1870's railroads sought
but failed to get federal legislation to make pooling contracts enforceable in courts of
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law (141).  This led to the failure of then legal pools to set prices, not only in railroads,
but also in manufacturing.  
Chandler asserts that had the law sanctioned pooling contracts, cartels rather
than integrated corporations would likely have been the dominant form of business
organization in America, more approximating the practice prevalent in Great Britain.
Had they been sanctioned, cartels might have tied themselves to the political system to
thwart efforts of potential rivals, and in so doing entrenched existing businesses at the
expense of creative destruction.  The resulting cartelistic dominance would have
retarded rapid industrial development by inhibiting managerial coordination.
Outlawing cartels was essential in order to consolidate and rationalize industries
dominated by large integrated firms.  On no subject in the Visible Hand does Chandler
so explicitly demonstrate the importance of legal standards.
Government Standards.  The state also possesses the capacity to coordinate
production and distribution.  Although Chandler champions free markets, at times he
does recognize the benefits of government coordination and oversight.  For example,
he approvingly notes that the Massachusetts legislature required banks to make regular
reports to the Governor and Council as early as 1792.  He also notes that early railroad
charters included “close legislative oversight” (82).  
State action sometimes facilitated or required industry-wide standards.  Thus
state railroad commissioners met in 1879 to “set up uniform accounting methods”
(112).  Later, the national government set up uniform accounting standards for the
railroads in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.  State regulation of grain elevators
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in the 1850's and 1860s “helped to standardize more precisely the grading and methods
of inspection” (212).  The Railway Safety Appliance Act of 1893 required air brakes
and standardized automatic couplers on all railroad cars (130).  Chandler sees these
actions as beneficial.  However, he emphasizes the coordination required among
managers for these developments, while noting in passing the role of the state.
Chandler does not theorize about when the state ought to intervene by providing
industry standards.  Nor does he distinguish, in these instances, the coordinating
capacities of middle level managers from that of government bureaucrats.  
Antitrust Regulation.  Chandler notes that antitrust law did have a significant impact
on corporate legal rights.  The failure of pooling contracts provided an impetus for
Standard Oil legal counsel S.C.T. Dodd to devise the “trust” in 1882.  Individual
companies were issued shares in a centralized board, which directed pricing and
manufacturing policy.  Operational management was maintained in each individual
unit.  Profits were sent to the central office, which redistributed these to trust
certificate holders.  This form of organization had a short life, although the name
“trust” would remain in the lexicon.  Chandler notes that the political winds did not
favor cartels, although he does not explain why.  In 1890 the Sherman Antitrust Act
made trusts illegal.  
Chandler argues that without the Sherman Act cartels of family firms “might
well have continued into the twentieth century in the United States, as they did in
Europe” (375).  This parallels his arguments regarding pooling contracts.  Cases such
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as E.C. Knight,3 Addyston Pipe,4 and Trans-Missouri Freight Association5 upheld
consolidations while proscribing loose combinations.  These cases led to a vast
expansion of investment banking as the drive to consolidate gained momentum (333).
The Northern Securities6 case slowed corporate consolidation by dissolving that
particular holding company, although it did not make holding companies illegal per se.
Rather, it induced corporations to eliminate constituent firms and consolidate into
single companies rather than risk dissolution.  Chandler’s ultimate judgment is that
antitrust legislation “reinforced technological and market imperatives” (375).  It did so
by facilitating the centralization of managerial control.
Patents and Tariffs.  Chandler argues that patents were of greater import than tariffs
in the success of the large industrial corporation, but downplays both.  For example, he
notes that a legal battle over patents slowed commercial production of sewing
machines in the early 1850's (303).   Patents protected American machinery makers,
but were often ineffective in foreign markets.  Chandler argues that continuous
improvement of the product was often more effective as a strategy, particularly after
the 1880's (374).  Rather than rely on patent protection, it was more effective for
companies to continuously improve production methods, which were in any case
changing rapidly.  His conclusion is that reliance on patents without a well-developed
organization was not a viable business strategy (374-5).  
Chandler argues that tariffs had minimal impact.  He does acknowledge some
3 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
4 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
5 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166 U.S. 290 (1896).
6 Northern Securities Corporation v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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exceptions, such as Francis Cabot Lowell's textile firm, a Boston Manufacturing
Company which was aided by the Tariff of 1816 (59).  Yet he downplays their
significance when he argues that legal reasons were less important than business
reasons for the success of the large corporation.(334).  He also notes that the lack of
government subsidies hurt American companies from competing in international trade
shipping, though noting that congressional law reserved coastal and inland shipping to
American companies (190-1).  Nevertheless, he argues that foreign companies could
avoid the tariff by investing in the United States.
    The tariff has long been recognized as one of the most politically
contentious issues of the late nineteenth century, with the major divisions falling along
sectional lines.7  C. Vann Woodward credits the tariff with drawing resources from
South to North, by protecting domestic manufacturing goods, and inciting retaliatory
tariffs that hurt southern cotton growers.  The tariff funded a Civil War pension system
that rewarded Union soldiers, but not former Confederates, even as the South paid its
share of the cost.8   Richard Bensel positions tariffs as one of three great political
economic issues in the late nineteenth century (the others being the gold standard and
building a national market).  The tariff was battled out in the Congress, the least
insulated of the three branches from popular political pressure.  Although Bensel terms
7 There are, of course, many sources for this, but for political-economic implications see Bensel,
Political Economy of American Industrialization; and also C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New
South, 1877-1913, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951).  Bensel considers the
tariff to be one of three major policies of the Republican coalition effort at industrialization (the
others being building a national market and the gold standard).  However, he also claims that while it
was essential politically, in terms of economics it was less important than the other two (512-518). 
8 Woodward, Origins of the New South.  Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The
Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 1992)
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the tariff the least essential of the three major policies (so that Congressional
contestation did not so seriously threaten the political economic program as a whole),
the contentiousness with which it was fought belies Chandler's assertion that it did not
much matter.9  
Public Pressure.  The political process often involves public pressure, but this only
rarely shows up in Chandler's narrative.  When states did not provide wanted rules it is
because public sentiment did not allow it.  Thus when railroads petitioned Congress to
make pooling contracts enforceable in courts of law, Congress resisted due to adverse
public pressure (141), and as noted above, public sentiment did not favor cartel
agreements to be enforceable in court.  On the other hand, legislation to protect local
retailers from wholesalers and department stores failed (237).  And when corporations
needed a statute to merge or act as holding companies, New Jersey quickly
accommodated them (319).  Chandler sees the first of these as rare, and the last of
these as the normal circumstance.  He provides no explanation for when and why
public pressure will be successful.    
Chandler does not systematically theorize about the appropriate extent of
government regulation or settings of standards.  In his view public policy did not have
a significant impact on the character of the large industrial business organization.
Rather, he argues that the revolution in transportation and communication led to the
possibility of mass markets, which were best exploited by the systematic managerial
coordination.
9 Bensel, Political Economy of American Industrialization.
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Chandler's theory of corporate development might seem compatible with
Ronald Coase's theorem on property rights.   The Coase theorem states that as long as
clear and stable property rights are defined, individuals will maximize utility,
resources will be put to their most productive uses, and social wealth will be
maximized.  Changing a liability rule, or other property right, may well allocate wealth
in one direction or another, but the impact on overall social wealth will not change.10
Thus it does not matter what the property rights are, so long as they are both clear and
stable.  This roughly comports with Douglass North's emphasis on clear and stable
property rights.  North emphasizes the importance of transaction costs, whereas Coase
defines them out of this theory.  Neither distinguishes between types of property rights
that might be more or less conducive to rapid economic growth, although Coase is
more explicit, and adamant, that the content of the law will not alter the overall social
product.     
Both Chandler and Coase treat the market as natural, and both recognize the
importance of property rights.  If we introduce legal imperatives to the Chandlerian
process, however, these theories are no longer compatible.  Chandler argues that the
large corporation is more efficient than mere market transactions.  According to him,
property rights laws that encourage large industrial corporations thus allow for greater
efficiency and a greater social product than laws that do not.  The import of this is
most apparent in Scale and Scope.  There Chandler identifies legal rules regarding
cartels and pools as the cause of differing trajectories of business development in
10 R. H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. III, (Oct.)
1960: 1-44.
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Germany, England, and America. The acceptance of cartel contracts as legally
enforceable in Great Britain retarded the development of the large industrial
corporation.11  If this is so, then it does matter what the law is: rapid industrial
development is more likely under laws conducive to the Chandlerian process.  
 Legal Standards  
This analysis above shows that Chandler's narrative does allude to legal
problems and political conflicts.  Yet, as Richard Bensel notes, Chandler downplays
political developments, and under-theorizes the political problems involved in creating
legal rules.12   It is the thesis of this chapter that while Chandler plays down the
importance of legal requirements, many of these elements can nevertheless be derived
from his work.  In the process the importance of these legal provisions to the
developmental process is clarified.  Despite this, there are some areas of the law that
do not play a notable part in Chandler's narrative.  These areas impact development.
The purpose of this section is to identify these areas of the law.  
Challenges to Chandler's thesis assert that efficiency fails as an explanation for
why firms consolidated, and fails to explain why these same firms were able to
succeed as large industrial entities.  These take a variety of tacks, and I will review
three examples here.  Naomi Lamoreaux agrees that Chandler is right to point to
market forces, but that he nevertheless misses a major dynamic impacting corporate
11 Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge: Belknap Press,
1990). 
12 Bensel, Political Economy of American Industrialization, 6-8.
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consolidation.  She distinguishes between firms in rapidly growing markets and those
where market shares were relatively stable.   Consolidations, she asserts, were more
likely in industries with unstable, rapidly growing markets than in those with stable
market shares.  The horizontal consolidation movement of 1895-1904 was triggered by
the economic depression of the 1890’s.  The poor economy led to real pain for firms,
particularly for those growing, but unsettled industries.  They consolidated in order to
rationalize markets in the face of “ruinous” competition.  
In a similar vein, Neil Fligstein argues that the merger movement was an
attempt to gain "direct control" over markets.  He asserts that overproduction rather
than efficiency best explains this.13   He demonstrates that the best predictor of
whether a firm would merge with others in its industry was whether it had attempted
earlier to form a cartel.  Thus the motivation for merger was not economies of scale,
but rather market control.  This is supported by Lamoreaux's evidence that vertically
integrated firms were not more likely to merge than other firms, and that firms in
industries where market share was highly contested were more likely to merge than
those in industries with stable market shares.14  This also suggests that horizontal
mergers were sought to gain market control.
A third, more direct critique, comes from William G. Roy.  He argues that the
rise of corporate capitalism is best explained better by a theory of power relations.15
13 Fligstein, Transformation of Corporate Control, 65-7.
14 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 90-94.
15 William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997)
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Property relations are defined and enforced by the state.  In his view, the rise of the
large corporation involved a fundamental shift in the nature of corporate “rights,
entitlements, and obligations.”  These favored a new corporate class over proprietary
industrial owners.  Capital was "socialized" and markets were constructed.  Ownership
became more liquid,   and capital was created by social agreement (capitalizing the
promise of future earnings), often mobilized from beyond the original owners.16  Using
a statistical analysis, he finds that those corporations that consolidated and captured
markets were not necessarily the most efficient.17  
According to Roy the most important merger joined together industrial capital
with finance capital.  These newly adopted organizational forms were isomorphic:
they resembled prior-existing forms.  European investment banks, particularly those in
England influenced the form of American investment banks.  Industrial capital in
America then copied these American investment banks.  The resulting state policy was
shaped to meet these needs.   Management was separated from ownership, and power
was concentrated in the former.  This led to interlocking directorates.  Many directors
either were investment bankers, or were responsible to investment bankers.
All three theses challenge Chandler's reasons for corporate consolidation.
Lamoreaux and Fligstein each argue for greater emphasis on a corporate desire for
market control rather than for efficiencies of scale and throughput.  Roy places greater
emphasis on legal construction, and finds access to power as the reason for the
16 Roy, Socializing Capital, 248;  The constructions of markets is derived from Karl Polanyi, The
Great Transformation, (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944). 
17 Roy, Socializing Capital, 26-40.
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construction of corporate laws.  
This is a fundamental disagreement.  Consolidation of two or more
corporations might have two distinct purposes: they could be formed to create greater
efficiencies or they could be formed to eliminate competition.  The first case
corresponds to the Chandlerian ideal of greater efficiency, the second to a power
theory of consolidation.  Nevertheless, they usually work together, and we can
identify areas of agreement as to which legal rules are most conducive to corporate
success.  
The areas of the law that deserve further elaboration include rules giving
greater concentration of power in boards of directors, rules regarding combination,
antitrust regulation, and limited liability. In what follows I examine these areas for
legal rules conducive to corporate growth.18 
Concentration of Power in the Board of Directors.  In standard economic theory
property rights adhere to owners.  Yet, as Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means show in
their classic study, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, ownership became
separated from control in the late nineteenth century.  Shareholders became more or
less passive investors, and the board of directors gained control over firm operations.
This thesis has been widely recognized since.  
 Measuring control of management vis-à-vis shareholders is not a precise
science.  Berle and Means detail a number of methods by which the board can gain
18 Roy identifies three areas of law in his development in Socializing Capital.  These are intercorporate
stock ownership, the concentration of power in boards of directors, and limited liability.  Roy,
Socializing Capital, 149-154, 175.
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power.  This includes both legal means and extra-legal means.19   Those that are
accomplished by legal means were put into place via statutory law, by common law, or
by a combination of both.  Statutes often determined who had power to make major
decisions affecting the finances of the corporation.  Among these decisions are the
ability to increase or decrease the corporation's amount of capital stock, the power to
borrow money or issue bonds, and the power to make major transactions, including the
purchase of another firm.  The most restrictive laws required a formal change of the
charter, with unanimous or a supermajority of shareholders to make the relevant
decision.  Giving the board a formal role, lowering the threshold of shareholder
approval, or removing shareholder participation altogether tilted power into the hands
of management.
Other statutory devices that shift power to management include the power to
issue multiple classes of securities, the timing for issuing these same securities, and
the discretion to buy back shares.20  Multiple classes of stock provide an opportunity
for management to shift money such that one class benefits at the expense of others.
Another shareholder right Berle and Means identify is the preemptive right.  If a
corporation decides to issue new shares of stock, shareholders with the preemptive
right may purchase that new issue in the same proportion as their existing holdings.
This allows them to retain the same proportion of ownership as before the issue.
19 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (New
York: Macmillan, 1937), 70.  
20 Ibid., 143, 160-61, 174, 191.  There are additional powers that may accrue to management, including
the power to control accounting (202), and to alter the original contract rights of securities holders
(207).  However, these advances occur after 1900, the period of study here.
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States need not require a preemptive right, and those that weaken this right strengthen
the hand of management.21  
States allowed corporations to make contracts.  In making some contracts,
corporations made purchases.  Some states allowed certain purchases to be made with
corporate stock.  The question then arose as to the value of the purchases, including
who had authority to make the final determination.  Roy has a measure of
management's ability to value these purchases without input from the shareholders.
He uses this as a proxy for a states' propensity to place more power in management.
This is an important corporate right.  However, it is only one.  Part of my argument is
that states adopted different strategies for regulating corporations.  A narrow proxy
such as Roy uses here may or may not accurately reflect the extent to which state
statutes shifted power from the shareholders to management.
Berle and Means also discuss extra-legal means by which power can be shifted
from ownership to management.  These are outside the political process.  The most
important such shift in power resulted simply from the process of spreading ownership
among large numbers of shareholders such that no one individual or even small group
of individuals could own more than a fraction of a percent of the enterprise.  In this
case, if there is a majority of small stockholders situated similarly, the collective action
problem will nonetheless render them unlikely to be able to combine their strength.  
Berle and Means list five types of ownership structures.  An individual might
have complete ownership, in which they have full control; might have majority
21 Ibid., 145-6.
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ownership, which will also result in complete control; or might use a legal devise
without majority ownership that nevertheless provides full control.  There can also be
minority control, whereby a minority stockholder has a significant stake while all
others have only a very small stake.  This effectively gives control to the former.
Finally, when ownership is sufficiently diffuse, so that no one shareholder has more
than a very small percent ownership of the firm, then either a minority will be in
control, or management control will be in control.22  Obviously this will vary
depending on particular dynamics of an individual firm.  The point is that these
variations in management ownership are not legislated, and are not developed in case
law.
It is worth noting that the merger movement from 1895-1904 was
characterized by such a change in ownership structure.  Martin Sklar's term of
proprietary capitalism reflects control by family firms and otherwise cohesive groups.
Corporate capitalism reflects the ownership of large numbers of shareholders such that
no single individual had control via stock holdings alone.  The shift towards
managerial specialization and control that Chandler celebrates resulted in part from
this extra-legal dynamic, and in part from changes in the statutes.  
The extra-legal means of corporate control presents a challenge for any study
of management-shareholder relations.  The question immediately arises, to what extent
is management control via extra-legal means “natural”?   The creation of the private
corporation is a governmental act designed to enable private actors to organize capital.
22 Ibid., 70.  
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Most states from the start had no limit on the maximum number of shareholders for a
given firm, although some had limits on the minimum number.  Early practice of most
corporations was centralization around a proprietary firm.  Investors put money in the
firm based in part on the reputation of the management, which had a significant
stakeholder share.23  
The classical (and neoclassical) maximization postulate suggests that
individuals seek to better their condition.  New Institutional Economics suggests
individuals in a given institutional setting will seek to further their interests within the
constraint of the established institutions.  I would simply note that as corporations
transformed from proprietary firms into corporate capital firms listed on stock
markets, the institutional structure needed to diffuse ownership was already in place.
No further law needed to be passed; all that was necessary was greater size. It was, in
essence, an unanticipated consequence of the institutional structure of corporate
markets as they evolved in the late nineteenth century.  
We might expect that extra-legal means as identified by Berle and Means were
constant across the states.   The extra-legal means of management functioned in any
state which framed charter law to permit multiple owners (virtually all did).  Thus any
advantage a state had in attracting corporate capital would accrue based on the legal
provisions discussed as discussed above.  This would be convenient.  
On closer reflection, however, it is not clear that this extra-legal means of
23 For a discussion of this practice regarding banks, see Naomi Lamoreaux, Insider Lending: Banks,
Personal Connections, and Economic Development in Industrial New England, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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centralization was truly independent of state law.  Large size and the ability to
combine operations via merger greatly increase the likelihood of large firms with large
numbers of shareholders.  State restrictions on size of capital would serve to restrict
the capacity for extra-legal means of managerial control to materialize.  A strict
limitation of capital, if low enough, would not permit enough individual owners to
have a share in the company.   The ability to combine operations, whether via merger
or inter-corporate stock ownership, permits firms to get much larger very quickly.
Statutory law in these areas affects the impact of extra-legal means of corporate
control within a state.  Other restrictions, such as limitations on real estate, might have
a more limited, but similar impact restricting large size.
It is likely, furthermore, that some states used specific policies to purposely
place greater control in management.  Eliminating the need for shareholder approval of
major transactions is a likely example.  Other policies that centralized management
power  probably did so unintentionally.  Provisions that permitted firms to issue
multiple classes of stock likely were intended to encourage capital formation, and not
to give greater power to management.  Similarly, states that allowed large size by
raising capital limits or allowing mergers might well have intended to sanction large
size without intending to centralize management control. 
Managerial centralization encourages the Chandlerian process by facilitating
strategic planning.   Some elements of law are directed specifically towards this end,
such as removing shareholder impediments to management actions.   Others, such as
permitting large size or mergers are also facilitative, though enacted for a purpose
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other than management centralization.  Nevertheless, these size and combinations
provisions work with the Chandlerian imperative, not against it.  
Pooling and Cartels.  The demise of cartels is a fulcrum point on which the rise of the
large corporation turned.  Recall that Chandler regards pools and cartels as a roadblock
to efficient managerial coordination.   In Roy’s analysis, pools and cartels were not a
response to the problem of internal organization to coordinate throughput, but rather
an attempt to “rationalize” industries and to discipline markets.  Earlier in the century
local pooling was an accepted activity that reduced “ruinous” competition at the local
level.  Thus pools and cartels were not new; what was new was the effort to establish
these on a national level.24  Prohibition of pooling occurred when the state imposed a
vision of what was “natural” vis-à-vis the markets.     
Any contract results in at least a partial restraint on trade.  In mid-nineteenth
century common law tradition, general restraints on trade were forbidden but a partial
restraint was legal.  Although legal, these agreements were not enforceable in courts of
law.  Pooling agreements were in use after 1860, but it was only in the 1880's that
pooling was considered to be a “general restraint on trade.”25  Although the judiciary
refused to sanction contracts in restraint of trade, parties to these contracts were not
subject to prosecution.26    Freedom from prosecution in such instances, however, is
not the key point for the Chandlerian process.  What matters, rather, is enforceability
in courts of law.  Without that enforceability, a cartel will fail in its efforts to
24 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation. 184.
25 Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1991), 276-8.
26 Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement, 162.
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coordinate market activity.  
Roy and Chandler disagree on the original purpose of pools, but agree in the
effects of their prohibition.  From the Chandlerian perspective, pools and cartels were
an example of experimentation by entrepreneurs as business actors sought to
rationalize production.  I simply add that pools were evidently conducive to industrial
development during the period they were used.   But it is unlikely they would have
been so at a more advanced level of industrialization.27  
Combinations.  The very essence of the corporation consolidation movement was the
combination of capital via merger or by the formation of holding companies.  We can
usefully categorize combinations as trusts, holding companies, or mergers.  The former
allowed for the least leverage for management coordination, while the latter allowed
for the most.
The trust was a “loose” combination.  Stockholders traded in their stock
certificates for each firm for trust certificates for the trust.  The companies did not
combine operations, but their output and pricing was directed from the central office.
All sought in some form to prevent unreasonable restraints on trade, meaning market
coordination of output or prices.  As noted earlier, the first trust was formed by
Standard Oil in 1882.  Only a half dozen or so other trusts were formed during the
ensuing eight years.  Several states passes antitrust provisions in 1889, and the federal
government passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.  These made the trust form of
27 Chandler makes this point more forcefully in Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial
Capitalism (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1990).  Here he shows that in Great Britain cartels were
legal, and tended to dominate.  Chandler credits Britain’s relative decline in industrial success
(compared to the United States and Germany) in large measure this cartelistic dominance.
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organization illegal.  
The holding company is a second type of combination.  It is a corporation
created to own other corporations.  With a controlling interest, a company is able to
direct its subordinate corporation's operations.  Nevertheless, management in a holding
company is less likely to be closely integrated as in a pure consolidation.  The extent
of corporate holdings other corporations may range from minority ownership to a
controlling interest.
It is useful to distinguish between companies that can purchase corporate
securities, and those that are formed solely to hold stocks in other companies.  The
former has a line of business as their primary object.  Such firms may have an interest
in vertical or horizontal holding of corporate securities.  Vertical inter-corporate
stockholding might allow a firm to secure a stable supply of raw materials by holding
shares in a firm that supplies those materials.  This is holding stock by moving
“upstream” towards supply.  Holding corporate stock of a railroad to insure product
distribution is moving “downstream” into distribution.   
The second type exists solely to control other firms.  Technically, only these
are true holding companies.  In either case, the holding company may direct output and
price, and might well include an upper management that directs corporate strategy, but
this firm will not be able to coordinate throughput with the same degree of
effectiveness as an outright merger.28  
28 This definition of the holding company is consistent with that in chapter one of James C. Bonbright
and Gardiner C. Means, The Holding Company: Its Public Significance and its Regulation (New
York:  McGraw-Hill, 1932). They, in addition to effective control of a company holding stock in
other companies emphasize four features: centralized control, unified financing, pyramided stock
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Bonbright and Means claim that the holding company as a means of control
was not used significantly until after the E.C. Knight decision of 1895.  Following the
Northern Securities case, which dissolved that particular holding company,
corporations became less likely to form holding companies and more likely to merge,
as direct merger was seen as more legally secure.29 
Both forms of holding company provide for the possibility of leverage,
sometimes with multiple layers of management.  For example, ownership of 50% of a
subsidiary allows for full control over its operations (except for where a supermajority
of stock is necessary for a decision).  If that subsidiary company itself owns 50% of
another company, then the original corporation can control the sub-subsidiary with
only 25% ownership.  Multiple tiering in this manner can thus provide for great
leverage of control.  From a Chandlerian point of view, while the holding company
may allow for the coordination of price and output, it is less capable of coordinating
details of production and distribution compared to a fully integrated company.  On the
other hand, it allows for greater flexibility in buying and selling assets.  Thus it makes
it easier to undo a faulty business decision compared to a merger.
A merger is the “tightest” form of combination: there the companies combine
operations in an integrated whole. The late 1890's and early 1900's witnessed a “great
control and  capital inflation. The first three I deal with.  Capital inflation was the issuance of stock
in excess of what the subordinate company could get away with, because the subordinate company
was subject to restrictive regulations that a parent company might not be.  While its motives are
similar to stock watering (where stock is issued in excess of the value of the constituent parts of a
combined corporation), in theory at least, there were assets backing the securities.  Stock watering,
however, was a significant issue in the late nineteenth century.
29 Bonbright and Means, The Holding Company.  See especially p. 66-72.  The draw on data from
Eliot Jones, The Trust Problem in the United States, (New York, 1928), esp. p. 40.
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merger movement.”  From 1895-1904  some 1800 firms consolidated into about 200
much larger entities.30  These companies had large numbers of shareholders, power
concentrated in management, and listings on stock exchanges.  The merger movement
was possible only with a legal environment conducive to merger.  
A variation on a straight merger is the asset transfer model, where corporate
assets are bought by a “parent.”  Rather than a merger of equals it is the acquisition of
the entirety of a corporation's assets by another.  Functionally, the tightness of the
operations depended on the management of the acquiring company.  The acquiring
company does not have to alter its management structure to make the acquisition as a
result of the transaction.  It becomes feasible in part if the acquiring corporation can
issue some form of debt representing its new acquisition.31  
Limited Liability.  Limited liability was not a universal policy in the 19th century.
This is probably not  appreciated as widely as it should be.  Horwitz notes that "truly
limited shareholder liability was far from the norm in America even as late as 1900."32
For example, New York experimented with double liability for banks in the first half
of the century.33  As a result of the variation in state policies, Hurst downplays the
30 Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904.
31 See Hovenkamp, 255-7.
32 Horwitz, Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal
Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 94.  By contrast Chandler barely mentions
limited liability, and appears to consider it a natural constituent element of the corporate form of
existence.  See The Visible Hand, 36-7.
33 David A. Moss and Sarah Brennan, “Managing Money Risk in Antebellum New York: From
Chartered Banking to Free Banking and Beyond,” Studies in American Political Development 15:2
(2001), 138-62.  See also L. Ray Gunn, The Decline of Authority: Public Economic Policy and
Political Development in New York, 1800-1860, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 121, 227,
231-34, 236; and Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation, 1784-
1855: Broadening the Concept of Public Service During Industrialization, (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1982), 69-72, 190-2, 183-6, 192-4, 256-8.
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importance of limited liability, emphasizing the pooling of resources under centralized
control.34  Early 19th century law conceived of the corporation as a trust fund for
shareholders.  This doctrine was applicable to a world where the corporation was an
artificial entity entrusting to hold assets for the shareholders.  Thus additional liability
in certain circumstances made sense.  The trust fund doctrine eroded in late in the
century.  Over time, in common law, shareholders began to be conceived as mere
investors.35  Limited liability was an essential element of this doctrinal transformation.
Roy measures state variation of limited liability by whether they have
provisions for additional shareholder liability to be paid to mechanics and laborers.36
Thus shareholders would be liable for monies owed over and above their contributions
when, at dissolution, wages were due to the employees.  Provisions such as these
ought to have an impact on the Chandlerian process.  Unlimited liability encourages
shareholders to actively oversee the corporation, thus restricting management
discretion.  
Antitrust.  The politics of antitrust is one area where the legal process cannot
be missed, even by Chandler.  Most such scholarly attention has focused on federal, as
opposed to state, antitrust policy.  Martin Sklar has demonstrated that the court
declined to follow common law precedents that the act’s authors might reasonably
have expected to be applied by the court, given that the act borrowed language from
the common law.  The Supreme Court refused to recognize otherwise widely accepted
34  J. Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation, (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 1970), 25-6.  
35 Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960, 94.
36 Roy, Socializing Capital, 175.
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common law between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade.  The Trans-
Missouri (1897) case redefined the Sherman Act so that all combinations in restraint of
trade were illegal, not merely those that were “unreasonable,” in contrast to prior
common law practice.37   I accept Sklar's analysis as a point of departure for the
analysis of state antitrust actions.
The corporate question arose in the states before it arose in the nation, and
some states enacted antitrust policies before the Sherman Act of 1890.  States had two
means of controlling the corporation.  The first was statutory corporation law, and the
second was common law actions against restraints on trade.38  The first was arguably
the stronger lever of the two, because it creates the very possibility of corporate
existence.39  As late as the 1890's it was conceivable that states could control the
corporation via statutory corporate law.40  Statutory law relaxed limitations on size,
mergers, intercorporate stock holding, and other means of consolidation or agreement
between firms.  This is the very subject of this dissertation.  
Statutory law could cut across state lines.  States' economies were impacted by
firms chartered in other states.  A state could combat this by placing restrictions on
foreign corporations.  However the ability of a state to restrict corporations from other
37  Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 100-1, 127.  See also Hans Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust
Policy: Origination of an American Tradition, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1955). U.S. v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Association (166 U.S. 290). 
38 Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 244-5.
39 Hovenkamp argues that corporation law was a poor device for selecting between harmful mergers
that spawned monopoly or uncompetitive behavior, and those mergers that were efficient or
economically beneficial.   Enterprise and American Law, 266.  By contrast Lamoreaux argues
corporation law was a stronger tool than antitrust law.  Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement,
162.
40 McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision”, 1-3.
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states was limited by the practice of comity.  By this principle, states accommodated
foreign corporations on much the same footing as domestic corporations, with the
expectation that the other state would similarly treat corporations chartered in its state.
As some states liberalized their laws, corporations chartered under these liberal
policies were positioned to capture markets in the more restrictive states.  This tended
to undermine statutory corporation law, the strongest state method of control.  
After the 1890's states largely abandoned regulating objectionable antitrust
activity via statutory law, although they would continue some prosecutions via
common law restraints of trade.41  Restraints of trade as a means of state control could
be effective only if the provisions were enforced.  The history of this enforcement,
although significant, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Suffice it to note that
vigorous enforcement need not inhibit the Chandlerian imperative.  Sklar details the
Roosevelt and Taft Administration's in the vigor in instigating restraint of trade
prosecutions.  Sklar notes that Taft instigated twice as many such actions in under half
the time as Roosevelt.  Taft sought to follow common law understanding of
unreasonable restraints of trade, prosecuted in the judicial arena.42  Yet Taft was also
amenable to large corporations.   While restraint of trade prosecutions this might cause
concern to individual businessmen, so long as the unacceptable activities were clearly
demarcated, and still permitted consolidations and large size, then the Chandlerian
41 Thorelli and McCurdy each argue states abandoned statutory policy with the turn of the century.
Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 265, 596; McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision”, 304, 322;
Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 244 n12.  Hovenkamp argues that states continued with
common law restraints of trade prosecutions even after this.  Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American
Law, 244-5.
42 See Chapter 5 in Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 333-82.
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imperative could be met.  This was the case under the Taft formulation.  
The question regarding antitrust is whether it hinders or aids corporate
development.  Chandler argues that antitrust policy merely reinforced managerial
imperatives.  By this he appears to mean that antitrust policy furthered corporate
consolidation that he argues would have taken place in any case.  As Arnold Paul
notes, however, the conservative judicial reaction in favor of corporate consolidation
in the E. C. Knight decision was rooted in response to the threat of the populist
uprising upsetting the established economic order.43  This policy was by no means
assured.
A Standard for Statutory Incorporation Law
Part of the Chandlerian process involved the capacity to experiment with
different organization forms.   This may involve a single firm's reversal from a failed
organizational structure, or demise in the process of creative destruction.  For
Chandler the political ideal is a society-centered application of business incorporation
law that promotes administrative coordination.  Chandler's narrative downplays the
role of politics as ancillary to the harnessing of economies of throughput and size.
Nevertheless, Chandler’s narrative still required that the political system adapt the
corporate form to new imperatives of scale and scope.  Without changes in legal
rights, the large corporation would not have been possible.  There would have been a
greater likelihood of entrenchment of business forms with more limited coordinating
43 Arnold Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of the Bar and Bench, 1887-1895
(New York: Harpers Torchbooks, 1969).
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capacities. 
The above critique points to a variety of political factors that contributed to
corporate development.  Nevertheless, for the purposes of deriving standards for the
purpose of fostering rapid economic development, they alter Chandler's standards only
slightly.  The following are the key principles that are conducive to efficiencies of
scale and scope.
A.  Legislation should facilitate managerial specialization, including the
separation of management from ownership.  Managerial coordination is
necessary to harness economies of scale and scope.  Laws that enhance managerial
capacities are preferable to those that do not.  Concentration of power in boards of
directors leads to specialization of both middle and upper management.  This
allows “visible hand” coordination of purchasing, manufacturing throughput, and
marketing.  Policies that promote organizational forms that inhibit centralized
coordination are not desirable. 
B.  Laws should permit large size.  A large corporate size permits managerial
coordination and concomitant economies of scale and scope.  This can come from
internal expansion, vertical integration or horizontal combination.  
C. Laws must be conducive to mergers.  Mergers that promote economies of scale
and scope are beneficial.  Not all mergers will accomplish this, but the market
should weed out failures.  Mergers directed towards short-term market control will
be unlikely to develop coordinating capabilities needed to succeed in the long run.
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Mergers with businesses outside one’s core competencies are less important.
Holding companies are less important because there is less likelihood of
comprehensive managerial coordination.
D.  General Laws are superior to special acts of the legislature.   Laws that
facilitate managerial coordination should not be reward charters based on
favoritism.  General laws are preferable to special acts of the legislature.  
E.  Legislation that promotes cartelistic behavior should be discouraged.
Cartelistic behavior inhibits centralization of managerial coordination.  In the
absence of market sharing arrangements via cartels, consolidation is more likely,
and thus there will be the possibility for centralized control.
F.  Antitrust legislation should reinforce market imperatives.  In practice this
means that large horizontal and vertical mergers should be permitted.  Antitrust
policy should only discourage collusive price gouging.  This means that firms that
do not engage in predatory behavior should not be prosecuted, and also that firms
should be free to experiment with different business strategies to harness the
economies of scale and scope.
G.  Expansion to related products.  A corporation must be able to extend the range
of their business to exploit related products and technologies in order to take full
advantage of economies of scale and scope.  This may take the form of vertical or
horizontal expansion or vertical by horizontal or vertical integration.    
H. Power in Boards of Directors.  Central direction is facilitated by control in the
board of directors.  Statutory elements that contribute to this control include the
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power to value assets purchases with corporate stock, to value intangible assets, to
issue multiple classes of stock, to buy back shares, to set the timing of dividends, to
make major transactions without shareholder approval, and the weakening of
preemptive shareholder rights.
I.  Limited Liability for Shareholders.  There should not be requirements on
shareholders for extra liability.
By emphasizing the legal aspects of industrialization, I derive a most un-
Chandlerian standard.  Chandler emphasizes the replacement of market transactions
with managerial coordination.  Nevertheless, his position emphasizes the market as the
driving force for corporate transformation.  The standard here, rather, emphasizes the
interaction of the firm, the political system, and the economy.
In crafting this evaluative standard from Chandler’s narrative and from critical
elaborations I seek to avoid normative evaluation.  I accept that Chandler is largely
correct that rapid industrial development is more likely with centralized control of
oligopolistic corporations.  Thus large corporate size might well facilitate the unequal
accumulation of wealth, and it might well not be conducive to participation in civic
life.  Concentration of power in management might well be at once conducive to
economic development and also unfair.  As Burnham has noted, accumulation in the
initial stages of industrialization has been a brutal process in many, if not all
instances.44  That does not mean the Chandlerian process does not facilitate more rapid
44 Walter Dean Burnham, “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe”, 59 American
Political Science Review, (1965), 7-28, 24; see also comments by Bensel, Political Economy of
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industrial development than would otherwise occur.
The ideal corporate structure may well include more significant restraints on
management.  This is a problem of precisely crafting management incentives so that
they pursue Chandlerian goals.  There is a tension between shareholder oversight of
management to insure it makes decisions in the interest of the shareholders, and
liberalizing corporation law so that management has freedom to make strategic and
financial decisions with dispatch.  Chandler does not provide a theory of the proper
extent of government regulation.  Such a theory might well have both an economic





Incorporation Law in the States
This chapter describes the broad contours of corporation law for manufacturing
companies in 35 states from 1865-1900.  I categorize statutory corporation law
according to the standards developed in the preceding chapter, reorganizing them into
four major areas.  The first area involves the basic contours of corporate existence;
these are constitutive provisions.  This includes the establishment of general laws of
incorporation,  provisions for the range of legitimate corporate purposes, and limits on
term of existence, on capital stock, and on property rights.  The second area  involves
internal corporate governance.   This includes placing power in boards of directors,
the location of authority to make major financial decisions, and the ability to offer
special classes of stock.  The third area involves limited liability of shareholders and of
directors.  The fourth area involves the right to form combinations.  This includes the
power to merge, and to purchase stock of other corporations.
The division into these categories is somewhat artificial, in that the areas of
corporation law overlap.  Thus for example, a provision that extends corporate objects
will impact an otherwise narrowly written general law.  The ability to offer multiple
classes of stock impacts the ability to alienate corporate property, yet also contributes
to concentration of power in directors.  However, this taxonomy tends to render the
various provisions more intelligible than they would be otherwise.
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States often wrote separate laws for different classes of organizations, one of
which was manufacturing.  Manufacturing firms can be distinguished from
organizations formed for purposes such as insurance, railroads, canals, turnpikes,
banking, savings and loans, or cemetery associations: manufacturing firms were not so
directly affected with the public interest—they were not public utilities or
transportation infrastructure.1  It was the manufacturing laws that evolved into the
general business incorporation law.2  
The data for this study are drawn from the various revised statutes and
consolidated codes from 35 states.  These are the states that were in the Union at the
end of the Civil War.3   States during this period issued revised compilations of their
laws typically every 10 to 20 years. Most were published by authority of the state, but
in some states there were also private compilations.  The quality of annotation for
these books varied.  Some publications clearly referenced the session laws and
relevant court decisions; others merely reported the laws in force at the date of
publication, making a precise genealogy difficult to ascertain.  Where possible (and
useful), I supplemented the statutory revisions with the state session laws.4  A list of
1 The distinction of firms “affected with the public interest” was made in Munn v. Illinois (94 U. S.
113, 4 Otto 113 [1876]), where the Supreme Court ruled that states had the authority to regulate
firms that “becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public
consequence, and affect the community at large”. 
2 That is not to say that all innovations occurred first in the manufacturing law.  Some provisions were
first developed in regards to railroads.  See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., [Material For Studies Of The Legal
Development Of Corporations In Various States], (New York: s.n., 1932.  These are unpublished
notes on file at Columbia University Law Library.
3 I omit South Carolina due to lack of data.  Excluded are territories existing at the end of the Civil
War, although many of these became states during the period under study.  These states, of course,
were located in the West.  As a rule, undeveloped states had fairly simple corporation laws, as did
territories.  It is notable then, that the aspect of sovereignty that rural yet growing territories
exercised included corporation law.   
4 I wish to thank Richard Bensel for providing me access to his private collection of revised statutes,
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compilations I used for this study is provided in the Appendix.
I seek here to render the complexity of corporation law, even as I try to present
summaries of state law in as simple a manner as possible.  I present a number of tables
making comparisons of state policies by section, constructed with 12 year intervals.5
The dates of observation are 1865, 1876, 1888, and 1900.  1865 is the first year of this
study, chosen because it marks the end of the Civil War, delineating a takeoff point for
American industrialization.  1888 marks the first year of the New Jersey statutes: New
Jersey at that time liberalized its laws to benefit a particular firm.  Only in the next
year would it more systematically examine and liberalize its charter law (more on this
below).  1900 marks the end of this study.  This is a somewhat arbitrary cut off point;
one could argue just as well to continue the study up to 1914, the onset of World War
I, and the end of the reforms of the Woodrow Wilson Administration.  However, the
merger movement occurred from 1895-1904; and most provisions allowing it to take
place were themselves in place by 1900.  1876 is chosen as a mid-point between 1865
and 1888; it also distinguishes between reconstruction and post-reconstruction.
Conveniently, each interval is 12 years.  
Several observations follow from the data.  The first has to do with patterns of
development.  Corporation law in the Northeast was more developed than in the South
and West.  Nevertheless, the South and West did have corporation law provisions, and
which is many times more extensive than any library I am aware of.   The Tarlton Law Library at the
University of Texas at Austin has an excellent collection of session laws dating back to the founding.
It holds complete collections for many states, although, regrettably, for other states the holdings are
spotty.
5 I use the same sectional division used by Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict
and Change in American Foreign Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
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several were amenable to the corporate capital, should it wish to employ resources
there.  Second, states used a variety of different provisions to restrain the corporation.
We can see this in the variety of restrictions on corporate capital, on term of existence,
on legitimate objects, and the like.  Thus there was wide variation on corporate policy
even within regions.  Third, the states experimented with the different levers of
organization.   This resulted in different combinations of laws that gave power to the
corporation, even as states sought to constrained that power. Were we to only look at
one area of statutory law, we might incorrectly characterize the overall character of a
state's corporation law.  Rather, we must examine the overall character of the law to
accurately depict state policy.
Fourth, there was a gradual relaxation of corporation law across the states.
Were we to only look for say a ten or twenty year period in a few areas of corporation
law, we would not see much change.  Conversely, looking at a number of states across
only one or two areas of corporation law also would not show much evidence of
change.  However, when we look at all of the states in a number of different areas of
the law over a 35 year period of time, we see substantial change that seriously
impacted the trajectory of corporate development.  
Fifth, New Jersey has been regarded as the leader of the “race to the bottom,”
due to a significant liberalization from 1888-93.  Yet virtually every provision of the
New Jersey laws existed in somewhere else, typically at least 20 years earlier.  The
New Jersey innovation was in assembling already existing statutory provisions into a
unified liberal policy.  This development reflected an evolution in mindsets over
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appropriate  corporate attributes.  The New Jersey laws would have been
inconceivable 20 years earlier.  
Finally, the pattern of development of corporation law is humbling for those
who wish a simple theory of corporate development.  Because states pursued different
strategies, we cannot look to only one or a few areas of corporation policy as
indicators of liberalization.  That there is a sectional pattern is unsurprising.
However, it (obviously) does not explain regional variation.  By contrast, the degree of
capital concentration in the states does help explain the variation.
Characteristics of Major Corporate Rights 
Constitutive Provisions
General Laws.  A general law for corporations makes the acquisition of a charter a
matter of right for any applicant that meets the established criteria.  This right takes
discretion away from legislatures, and in theory, out of the political process generally.
However the attributes of general laws were delineated by legislatures.  
At a minimum, all general laws grant a group  of individuals the right to form
an association and to become a body corporate.  They grant the corporation the right to
sue and be sued; to hold a capital stock; to engage in an economic activity (whether
narrowly or broadly defined); to buy, own, hold, and convey property (with or without
restrictions); to elect officers (with some specification on the mode of election); to call
meetings; to make by-laws; and to use a common seal.  The corporation typically also
has obligations.  These include the duty to elect officers in a timely manner; to meet
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capital requirements before commencing operations; to file certain records with the
state or the county clerk; and to follow restrictions in the law. 
Charters for business corporations in America date from the late eighteenth
century.6  Corporations at that time were chartered by special acts of the state
legislatures.  A classic example was the charter for the Charles River Bridge
Company.  That charter authorized that company to build a bridge between Boston and
Cambridge, Massachusetts.  The  company then had the right to collect tolls for a
specified number of years, which was later extended to 70 years.7  This company was
not allowed to pursue other objectives, or use its funds or resources for any other
purpose.  
Special legislative acts of incorporation would eventually be replaced by
general laws.  Corporate attributes and rights were made available to all applicants that
met a preset criteria.   The transition from special laws to general acts began in 1811,
but did not take off until  the 1840's.  The authorization of special acts continued
alongside general laws for many decades, and was not truly phased out until the
1870's.
The first general law for manufactures was established in New York in 1811.8
6 For a history of the early American practice of incorporation, see Joseph Stancliff Davis, Essays in
the Earlier History of American Corporations [Numbers I-III and Number IV], (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1917).  
7 This would lead to one of the more celebrated cases regarding the attributes of corporations,
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (11 Peters, 420; 193 [1837]).  There the Supreme Court
significantly modified the Dartmouth College case by ruling that the grant of rights in a charter did
not prevent the state from creating a similar charter for a rival firm, unless specified in the original
charter.  See  Stanley I. Kutler, Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge Case,
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1971). 
8 Ronald E. Seavoy, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 1784-1855:  Broadening the
Concept of Public Service During Industrialization. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1982), 9-29.
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Originally in force for five years, it was extended until superseded in 1848.  It limited
capitalization to $100,000, placed control in boards of directors, and limited the term
of existence to 20 years.  It specified the types of manufactures covered under the law;
other industries were not included.  The allowable industries were textiles, glass, steel,
anchors, bar iron, hoop iron, and sheet lead.  The firms typically had only a few
shareholders, and shares had a high value.  Incorporators filed a certificate with a local
official and a copy with the Secretary of State.9   
This act was ahead of its time.  The move towards general incorporation laws
did not become a regular feature of state laws until after 1840.  At that time it became
a constitutional issue as well.  Eleven states passed constitutional provisions that
prohibited states from passing special acts when the requisite objects could be
achieved by general law, beginning with New York in 1846. Table 3.1 lists the states
that did so, and the year of enactment. 
The movement towards general laws is said to be rooted in the Jacksonian
aversion to special privileges, whereby states sought to eliminate favoritism.10
However this movement did not occur until the middle to late 1840's, well after
Jackson has left office.  Further doubt is cast on this thesis by the pattern of states that
adopted constitutional provisions in prohibiting special acts of the legislature.  Of the
states that codified prohibitions against special laws, many were not Jackson
9  Ibid., 65.
10 See William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); 72-74.  J. Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the
Business Corporation.(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1970), 30-34. 
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bailiwicks.  The 1848 mean Democratic share of the two-party vote for President for
the five states in that election that eventually adopted a constitutional provision was
48.2%.  For the 24 states that did not adopt a constitutional provision the Democratic
share was 49.9%.11 
Despite this, many states nevertheless passed special acts as a matter of course,
even when general laws were available.  This could benefit a corporation that received
a right or privilege not easily available to competitors.  In New York, for example, the
state constitution gave the legislature the discretion to determine whether a general law
could or could not accommodate a particular need.  The state continued to write
special charters in significant numbers until 1875.  A host of Governors vetoed some
of these special acts, and repeatedly issued messages complaining about the
impropriety of writing special acts when general laws were available.12   One other
reason given for the movement to general charters was the heavy workload at imposed
on legislatures that passed large numbers of special acts in each session.     
 Not all state constitutions prohibited special acts, but by 1865  most states did
have laws on the books providing general laws for some or many industries (also often
provided for in their constitutions).  Only Kentucky, Louisiana, and Virginia did not
have some provision for general laws by then; by 1877, only Louisiana had no such 
11 Presidential data tabulated from Walter Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 1836-1892,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955).  Similar results obtain using 1832 presidential data.
12  Seavoy, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 193.  For Governor's messages and vetoes
see Charles Z. Lincoln, ed., Messages from the Governors, (Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, 1909),
vol. IV, 513-516, 521-524 (Hamilton Fish), 636-7 (Washington Hunt); vol. V., 129-131, 133-136,
191, 231 (Edwin D. Morgan); 711, 848-9 (Reuben E. Fenton); vol. VI, 167-9, 246, 353 (John T.
Hoffman); 639 (John A. Dix); vol. VII, 546-7, 565-6,  (Alonzo B. Cornell); vol. VII, 296-7 (David
B. Hill); vol. X, 110 (Theodore Roosevelt).
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Table 3.1 Constitutional Requirement for General Laws
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States codes above had a provision permitting the formation of 
corporations for any lawful purpose, even if they also had long 
lists of acceptable objects at the same time.  Firms would be 
included in this category even if they excluded several types of 
firms from the general law.  Typically such exclusions were for 
industries in some way closely affected with the public interest, 
such as banking, insurance, railroads, water, and etc.
provision.  However, the content of the general laws reveals a gradual broadening of
purposes, even as the states nevertheless sought to retain control over corporate
objects.  New York, California, Indiana, Delaware, Louisiana, Texas and Pennsylvania
repeatedly passed laws granting general laws to narrowly defined, specific industries.
Over time, they broadened the law to encompass a greater variety of industries.  The
specificity of corporate objects is evident in the following excerpt from a law in New
York that originally provided for corporations for “manufacturing, mining, mechanical
or chemical” purposes.  By 1890, shortly before repeal, the act read: 
 “At any time hereafter, any three or more persons who may desire to form a company for
the purpose of carrying on any manufacturing, mining, mechanical or chemical business,
or the business of printing, publishing, or selling books, pamphlets or newspapers, or
advertising the same or other articles, or for the purpose of purchasing, taking, holding
and possessing real estate and buildings, and selling leasing and improving the same, or
the business of making butter, cheese, concentrated or condensed milk, or any other
products of the dairy, or the business of erecting buildings for church sheds or laundry
purposes, and the carrying on of laundry business or the business of slaughtering animals,
or for the purpose of towing or propelling canal boats, vessels, rafts, or floats on the canals
and navigable rivers of the state of New York, by animal or steam-power, or for the
purpose of buying storing, selling, or shipping coal, merchandise and farm produce, their
operations not to be confined to the country* in which their certificates shall be filed, or
the supplying of hot water or hot air or steam for motive power, heating, cooking or other
useful applications in the streets and public and private buildings of any city, village or
town in this state, or the business of buying, breeding, grazing, pasturing, dealing in and
selling cattle, sheep, hogs, horses and other livestock in the United States of America,
British North America and elsewhere, may make, sign and acknowledge, before some
officer competent to take the acknowledgment of deeds....” 13   
The original act dated from 1848, the extensions were periodically added until 1890,
when New York made a major revision of its laws.  The addition of new objects to the
laws amounted to a set of industrial acts.  Pennsylvania pursued a similar strategy,
providing  a list 25 different categories of acceptable objectives by 1900.14  The
13  [*So in the original.] 1890 N.Y. Laws c. 508.  
14 1897 Pa. Laws p. 283 § 1 (15 July); Pa. Rev. Stat. p. 772 (Purdons, 1905)
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specificity of these acts provides evidence of a type of mentality regarding state control
over corporate activities; this mentality gradually gave way to include more activities,
and eventually pave the way for laws that allowed corporations to engage in any legal
purpose.   
In 1875 New York passed a general law that allowed manufacturing firms to
incorporate for any legal purpose, not merely from the list in the (later extended) 1848
statute.  Both sets of laws operated along side each other until 1890.15  The catch was
that firms chartered under the 1848 law could pursue only those objects that were
listed, and these had to be specified in the charter, while the 1875 law allowed them to
pursue any legal object, but limited the amount of capital.  Allowing a corporation to
pursue any lawful purpose, however, was not new.  Connecticut did so in1837, as did
other states later, such as California in 1870.16  Allowing a general law for any legal
purpose did not in and of itself constitute a liberal policy.  Connecticut had other
restrictions in place.  It did, however, get the legislature out of the business of
restricting general incorporation laws to specified areas.  Thus these legislatures kept
out of the business of mediating industrial acts.  By 1888, on the cusp of the New
Jersey laws, 18 states allowed a firm to incorporate for any legal purpose.  Intriguingly,
this provision was spread geographically across the country.  It does not exhibit a
sectional pattern.  It did, however, get the legislature out of the business of mediating
charter law for industries based on favoritism.  This provision was a key component of
the later New Jersey liberalizations.   
15 1875 N. Y. Laws c. 611.
16 Conn Gen. Stat. §393 (1866).  Cal. Civ. Code § 286 (1886).
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J. Willard Hurst argues that legislators in the middle of the nineteenth century
conflated concern over companies with special action privileges with the general
business corporation.  This led to them resisting granting liberal corporate rights.  He
acknowledges the need for restrictions for the former on the basis of concerns over
balance of power within the polity.  But he believes legislators and other actors of the
time were mistaken in placing the same concern for corporations chartered for general
purposes. Hurst does not believe that corporations chartered for general purposes
posed a threat to the balance of power in the polity.17   
This is a conclusion with which I disagree.  Corporations chartered under
general law could gain a balance of power advantage by extracting concessions from
lawmakers.  With general laws there may be more open competition for influence vis-
a-vis lawmakers than under political economy of specially chartered corporations.  So-
called “first movers” that pioneered the implementation of strategy or technology often
captured the bulk of their market.  They could then leverage this position to pursue
advantageous laws.  Any economic actor that gains a predominant position in the
economy has the potential for political influence.  This is manifest in numerous
studies, none less so than in Martin Sklar's analysis of antitrust law.18  
Expansion of Objects.  In 1865 then, most states had general laws, but general laws
restricted the activities of any one firm to objectives that were specified clearly in the
charter.  Many states restricted firms to only one such object.  State restraint of
17 J Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation, (Charlottesville, University of
Virginia Press, 1970), 44-8.
18 Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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legitimate objects works in conjunction with the legal concept of ultra vires.  The
doctrine of ultra vires asserted that actions beyond the charter were illegal, and hence,
actionable.19    Thus states could, for example, annul the charter and remove all
corporate rights of a corporation that pursued objects not specified or granted in the
charter.20
There is a theoretical import to the restriction of objects.  The Chandlerian
imperative requires managerial coordination of complex activities in areas where such
coordination is more efficient than market transactions.  This process may take the
form of vertical integration or horizontal consolidation.  It may also take the form of
expansion to related products that can be produced efficiently with proprietary
technologies and coordinating systems set.  The expansion to related objects allows
firms to harness their competitive advantages in new market areas.  When corporations
could not expand to related products, their ability to employ their technologies in order
to take full advantage of economies of scale and scope was limited.  
The range of state policies provides evidence of a different attitude toward
corporate activity at the end of the period than existed at the beginning.  In 1865 most
states restricted corporate activities to narrow areas specified in the general law.  The
list of permitted objects expanded in a number of states over the course of the next
thirty-five years.  By 1900 they were barely an impediment to corporate expansion.  
19  For a discussion of Ultra Vires see Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law,
1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy,  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 77-8
(Hereafter identified as.  Transformation of American Law II); and Clyde L. Colson, “The Doctrine
of Ultra Vires In the United States Supreme Court Decisions”, 17 West Virginia Law Quarterly n. 3
(1836) 179-217, esp. 184-89.
20 Such an action was known in the law as quo warranto.
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Table 3.2  Expansion of Corporate Objects
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1865 1876 1888 1900
North Connecticut none none charter charter
Delaware any
Illinois            any* any* any*
Indiana charter charter charter
Maine
Maryland any any any any
Massachusetts none none charter* charter*
Michigan charter charter charter
New Hampshire
New Jersey  vertical vertical charter/any
New York  industrial industrial 
Ohio charter/indust. charter/indust charter/indus charter/indus
Pennsylvania charter charter charter none
Rhode Island
Vermont none none none none
Wisconsin charter charter
South Alabama charter charter
Arkansas charter charter charter
Florida none none none none
Georgia
Kentucky charter
Louisiana charter charter charter charter
Mississippi none none none none
Missouri charter charter charter
North Carolina
Tennessee none none vertical** vertical**
Virginia none none none none
West Virginia charter/indus charter/indus.
West California
Iowa
Kansas    
Minnesota charter charter charter
Nebraska     
Oregon charter charter charter charter
Texas charter charter charter
If any, could expand to any object.
*Allowed expansion to any object authorized in the title.
**Selected industries only.
If blank, then the law was silent.
If none, then no expansion to other areas was permitted.  In some states amending of the 
charter could provide a way around this.
If vertical, the could expand vertically to materials acquisition businesses.
If industrial, could expand to areas of industry that were substantially the same
If charter, could explicitly expand by altering objects in charter.
An encapsulation of state policies allowing firms to expand their corporate objectives
is presented in Table 3.2.
 It is crucial to recognize how narrowly corporate objects were defined at the
middle of the century, and how much more broadly legitimate objects were conceived
of by its end.   For example, it took an 1852 Massachusetts law to permit firms that
manufactured cotton or woolen goods to also produce flax, silk, linen, or india rubber
goods.21  Ohio's laws here are also instructive.  Ohio first enacted a general
manufacturing law in 1858,22  and that same year clearly asserted that a corporation
may only pursue those  objects for which it was authorized.23  By 1861, manufacturing
firm were permitted to extend their business to another article, in same line of
business, with majority approval of the shareholders.24  As late as 1877 it took a new
law to allow a company that mined coal or iron to manufacture iron from ores (with
2/3 shareholder approval).25  An 1886 law permitted firms to enlarge their objects, so
long as they remained substantially remain the same (this time with approval by 3/5 of
the shareholders).26  
Many states were silent in regards to the expansion of objects.  This included a
number of states in the periphery (such as Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Iowa)
where incorporation law was not a significant issue.  The likely reason is that there
were so few industrial corporations seeking amenable corporation laws.   A number of
21 1852 Mass. Acts 195; Mass. Gen. Stat. Ch. 60 §  37.
22 1859 Ohio Laws 145.
23 1858 Ohio Laws 145. Ohio Rev. Code  Ch. 29 § 90 (1860).
24 1861 Ohio Laws 58.  Ohio Rev. Code c. 25 §169 (1868 supp).
25 1877 Ohio Laws v. 74 p. 21 § 1.  Ohio Rev. Code §3867 (1880).
26 1886 Ohio Laws 193; Ohio Rev. Code § 3238a (1892).
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states permitted the charter to be modified to expand corporate objects, and in doing so
required stockholders to vote on this policy (by majority or super majority).  States
such as New York and Ohio allowed expansion to industries of the same general
nature.  In these cases the breadth of the categories would determine the restrictiveness
of the policy.  If the areas were strictly spelled out, such as in New York, then the
policy was relatively more restrictive.  
Illinois allowed manufacturing firms to expand to any other permitted area of
manufacturing as early as 1849;27  Maryland had a similar policy by 1860.28   This was
anomalous in 1865, but not so by 1900.  Whereas in 1849 Illinois' general laws
carefully specified types of permitted activities, by 1872 she allowed firms to
incorporate for any lawful purpose.  In conjunction with a liberal law on the expansion
of objects, this meant that corporations could engage in a wide variety of activities
without extensive legal hurdles.29  
Some states allowed vertical expansion.  New Jersey in 1875 allowed firms to
purchase mines and manufactures necessary for business (and to issue stock for their
purchase).30  This is an example of “upstream” expansion into materials procurement.
Tennessee in 1881 allowed expansion “downstream” so that firms could market and
sell the objects they manufactured;31 and in 1883 she allowed manufacturing firms to
erect elevators, hoist, warehouses and transfer tracks associated with their business.32
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 25 div. 13 s. 19- 20; c. 25 div. 14 s. 15-16 (1873).
28 Maryland Rev. Stat., art 26 § 60 (1868).  This was reaffirmed in 1878; Maryland Rev. Stat. c. 40 §
138. (1878)
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 25 div. 12 s. 1, div. 14 s. 1 (1873); Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 32 s. 1 (1874).
30 N. J. Rev. Stat. p. 187 § 55 (1877).
31 Tenn Rev. Stat. 1710 (1884).
32 Tenn. Rev. Stat. 1864 (1984).
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Yet by contrast, even at the late date of 1897, Pennsylvania wrote a new law that
limited  each firm to only one kind of business, which had to be clearly stated.33 
Removal of restraints on corporate objectives was one of the most important
elements animating “the race to the bottom.”  But it is important to note that there was
significant, and gradual relaxation of policies even before the New Jersey reforms of
1888.  Table 3.2 displays less change than actually occurred because states often
relaxed limitations on the expansion to new objects, without removing restraints
altogether.  These relaxations do not show up in the table.  It also shows a wide range
of variation on this basic constituent element of the very nature of the corporation in
the late 19th century.
Another way of getting at this is to examine the spread of adoption of
provisions that allow incorporation of any lawful business.  We can see the pattern in
table 3.3.  Connecticut had a general provision dating from 1837.  By 1888 19 states
had language to this effect.  Intriguingly, there is not a distinctive pattern according to
section.  In part this may have been due to Reconstruction: four southern states passed
provisions from 1868-1870.  
A state did not need to have a well developed corporation law to enable
corporations to exist.  Just a few provisions would allow corporations to function.
However, a more developed corporation law becomes necessary as economic relations
become more complex. A detailed and extensive law may curb or suppress corporate
abuses.  Southern states had a simple corporation law because they did not have many
33 1897 Pa. Laws, p. 283 § 1. (15 July).
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corporations.  However, they did permit corporations to operate, and they often had
liberal provisions (although perhaps as a result of benign neglect).
Term.  The original grants of incorporation via special act were typically limited to a
set term of existence.  The limitation of term as a principle should be familiar to
students of American political development.  For example, the First Bank and the
Second Bank of United States were each chartered for 20 years.  The effort to recharter
the Second  Bank, prompting Andrew Jackson's veto in 1832, is one of the central
dramas of antebellum American politics.34  Limits to terms of existence were
considered to be an appropriate lever of control by the state over business corporations.
While explicit limitations on term were likely to be carefully thought out, the
lack of a term limitation could result from either a conscious decision or from benign
neglect.  In the metropole restriction or accommodation was likely to have been
carefully thought out, due to the variety of industrial firms and their importance to the
state economy.  Northeastern states with no specified limits in 1865 included
Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.  States outside the metropole included Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Oregon (Texas at the time had no general corporation law).  By contrast, if
manufacturing and corporate activity was a small part of a state's economy, and if,
hence, corporate rights were not a major issue and the relevant codes were not long or
complicated, omission of term might be a matter of neglect.  This would be more
likely in the economic periphery.  By contrast, eight states relaxed their laws on term 
34 Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957).
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Table 3.4  Maximum Term of Existence in Years
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1865 1876 1888 1900
North Connecticut
Delaware 20 perpetual
Illinois 50 99 99 99
Indiana 25? 25? 25 25
Maine
Maryland 40 40 40 40
Massachusetts
Michigan 30 30 30*** 30***
New Hampshire
New Jersey 50 50 50  perpetual
New York 50 50 50 additional 50
Ohio




South Alabama 20 perpetual perpetual perpetual
Arkansas 20
Florida 20 20 20 20
Georgia 20 30 30 30
Kentucky 25 renewable 25 renewable
Louisiana perpetual perpetual
Mississippi by charter by charter  by charter 50
Missouri 20 20* 50 50
North Carolina 30 perpetual 30 30
Tennessee 20 20 20 20
Virginia 30 30 30 30
West Virginia by charter by charter 50 extend addtl 50
West California 50 50 50 50
Iowa 20 20 20 20
Kansas  20* 20* 20*
Minnesota 30 30 30** 30**
Nebraska
Oregon
Texas 50 50 50
* Kansas allowed successive 20 year extensions of term of existence.
**Minnesota allowed renewal equal to original term.
Tennessee had provisions for renewal.
***Michigan allows extension of additional 30 years.
over the period of this study: Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Jersey, New York, West Virginia.   Table 3.4 shows data on limitation of term.
There are two ways of looking at these data: first as a principle of state capacity
(and legitimacy) to control corporations, and second as a practical constraint on
corporate growth.  From the first perspective, many states did have significant
restrictions on term in 1865: ten states permitted maximum terms of 30 years of less.
This was relaxed only somewhat states by 1900: at that time eight states still had
restrictions of 30 years or less.  Some of these allowed modification of the charter to
extend operations up to the maximum allowable term of existence.  How many
corporations these laws applied to is unclear.  From a logical point of view, if a
corporation can be chartered for a thirty year period, most applications will not limit
the charter to only ten.   However,  the language of the statutes was often unclear as to
whether the charters were renewable up to the maximum term allowed, or whether
they could be renewed for that period.   
The second way to look at these data is as a practical constraint on corporate
activity.  Most states either did not have a limit, or had limits of 50 years or greater.
The laggards in this sample are Virginia and Indiana.  In addition, states without
general laws, such as Mississippi until 1890, granted existence only in legislatively
approved charters.  By 1900 many of the states, not merely New Jersey, had extended
the term of existence.35  Further, the 50 year limit would hardly come into play for
35 My strong suspicion is that by the mid-1880's term was no longer a significant restriction in most
states.  Either the charter could be renewed, or the corporation could be dissolved on paper and a
new, but essentially identical, corporation could take its place.  
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many corporations created after the Civil War until after 1915.  States were not likely
to abolish through legislation a corporation that was contributing to the economy.  It is
one thing to restrict corporate economic activity before it begins or before it expands
operations; it is quite another to destroy a corporation to that had been producing.
There was a clear movement from early on to relax this constraint.  Delaware,
for example, was silent on this issue until 1883, when she limited term to 20 years.  As
part of her general liberalization, copying New Jersey in 1899, she provided for
perpetual existence.36  Note however, that the New Jersey laws were not the first to
specifically provide for  perpetual existence.  That honor goes to Pennsylvania, which
passed such a provision in 1874.37  The limitation of term evinces a gradual change,
such that it was largely removed as a significant constraint by 1900.  
Capital Limitations.  A direct way to limit the possibility of monopoly is to limit the
value of capital stock.  Many states imposed such restrictions.  At the time, capital
stock was defined as the total of its stockholder shares, with clearly defined par values.
Thus a maximum capital stock requirement limited the amount of initial investment in
a corporation.  However, if a corporation retained earnings without making
distributions to shareholders, then it could increase its cash on hand and/or assets far
above a maximum level of capitalization.  This would particularly be the case with
firms that had at least some degree of monopoly power, and thus extraordinary profits.
Thus corporate size as measured by value of products could conceivably be far in
36 1883 Del. Laws c. 147 (vol 17); Del. Rev. Stat. § 1916 cl. 1 (1915).
37 1874 Pa. Laws p. 76 § 4 (20 April); Pa. Rev. Stat. p. 781 § VIII (Purdons, 1905).
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excess of a set limit on capital stock.  Nevertheless, many states did impose a limit on
capital stock, and also on the amount of debt that a corporation could accumulate.  
Fourteen states had a maximum level of capitalization written in law.  These
are  listed in Table 3.5.  The earliest was Massachusetts in 1851, with a limit of
$500,000;  Vermont and Michigan adopted that limit in 1853, as did Pennsylvania in
1854,  Arkansas by 1856,38 and Illinois in 1857.  Two other states imposed similar
ceilings in the 1850's: Wisconsin by 1858 imposed a limit of $400,000, and Tennessee
that year imposed a limit of $200,000, as did Maine in 1862.    Thus in the decade
before this study begins, nine states imposed maximum capital limitations of no more
than $500,000 on manufacturing firms.  In addition, Missouri imposed a limit of $2
million in 1864.  This new, much higher limit, turned out to be a harbinger of the
gradual removal of capital stock limitations.
[Table 3.5 about here]
Limitations on capital stock were concentrated in the northeast metropole.  Of
the fifteen states with some limit at some time during this study, only six were located
outside the Northeast quadrant of the country (Arkansas, Minnesota, Oregon,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin).  Capital stock limitations were concentrated in
areas where the corporation thrived, and where the possibility of an extremely large
firm existed.  
The limits were periodically raised, and then eventually removed.
Massachusetts  and Pennsylvania each significantly raised their limits in the 1870's, 
38 The exact date of the Arkansas enactment is not clear from the record available to me.
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Table 3.5  States with Maximum Levels of Capitalization 






Arkansas by 1856.  $500,000.  Appears to be removed in 1869 revision.
Illinois








Indiana 1889:  $2,000,000 for gas, oil and drilling firms.
1851  $500,000.
1870-1 $1,000,000 for mining, mechanical, manufacturing.  Half that for ice, 
agricultural, horticultural, etc.





1875  $2,500,000 for mining or manufacturing of iron, steel, silver, lumber, or copper
1881  $5,000,000 for specified manufacturing firms





1901  Limit removed.
1857  $500,000 for some manufacturing firms.  Illinois had two different sections by 
which a manufacturing company could take a charter.  Division 14 had the above 
limit, Division 13 did not.
by 1858  $4,000,000 (genealogy not clear)
by 1878 $250,000 (genealogy not clear).
1862  $200,000
1883  $2,000,000
1891  $ 10,000,000
1901  Limit removed
1864.  $2,000,000
by 1879  $10,000,000 (genealogy not clear holds until at least 1899).
by 1866  $500,000 (genealogy prior to 1866 is not clear).
1876  $2,500,000 for mining and smelting.
1881     Limits on mining and smelting removed
1883     Limit on all removed.
1870-1  $100,000.   The law was written with the form of $5000 minimum 
capitalization, with 20 times that amount for the maximum.  Later versions of this 
same act in the 1883-4 revised statutes had a minimum figure at $500, which would 
mean a maximum capitalization of $10,000.  I found no record of amendment for that 
change.   The revision of 1887 is also $10,000.  I have as yet been unable to resolve 
this discrepancy.  The maximum caps are removed in the 1904 rewriting of the law.
1875   $2 ,000,000
1883   $5,000,000
1890   Limit removed
New York had two sections of code authorizing charters.  One limited objects but not 
capital.  This limit refers to a 1875 law that was permissive in terms of objects.
Massachusetts to $1 million, and Pennsylvania to $5 million.   Minnesota kept its limit
for most firms, but raised the limit for mining and smelting firms to $2.5 million. New
York's 1848  manufacturing law was narrowly written, applied only to certain
industries, and had no capital stock limitations.   New York added a separate general
law in 1875 that operated alongside the 1848.  Both laws were in force until 1890.
The 1875 law allowed incorporation for any industry, but limited capitalization to $2
million.  This was raised to $5 million in 1883, and then removed in 1890 when both
old laws were repealed and a new law enacted. 
At the time of the New Jersey laws, several Northeast states still had capital
stock limitations but it was clear that the trend was towards either their removal, or
liberalization.  Minnesota had removed all such limits by 1883.  New York removed
its limits in 1890, while Maine increased its limit to $10 million in 1891, and
Pennsylvania to $10 million in 1891 and $30 million in 1893, before removing all
limits in 1901.  Most limits were gone by the end of the century.  The conception of
the corporation as a natural entity was not possible until some of these these onerous
limitations were removed.
Real Estate. A third restriction was on the right to own property.  States often
limited the amount of real estate a corporation could hold, quantified either by acreage
or by dollar value.  These limitations are restrictions on property rights in the most
literal sense.  They serve to constrain corporate size and power.   Data on the limitation
of real estate is reported in Table 3.6.
Eighteen states  had a “soft” limit in place by 1865.   I define a soft limit as one
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Table 3.6  Limitations on Real Estate
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1865 1876 1888 1900
North Connecticut Soft Soft Soft Soft
Delaware Soft Soft Soft None
Illinois Soft Soft Soft Soft
Indiana None None None
Maine Hard** Hard** Hard** Hard**
Maryland None None None None
Massachusetts Soft Soft Soft
Michigan Hard*** Hard*** Soft Soft
New Hampshire
New Jersey Soft None None None
New York Soft Soft Soft/Hard
Ohio Soft Soft Soft Soft
Pennsylvania Hard Hard Hard Hard
Rhode Island
Vermont Soft Soft Soft Soft
Wisconsin Soft Soft Soft Soft
South Alabama Soft Soft Soft Soft
Arkansas Soft Soft Soft Soft
Florida Soft Soft Soft
Georgia Soft Soft/hard* Soft/Hard* Soft/Hard*
Kentucky Soft
Louisiana   Soft Soft
Mississippi Hard Hard Hard Hard
Missouri Soft Soft Soft
North Carolina Soft Hard Hard Hard
Tennessee Soft Soft Soft Soft
Virginia Soft Soft Soft Soft
West Virginia Soft Soft Soft Soft
West California Soft Soft Soft
Iowa
Kansas
Minnesota Soft Soft Soft Soft
Nebraska
Oregon Soft Soft Soft Soft
Texas Soft Soft Soft
*Georgia limited holding of Foreign corporations to 5000 acres as of 1874.
**Maine limited real estate holdings to capital stock.
***3000 acre Limit, 10,000 acre limit for mining firms.
Blank means no provision or mention of limit
Hard means a definite dollar or acreage  limit on real estate holdings
Soft means a “necessary  and proper for legitimate objects” standard
None means that there is language permitting unlimited holdings.
Note in particular that within the category of hard limits, there can be considerable variation.
Wisconsin allowed real estate up to an amount determined in law, but did not thereby impose 
hard limits
where the state code limits real estate holdings to that which is “necessary and proper”
to conduct the  legitimate objects of the corporation.  This means that, as in many
other issue areas, the real bite of the limitation would depend on the strength of
enforcement.  The limitations at that time were spread throughout the Northeast and
South, and somewhat less prevalent in the West.
A hard limit is one where there is a dollar or acreage limitation on corporate
holdings.  Three states had these by 1865.  Pennsylvania limited real estate holdings
for mining companies to 2000 acres, and also had a soft limit for other firms.39
Mississippi had the most onerous restrictions, even as they raised their limits over
time.  By 1857 there was a $50,000 limit for corporations in general, but $500,000 for
manufacturing companies. 40  Maine limited real estate holdings to the amount of
capital stock, which itself was limited in 1862 to $200,000.41
There were exceptions that allowed companies to accept property for
obligations of debt.  For example, Connecticut early on allowed corporations to take
real estate to satisfy debt, as did Virginia, but Virginia also required that corporation
extinguish the same within a time certain.42  New York similarly allowed corporations
to hold mortgages to secure debts as of 1871, which applied to the 1848 manufacturing
law; the parallel general law of 1875 required them to extinguish property acquired for
39 1849 Pa. Laws, p. 563-8 §§ 3, 21 (7 April).
40 Miss Rev. Stat  c. 35 s. 2 art. 5 (1857).
41  Maine Rev. Stat. 48. s. 9 (1857); Maine Rev. Stat. c. 48 s. 18 (1871).  The limits on capital stock,
and hence real estate were raised to $2 million in 1883, $10 million in 1891, and removed in 1901.
Maine Rev. Stat.   c. 48 s. 17 (1883); Maine Rev. Stat Supp. c. 48 s. 17 (1895).   Maine Rev. Stat. c.
47 s. 7 (1904).
42 Conn. Gen. Stat. .§ 406 (1866).  1880 Conn. Acts 97.  Va. Code Ann. Ch. 56 § 3 (Ritchie 1860).
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a debts within three to five years.43  Some states were more strict than others in
requiring firms to sell real estate acquired for debt owed.  Illinois set procedures for
annual public auctions of excess real estate, and required that excess real estate held
over five years be forfeit.44  
In the late nineteenth century, currency was often hard to come by, and thus the
acceptance of property for legitimate obligations in hinterland areas made sense.  It
was a form of securitizing real estate.  Yet, this also went on the New York, in the
heart of the Northeast metropole.
There were few changes over the course of this study on limitations on real
estate.  By 1888, on the cusp of the New Jersey liberalizations, 21 states in the sample
had soft limits, four states (Georgia, Pennsylvania, Maine, and Mississippi) had hard
limits, and three states had laws specifically stating there was no limit on corporate
real estate holdings.  Real property limitations in Mississippi were raised to $1 million
in 1890, and to $2 million in 1892.45  Most notable are the relaxations of the two states
most identified with the “race to the bottom,” New Jersey and Delaware.  However,
neither of these states were the first to grant explicit permission to purchase, hold, or
convey any amount of real estate.  That honor belongs with Maryland (1860).46
Internal Governance
The second area of statutory incorporation law in this study is composed of
43 1871 NY Laws c. 481. 1875 NY Laws c. 611 § 2.  Five years required an extension from the court.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 32 s. 5 (1874).
45   Miss. Rev. Stat. c. 25 s. 838 (1892).
46 Md. Rev. Stat. art. 26 s. 42 (1860).
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provisions related to internal corporate governance.  These provisions affect control of
the corporation.  Recall that Berle and Means identify both legal and extra-legal means
of managerial corporate control; obviously, only legal elements enter the statute books.
Statutory elements of internal governance that contribute to management control
include the power to value assets purchases with corporate stock, to value intangible
assets, to issue multiple classes of stock, to buy back shares, to set the timing of
dividends, to make major transactions without shareholder approval, and the
weakening of preemptive shareholder rights.  
Director Control.  In a proprietary corporation, the majority stakeholder and
management are essentially combined in one  person, family or partnership.  The
original incorporators were likely to be the management of the newly formed
corporation.  It is only with the transition to corporate capitalism that we see a full
separation of management and ownership.  However, this was built upon prior
practice.  Many laws placing control in the management were written in the years
following the Civil War, and thus predate corporate capitalism.
The very first general laws authorized day to day management by a board of
directors.  This was the practice in nearly every general corporation statute that
followed.  One of the few exceptions was Tennessee, which from 1849 allowed that
affairs may be managed by directors, before changing the law in 1875 so that the
corporation had to be managed by directors.47   But this is an exception to the rule.
Attempts to run corporations entirely by shareholders did not find fertile ground.48  
47 Tenn. Rev. Code 1452 (1858); 1875 Tenn. Rev. Code 1706 (1884).
48 William Roy at one point notes that there did not have to be a directors of a corporation at all.
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Virtually every state granted corporations the right to make by-laws.  These by-
laws related to manner of voting (for example permitting proxy voting), chain of
command, setting up internal controls, and the like.  By-laws typically could only be
changed by a vote of shareholders.  This ranged from majority to supermajority votes.  
One of the earliest powers given to directors was to set the timing for calling in
subscriptions.  Stock of newly formed corporations was sold by subscription, with
actual payments made in installments.  Most states had explicit requirements regarding
how much stock had to be subscribed, and how much actually had to be paid in before
commencing business.  This served as a constraint on the maximum amount of stock
incorporators would request; if, say, 50% of the capital had to be paid in before
commencing business, asking for authority to raise an unduly high amount of capital
would hinder corporate formation.
Directors were given authority over the timing to call in subscriptions.  This
power was nearly uniform across the states.  Shareholders typically could not vote
shares until they were called in, but shares had to be called in proportion to amount
subscribed.  Shareholders at early stages of incorporation would have the same
proportion of stock, whether a small or a large percentage was actually paid in.  Thus
voting power would not change merely because more stock was called in, unless a
(minority) stockholder had subscribed for more that he was able to pay.  Director
authority to call in subscription could be used as a weapon against such subscribers.  In
addition, states had elaborate procedures for declaring the unpaid subscriptions that
Socializing Capital, 154.    
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became due.  In some states these procedures constituted a significant proportion of
the corporation law as a whole.  Through these procedures, default subscriptions could
become property of the corporation, and then dispensed or auctioned off to other
individuals.  This power gave directors some leverage over shareholders from the
outset. 
Nevertheless, constraints on management and obligations to shareholders were
written into the charter documents.  The most significant of these required shareholder
approval for major transactions.  For example, shareholder approval, whether by
majority or supermajority, was required in some states in order to increase or decrease
capital, to issue preferred stock, to enter into a new line of operations, to merge with or
purchase the stock of another company, to extend the term of existence, to purchase
real estate, or to modify by-laws or the charter document itself.  These laws
constrained management's ability to make major transactions without shareholder
approval.  
Of the 35 states in the dataset, 21 were silent in 1865 as to control of decisions
affecting the capital stock; many simply had not contemplated alterations of corporate
financial structure.  Of the remaining states, 7 required a supermajority to approve
such alterations, and 6 merely required a majority.  Alabama did not distinguish
between management and shareholders at all, simply granting the corporation the
power to alter the capital stock.  By 1900 only 7 states were silent on these provisions,
13 required a majority, and 12 a supermajority.  New Jersey granted directors the
power to make such changes in 1893, but it was not the first. Tennessee in 1875 gave
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directors the right to make applications for altering the capital stock of the
corporation.49  The broad contours regarding changes in capital structure are shown in
Table 3.7.
Southern states were less likely to have provisions on the books for the
alteration of capital stock.  In 1865, 3 of 12 (25%)  Southern states had such
provisions, compared with 6 of 16 (38%) Northern states.  By 1900, 7 of 12 (58%)
Southern states had such provisions, compared with 13 of 14 (93%) in the North, and 6
of 7 (86%) in the West.  The provision of such provisions in the law in the South was
less developed within each state in the South, and thus in the South as a whole, but it
was not non-existent.
The breadth of policies for any one state ranged from relatively simple to rather
complicated.  For example, New Hampshire designated directors to manage the
company, required unanimous shareholder consent to increase or reduce the number of
shares, and allowed directors to make assessments on subscribed stock.  These
provisions, written in 1867, were virtually unchanged by 1900.50  By contrast Michigan
at different times allowed directors to call in subscribed stock as they saw fit(1853);51
alter the number of shares the stock was divided into, so long as this did not increase
overall capital stock (1857);52 required 2/3 shareholder approval to increase capital
stock (1865);53 required 3/5 shareholder approval for major transactions involving title 
49 Tenn. Rev. Code 1695 (1884).
50 N.H. Rev. Stat. c. 146 §§. 4-15 (1876).
51 Mich. Gen. Stat. 4138 (1882).  
52 Mich. Comp. Laws, 2866-8 (1872); 1857 Mich. Pub. Acts 186.
53 Mich. Comp. Laws, 2870 (1872). 1865 1872 RS 2870; 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts  232 s. 2, (p. 343);
Mich. Gen. Stat. Supp.  4141A1 (1890).
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Table 3.7  Power to Alter Capital Stock
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1865 1876 1888 1900
North Connecticut  supermajority supermajority supermajority
Delaware   supermajority supermajority
Illinois supermajority supermajority supermajority supermajority
Indiana    supermajority supermajority
Maine supermajority supermajority supermajority majority
Maryland  majority majority majority
Massachusetts  majority majority majority
Michigan supermajority supermajority supermajority supermajority
New Hampshire  
New Jersey supermajority supermajority Directors
New York  supermajority supermajority supermajority
Ohio supermajority supermajority supermajority supermajority
Pennsylvania  majority majority majority
Rhode Island supermajority
Vermont majority majority majority majority
Wisconsin majority Supermajority supermajority supermajority
South Alabama corporation majority majority majority
Arkansas majority majority majority
Florida majority supermajority supermajority
Georgia
Kentucky     supermajority
Louisiana   majority majority
Mississippi     
Missouri majority supermajority majority majority
North Carolina majority majority majority
Tennessee supermajority directors directors directors
Virginia     
West Virginia
West California supermajority supermajority supermajority supermajority
Iowa
Kansas supermajority supermajority supermajority supermajority
Minnesota majority majority majority majority
Nebraska majority majority majority majority
Oregon majority majority majority majority
Texas majority majority majority
Blank means the law was silent
Majority means shareholders representing a majority of the stock have the power to alter the 
capital stock.
Supermajority means shareholders representing a supermajority of the stock have the power 
to alter the capital stock.
Directors means the directors had authority to alter capital stock.
Corporation means the corporation could alter capital, but the decision rule was not specified.
transfers (1869);54 allowed the firm to move to another location in the state with 2/3
shareholder approval (1875);55 required 2/3 shareholder approval to  expand corporate
objects (1875);56 with a majority of shareholder approval allowed the firm to establish
offices and hold meetings outside the state(1885);57 and more.  This variability is
necessarily vastly simplified as presented in Table 3.7.
Preferred Stock.  Allowing firms to issue multiple classes of stock
concentrates greater power in management.58  The logic is that these give management
the opportunity to shift the timing and distribution of monies to the advantage of one
class as opposed to another.  Multiple classes of stock has an early history, evident in
Table 3.8.  The overall pattern here is similar to the other provisions: earlier
appearance and greater prevalence in the North than in the West or South, but not to
the exclusion of the latter two sections.  By 1876 four Northern states, three Southern
states, and two Western states offered multiple classes of stock in some form or
another.  
There is a second “wave” of liberalization in this area in the early 1890's, as
five more states offer preferred stock, likely an artifact of the “race to the bottom.”
There sometimes were other restrictions on preferred stock.  For example, Michigan
54 Mich. Comp. Laws, 3434 (1872).
55 Mich. Gen. Stat. 4145 (1882).
56 MI 1881 Acts 187 p. 214 s. 18.  Amended by 1882 Mich. Pub. Acts 232 § 8;  Mich. Gen. Stat. Supp.
4161a7.
57 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts  232 §§ 18, 20; Mich. Gen. Stat. Supp. 6161b9 (1890).
58 Adolf A. Berle and  Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York:
Macmillan, 1932), 143, 160-61, 174, 191.  There are additional powers that may accrue to
management, including the power to control accounting (202), and to alter the original contract
rights of securities holders (207).  However, these advances occur after 1900, the period of study
here.
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allowed preferred stock up to 2/3 of the actual capital paid in, with dividends limited to
8%.  If the dividends on the preferred stock were not paid, holders had the right to vote
for directors, yet were not liable for debts in case of insolvency (except for wages due
labor).59 
New Jersey, although the first to codify preferred stock in 1860, is far from
alone in 1888, much less in 1900.  The New Jersey reforms in this area are an
inflection point, not a breakthrough.  The existence of preferred stock precedes the era
of corporate capitalism.   While it did provide management with an additional lever of
control, it was put in place before ownership and management became separated.
Some states set strict rules regarding the right to buy new issues of stock from
an existing corporation.  These states typically gave shareholders a “preemptive” right
to purchase new issues of company stock in proportion to the stock that they already
held.60  Without these regulations, management had a tool for the distribution of what
might well become highly profitable shares.  I found only two states with clear specific
provisions to protect a shareholder's preemptive right: Massachusetts in 1870, and
Alabama by 1886.61  Only four states had clear statutory provisions regulating the
valuation of assets purchased with company stock.  Illinois in 1849 allowed stock to be
purchased only with money; in 1857 she made an exception for stock purchased with
land, which had to be evaluated by independent third party.62  Tennessee (1858) only 
59 1893 Mich. Pub. Acts 197, (p302).
60  Ibid. 145-6
61 Ala. Code § 1675 (1887); 1870 Mass. Acts 298; Mass. Gen. Stat. Ch. 224 § 7, 25; 1871 Mass. Acts
392 §1.
62 Ill. Gen. Stat. c. 25 div. 13 § 14, & div. 14 §. 12 (1873).  
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Table 3.8  First Year Allowing Preferred Stock
102
















South West Virginia 1864
Missouri*** 1868
Alabama 1875
















*California and Ohio refer to preferred stock in their revised statutes, 
but the date of origin in not specified.
**New York in 1880 referred to allowing the exchange of preferred 
stock for common; I am  not sure of the date when preferred was first 
offered.
*** The 1875 Missouri Constitution required unanimous consent in 
order to offer preferred stock.
allowed money to be used to pay for capital stock, while Kansas (1859) allowed stock
purchases with property so long as a judge-appointed freeholder ascertained the true
value of the property.63  New Jersey (1891) allowed the corporation to remove
restrictions on the sale of stock with a vote of 2/3 of the shareholders, thus allowing a
supermajority of shareholders to remove the preemptive right for all shareholders.64
Delaware (1883) required stock purchases be made in cash, but allowed a corporation
to make purchases with stock, valued by the directors.  In 1899 Delaware adopted a
code based on New Jersey's innovations, and at that time made director's valuation of
assets purchased with corporate stock conclusive.65
Having discretion in the timing of dividends and to buy back shares also gives
management the opportunity to affect share value.  Most states allowed directors to
determine the timing for the payment of dividends.  There were a few notable
exceptions.  Virginia (1836) and Pennsylvania (1849) each provided for dividends to
be declared semi-annually.66  Arkansas required semi-annual dividend payments, but
also required that ten percent over the amount of the original capital stock had to be set
aside as a reserve before payment of dividends.67  By contrast, Tennessee (1881)
required dividends be paid when over four percent of the capital stock was held in the
corporate treasury.68  But again, most states gave discretion to management over the
timing and amount of dividends.  The major constraint was legal: in most states
63 Tenn. Code § 1456 (1858); Tenn. Code § 1856 (1884). Kan. Stat. Ann. c. 33 §  2 (1860).
64  N.J. Rev. Stat. § 220, p. 953 (1896).
65  1883 Del. Laws c. 147 v. 17 §§ 29, 30;  21 Del. Laws, c. 273; 22 Del. Laws c. 392; Del. Rev. Stat. §
1928 (1915).
66 Va. Code Ann. Ch. 56 § 30 (Ritchie 1860); 1849 Pa. Laws p 565 § 14 (7 April).
67 Arkansas Rev. Stat.  c. 95 § 10 (1858).
68 Tenn. Code § 1870 (1884).
103
directors were personally liable if dividends were declared and paid when the
corporation was insolvent, or if the  payment would render the corporation insolvent.
 Several states insisted upon protecting minority stockholder rights by requiring
cumulative voting of shares for directors.  This meant that, if several board seats were
up for a vote, a shareholder could combine votes for all seats, and allocate them as
desired.  For example, a shareholder with 100 shares at a meeting where 4 directors
were chosen could allocate all 400 votes for one director.  This gave minority
shareholders greater likelihood of capturing at least one seat.  States with statutory
provisions included Illinois (1872),69 Michigan (1885),70  Ohio (by 1893).71  West
Virginia (1872) and Missouri (by 1875) each put a requirement for cumulative voting
in their state constitution.72  
Liability
Shareholder Liability.  Limited liability was by no means universal in the19th century.
Limiting liability was shaped in part by the manner in which shares were sold, and
cannot be properly understood otherwise.  Shares of stock were sold via subscription.
An individual made a contract to purchase shares, paying for part of the subscription
up front, with the rest to be called in later.  Typically, subscribers were liable up to the
full amount subscribed, not merely what they had actually paid in, but this was by no
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 32 § s (1874). 
70 1885 Mich. Acts 112 (p. 116); Mich. Rev. Stat. Supp. 4885a (1890).
71 1895 Ohio Laws v. 93 p. 230; v. 50 p. 274 § 9; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3245 (1900).
72 W. Va. Const. of 1872 art. XI § 4; Missouri Const. art xii § 6 (1875).  Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 21 § 712
(1879).
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means a universal rule.73 
Table 3.9 shows extent to which limited liability had spread among the states
in the period from 1865-1900.  By 1865 most states had at least simple provisions on
the books for limited liability, but some were more elaborate.  Several states provided
for additional shareholders' liability for obligations due to miners, laborers, and
workers. These were Illinois (1849), Massachusetts (1851), Michigan (1853),
Pennsylvania (1854), Tennessee (by 1858), and Wisconsin (by 1858), and Indiana
(1875).74  No state instituted additional liability for labor after 1875, and no state
removed labor liability after that date.  These policies are indicative of the strength of
labor at a fairly early date, far in advance of the labor strife of the 1890's.
There were other forms of additional liability.  In Pennsylvania, if the capital
stock was withdrawn and returned to the stockholders leaving the corporation unable
to pay its debts, the shareholders remained liable to creditors up to the amount returned
to them.75  Two of the most interesting cases are California and Ohio.  California had
proportional shareholder liability up to the full amount of debt owed (this was actually
mandated in the state Constitution of 1849); she changed the law to make shareholders
liable up to the amount subscribed in 1876.76  Ohio mandated double liability in 1851, 
73  For the purposes of this study I categorize liability limited up to the value of the subscription as
limited liability, even though this means that it was possible a creditor could seek monies from
shareholders for unpaid subscriptions.
74  1854 Pa. Laws, p. 215 § 2 (27 March); 1874 Pa. Laws, p. 101 § 39 cl. 11 (29 April); 1855 Mass.
Acts 298; Mass. Gen. Stat. Ch. 60 § 12 (1860); 1851 Mass. Acts 133 §15; 1851 Mass. Acts 252;
1852 Mass. Acts 9; 1855 Mass. Acts 146 § 1.  1878 Ind. Rev. Stat., Ch. 84; 1875 Ind. Acts p.
29;1873 Ind. Rev. Stat. c. 25 div 13 § 18;  Mich. Rev. Stat. 2852 (1872); Tenn. Code § 1464 (1858).
1858 Wis. Rev. Stat. c. 73 § 25.
75 1874 Pa. Laws, p. 101 §39 cl. 4 (29 April).
76 Cal. Const. of 1849, art. IV § 36;  1850 Cal. Stat. 347, § 32;  Cal. Gen. Laws § 777 (1870);  Cal.
Civ. Code § 322 (1886).
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Table 3.9  Shareholder Liability
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1865 1876 1888 1900
North Connecticut
Delaware Limited
Illinois Labor Labor Labor Labor
Indiana Labor Labor Labor
Maine Extra* Extra* Limited Limited
Maryland Limited Limited Limited Limited
Massachusetts Labor Labor Labor Labor
Michigan Labor Labor Labor Labor
New Hampshire Limited Limited Limited Limited
New Jersey Limited Limited Limited Limited
New York Limited Limited Limited Limited
Ohio Limited/extra Limited/extra Limited/extra Limited/extra
Pennsylvania Labor/Extra Labor Labor Labor
Rhode Island Extra Limited Limited Limited
Vermont Limited/extra**Limited/extra**Limited/extra**Limited/extra**
Wisconsin Labor Labor/extra*** Labor/extra*** Labor/extra***
South Alabama Limited Limited Limited Limited
Arkansas Limited Extra (double) Extra (double) Extra (double)
Florida ?(1868) Limited Limited Limited
Georgia Limited Limited Limited Limited
Kentucky Limited Limited
Louisiana Limited Limited Limited Limited
Mississippi Limited/extra Limited/extra Limited/extra Limited/extra
Missouri Limited Limited Limited
North Carolina Charter
Tennessee Labor Labor Labor Labor
Virginia Limited Limited Limited
West Virginia Limited Limited Limited Limited
West California Extra Limited Limited Limited
Iowa Limited Limited Limited Limited
Kansas Extra (double) Extra (double) Extra (double) Extra (double)
Minnesota Limited Limited Limited Limited
Nebraska Limited
Oregon Limited Limited Limited Limited
Texas Limited Limited Limited
*Maine had limited liability that extended for one year after transfer of shares.
Labor indicates extra liability to pay workers.
Extra indicates some form of proportional, double, or other extra liability.
Charter indicates that charter must specify.
**Vermont had limited liability, but made shareholders individually liable if  the capital 
stock was withdrawn.
***Wisconsin had a provision for extending liability past transfer date for corporations 
that held secrets that might adversely affect the share price.
relaxing to limited liability in 1854.77  Gas companies there had double liability; and
manufacturing companies that took advantage of a provision permitting them to
increase their capital stock at the same time had to accept proportional liability beyond
the amount of the original shares.78  Kansas (1860) and Arkansas (1868) each had a
constitutional provision mandating double liability.79    These examples demonstrate
state action in the regulation of the corporation on this issue, and some variety in
policies that were adopted.  By and large, however, limited liability was largely
accepted before the enactment of the New Jersey laws.
Director Liability.  Special liability imposed upon directors is rarely remarked upon
in the literature.   Yet states routinely sought to constrain director actions.  Typically
such provisions made the directors jointly and severally liable for undesirable financial
transactions.  States made directors liable if they authorized and paid  shareholders
dividends when the corporation could not pay its debt, or if those payments rendered
the corporation unable to pay its debts.  Directors who were either absent at the
meeting authorizing an illegal dividend, or that voted on the record against it, were
exempt from liability.  
Director liability appears to have first been written into the charter of the Bank
of New York in 1791 (it was later that same year also written into the charter of the
First Bank of the United States).80  This feature was prevalent in many general laws at
77 Ohio Const. art 13 § 3 (1851); also Ohio Rev. Code § 3258 (1880); 1854 Ohio Laws  44; Ohio Rev.
Code  Ch. 29 § 95 (1860).
78 1865 Ohio Laws 134. Ohio Rev. Code Supp c. 25 § 445-49 (1868).
79 Ark. Const. Of 1868 art. V § 48; Kan. Const. Of 1860 art. XII § 2.  Kansas also codified this  in
statute law in 1868,complete with procedures to attach personal property: Kan. Gen. Stat. c. 23 §
1204-6 (1889).  
80 Edwin J. Perkins, American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700-1815, (Columbus, OH:
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their outset.  In fact, Massachusetts placed such liability requirements on chartered
corporations in 1838, even before it wrote a general law.81  
There were other uses of director liability.  In some states liability was placed
on directors when they did not follow procedures set in law, such as filing required
papers with the state.  This was the case in Vermont (1853).82  Directors were made
liable by Rhode Island for filing willful false misrepresentation (1857),83 by Tennessee
for loans to shareholders or for dividends that were required had but not paid,84 and by
New York for overissue of securities backed by corporate property (1892).85  
Directors could also be singled out for fraud.  Maine in 1844 made the
corporation treasurer subject to fine and imprisonment for not filing required financial
statements with the state.  Tennessee decreed that keeping false books, directing funds
to unauthorized activities (1875) could result in a forfeiture of the charter.86  More of
these provisions were written into law as the century progressed; few states took
provisions off of their books.  
Director liability acted as a substitute for what today would be state regulatory
provisions over corporate governance. Table 3.10 displays a very broad brush picture
of the distribution of these laws.  While I note which states had any law that placed 
Ohio State University Press, 1994), 374-5; Henry Doment, A History of the Bank of New York,
1784-1884, (New York: G. Putnam & Sons, 1884) 8; Shaw Livermore, “Unlimited Liability in Early
American Land Companies” Journal of Political Economy 43 (1935), 683. John Thomas
Holdsworth, First Bank of the United States, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), 126.
81 Mass. Gen. Stat. Ch. 60 §§  23-26, 30 (1860).
82 Vt. Gen. Stat. c. 86 § 62-3 (1863).
83 R.I. Rev. Stat. c. 128 § 18 (1857).
84 Tenn. Code § 1870 (1884).
85 1888 N.Y. Laws c. 394.
86 Tenn. Code §§ 1716-18, 1856 (1884).
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Table 3.10  Director Liability
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1865 1876 1888 1900
North Connecticut Extra Extra Extra Extra
Delaware Extra Extra
Illinois Extra Extra Extra Extra
Indiana
Maine Extra Extra Extra Extra
Maryland Extra Extra Extra Extra
Massachusetts Extra Extra Extra Extra
Michigan Extra Extra Extra Extra
New Hampshire ? Extra Extra Extra
New Jersey Extra Extra Extra Extra
New York Extra Extra Extra Extra
Ohio Extra Extra
Pennsylvania Extra Extra Extra Extra
Rhode Island Extra Extra Extra Extra
Vermont Extra Extra Extra Extra
Wisconsin Extra Extra Extra Extra
South Alabama
Arkansas




Mississippi Extra Extra Extra Extra
Missouri Extra Extra Extra Extra
North Carolina Extra Extra
Tennessee Extra Extra Extra Extra
Virginia Extra Extra Extra Extra
West Virginia Extra Extra Extra Extra
West California Extra Extra Extra Extra
Iowa
Kansas Extra Extra Extra
Minnesota Extra Extra Extra
Nebraska
Oregon Extra Extra Extra Extra
Texas Extra Extra Extra
Extra means that the state had at least one law on the books placing additional 
liability on directors.  If there is no entry, the law was silent.
extra liability on management, many states added additional provisions over the years.
This appears to have been an attempt to regulate fiscal responsibility of the corporation
without creating a bureaucracy.  Interestingly, it does not appear to have been a major
restrain on corporate formation, as corporate-friendly also had these provisions.
Combinations
Mergers.  The Chandlerian imperative requires enabling the coordinating capacities of
managers.  Combinations can be formed by informal agreement, by trusts, by mergers,
and by holding companies.  Mergers can be formed horizontally, with firms in same or
similar industries, or they can be formed vertically with firms in upstream or
downstream enterprises.  Note that allowing any two firms to combine need not be
either vertical or horizontal; it would merely be consolidation of firms in totally
separate areas.  However, such a combination would do little to harness the
Chandlerian imperative of managerial coordination.
Without a general law, a merger required an act of the legislature.  In this
regard, mergers of railroads preceded that of manufacturing corporations.  In general,
states were careful to allow mergers of railroads that connected to form continuous
lines, while prohibiting mergers of competing lines.  This distinction was not always as
clear in practice as theory might desire; a parallel road might compete with a given
road, but also provide continuity not otherwise available over other segments.
States at first allowed mergers under carefully delineated circumstances.
Illinois, a state that tended to be restrictive, provides a good example.  Beginning in
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1872, corporations there could merge with an other corporation of the same general
character, in the same vicinity, provided that no more than two such corporations
combined, and that 2/3 of the shareholders in each approved.87  Michigan allowed
mining companies to consolidate in 1857, but in 1871 included the proviso that their
lands must be adjoining.88  Maryland is an interesting case.  The constitution of 1867
required a three person commission be formed to draft new corporation laws.  This
resulted in what for its time was a liberal law that allowed any two firms to merge.89
By contrast, Ohio (1868) permitted  horizontal mergers of mining firms or of
manufacturing firms, but not across two or more industrial sectors.90  A separate Ohio
law allowed firms in designated industries (“oil, salt, refining, purifying, mining ores,
or manufacturing the same”) to combine.  The increase in size of the new firm was
limited to three times the size of any of the original companies.91   The overall pattern
can be seen in Table 3.11.
Allowing consolidations under particular conditions was not limited to the
Northeast, although these were more prevalent there than in the South or West.
Missouri (1870), Alabama (1873), and Louisiana (1874), each allowed horizontal
mergers among firms of the same general nature, with approval of a supermajority of
the stock.92   Minnesota (1876) allowed mining companies to acquire a firms that 
87 Illinois Rev. Stat. c. 32 §§ 50, 52, 56, 59 (1874).
88 1857 Mich. Pub. Acts p. 437; 1871 Mich. Pub. Acts  p. 10; Mich. Comp. Laws 2879-83, 2892-6
(1872).
89 1868 Md. Laws c. 471 § 36; Md. Rev. Code 23 § 36 (1878).
90 1868 Ohio Laws v. 65 p. 50 §1. Ohio Rev. Stat. § 3864 (1879).
91 1868 Ohio Laws 50; Ohio Rev. Stat. Supp. c. 25 § 459-61 (1868).
92 1879 Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 221 §§ 944-46; 1872-3 Ala. Acts 37, p. 82; 1874 La. Acts p. 158; 1875 La.
Acts. p. 18.
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Table 3.11  The Right to Merge
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1865 1876 1888 1900
North Connecticut
Delaware any
Illinois horizontal*** horizontal*** horizontal***
Indiana
Maine any??
Maryland any any any
Massachusetts
Michigan horiz.**** horiz.**** horiz.****
New Hampshire
New Jersey Horiz. (limited) any
New York vertical vert. & horiz. vert & horiz.










Louisiana horizontal horizontal horizontal
Mississippi












****Mining company can buy shares of railroad that carries its product.
If blank, then the law was silent.  
If prohibited, then a corporation could not merge or purchase shares in another company.  Some 
states in this category did have exceptions for the satisfaction of debts.
If vertical, then a corporation could purchase companies that manufacture supplies for authorized 
business, or transportation firms involved in distribution of their product.
If horizontal, then a corporation could merge with a firm of same general nature, in same industry, 
or to related product areas.
If any, then corporations could combine for any purpose.
authorizing such holdings.  It is possible the statutory law was silent, and court rulings permitted 
this.
*** Only two can consolidate, of similar type; purpose must be clearly and narrowly stated.
smelted the same kinds of ores that the company extracted from the earth.93  Perhaps
most surprising was the broad language adopted by Kansas, a state that tended to be
restrictive.  Kansas had passed a law in1868 allowing any two telegraph companies to
consolidate with shareholder approval.   As of 1885, the same privileges were
extended to all other corporations.94
New York was relatively active in liberalizing its merger provisions.  In 1877
she  allowed corporations in specified industries to consolidate when their purposes
were substantially the same.95  By 1884 New York set standardized procedures for
purchasing other firms.  Boards of directors were authorized to enter agreements to
merge two or more manufacturing companies, and individual stockholders who
disagreed with the valuation were given a procedure by which a court-appointed panel
would adjudicate the value.96    An 1888 New York provision authorized to directors to
extend the range of corporate objects within one year of its charter, so long as the
business was of the same general character.97  When combined with the merger
provisions, it allowed substantially greater flexibility than had existed before.
In this context, the New Jersey liberalizations on mergers must be viewed as
less novel than has generally be considered.  Over time the consolidation provisions
were liberalized in many states.  In a manner similar to New York, New Jersey
93 1876 Minn. Stat. c. 28 § 8;  Minn. Gen. Stat. c. 34 § 151 (1888).
94 1868 Kan. Sess. Laws (Act of Oct. 38 1868); 1885 Kan. Comp. Laws. c. 23 art 8 § 70; 1889 Kan.
Gen. Stat. § 1160.
95 1877 N.Y. Laws c. 374.  This law nevertheless limited the capital of the combined company to the
limit prescribed by law.
96 1884 N.Y. Laws c. 367. 
97 1888 N.Y. Laws c. 513. 
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allowed certain firms to consolidate in 1883, and extended this to other firms in
1888.98  A more significant change came in 1893, when New Jersey allowed any two
firms to consolidate.99
Inter-corporate Stock Holding.  One of the most surprising findings of this research
is that many states at a relatively early date allowed specified corporations to combine,
even if the scope of the provisions were limited.  This was also the case with
intercorporate stock holding.  Inter-corporate stock holding can provide for centralized
management, but not to the degree of a integration via merger.  A holding company
has somewhat greater financial flexibility, such as permitting partial ownership and
multiple tiering of assets.  Table 3.12 displays the data.
Inter-corporate stock holding provisions have a slightly different genealogy
than merger provisions.  Firms were allowed to contract debts, and sometimes firms
defaulted.  States made provisions allowing firms to acquire the stock and bonds of
other firms to satisfy debt obligations.  In this regard, the genealogy is similar to real
estate restrictions that allowed exceptions to satisfy debt obligations.  Thus even
restrictive Virginia, which prohibited the purchase of another corporation's stock, as
early as early as 1849 did allow an exception for the satisfaction of judgments or
debts.100 
Other states also were strict.  Pennsylvania in 1849 prohibited using capital
stock to invest in other firms, before allowing investment of surplus funds in 1868.101  
98 1883 N.J. Laws p. 242; 1888 N.J. Laws p. 441; N.J. Gen. Stat. §§ 330-4, 346-50, (1896).
99 1893 N.J. Laws p. 121; N.J. Gen. Stat. § 273-80 (1896).
100 Va. Code c. 56 § 3 (1849).
101 1849 Pa. Laws p. 565 § 8 (7 April); 1868 Pa. Laws p. 50 § 1 (31 March).
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Table 3.12  The Right to Hold Corporate Stock
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Michigan limited Vert. limited/vert. limited/vert limited/vert.
New Hampshire
New Jersey * horizontal any
New York vertical vertical vert & horiz.
Ohio vertical vertical vertical 













Tennessee vertical**** vertical**** vertical****
Virginia prohibited prohibited prohibited prohibited








If blank, then the law was silent.  
** Georgia's 1877 Constitution forbade mergers; there is a case law regarding some exceptions.
****Mining company can buy shares of railroad that carries its product.
Michigan as of 1867 allowed manufacturing companies to hold stock of salt companies.
As of 1855 Michigan allowed mining firms to invest in railroads that reach mines.
If prohibited, then a corporation could not merge or purchase shares in another company.  Some 
states in this category did have exceptions for the satisfaction of debts.
If vertical, then a corporation could purchase companies that manufacture supplies for authorized 
business.
If horizontal, then a corporation could expand to related product areas.
If any, then corporations could combine for any purpose.
* New Jersey has a 1875 law that refers to holdings of stock, but I have been unable to find a law 
authorizing such holdings.  Possibly the statutory law was silent, and court rulings permitted this.
# Wisconsin in 1878 forbade holding stock of other companies; in 1879, 1881 and 1882 it made 
exceptions for logging, and to allow firms to hold stock in firms that provided power for them.
## Alabama as of 1889 allowed land companies to invest in assets of other enterprises, and hold 
securities.
Georgia's 1877 Constitution prohibited the legislature from authorizing corporations to
purchase shares or stock in any other corporation, or to make any contract which
tended to lessen competition or encourage monopoly.102
Another purpose behind inter-corporate stock holding was to facilitate
distribution.  Michigan's early inter-corporate stock holding provisions (1857)
permitted mining companies in the upper peninsula to hold stock in firms organized to
construct canals, harbors, plank roads, or railroads that would provide transportation
from the mines.103  Ohio (1867) allowed railroads to purchase up to1/3 of the stock of
grain elevators that the railroad serviced,104 and by 1874 allowed mining and
manufacturing firms to purchase stock of railroad or transportation they used.105  There
were similar provisions in Tennessee (1875) and West Virginia (1877, 1882).106    
States also allowed vertical investment upstream to material procurement.
New York (1876) amended its 1848 manufacturing law to permit a corporation to hold
stock in the capital of any corporation that manufactured or used materials produced
by that company.107  Minnesota (1881) allowed mining firms to take and hold stock in
any other corporation.108   Wisconsin allowed mining and manufacturing firms to buy
and hold stock in companies that generated electric light for them.109  In West Virginia
(1882) a manufacturing firm could purchase stock in a company that produced the
102 Ga. Const. Of 1877 Art. 4 § II para. iv; Georgia Code p. 1304 (1882).
103 1855 Mich. Laws, p. 44; 1872 Mich. Comp. Laws § 2871.
104 1867 Ohio Laws v. 64 p. 85 § 4; Ohio Rev. Stat. § 3842 (1879).
105 1874 Ohio Laws v. 71 p. 69 § 2; Ohio Rev. Stat. § 3863 (1879).
106 1877 W. Va. Acts c. 8; W. Va. Code c. 53 § 1 (1899); Tenn. Code  § 1692 (1884). 
107 1876 N.Y. Laws 358, 458.
108 Minn.  Gen Laws. v. II c. 34 § 151 (1888).
109 Wis. Rev. Stat. Supp. c. 86 § 1775 (1883).  
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materials used in its objects, with a vote of 2/3 of the shareholders.110  New York
(1890) also allowed firms to purchase stock in firms that supplied mining and
manufacturing products needed for their business.111  
The corporation code could also be used to direct investment in favored areas.
Pennsylvania early on allowed firms to invest surplus funds in the public debt of the
state of Pennsylvania, and of Philadelphia, as well as allowing investment in real estate
and in securities.112  Michigan pioneered provisions designed to encourage favored
industries, by allowing all manufacturing firms to invest in the stock of salt
manufacturing firms in 1867.113  Wisconsin prohibited inter-corporate stock holding,
but made exceptions for logging firms to buy and hold stock of other logging firms.114
Pennsylvania (1887) allowed iron and steel firms to hold stock and bonds of other
companies, and other companies to hold stocks and bonds of iron and steel firms.115
New York rewrote its corporation law in 1890, with a separate section for stock
corporations.  There she allowed intercorporate stock holding, and allowed directors to
vote the stock help by the company.116  
In the years that followed, states began to seek to attract corporation charters.
This was significant in that corporate capital was sought across state lines.  New Jersey
allowed corporations to purchase stocks and bonds of firms in other states in 1888, a
110 W. Va. Code c. 53 § 1 (1899). 
111 1890 N.Y. Laws c. 688 § 40.
112 1868 Pa. Laws p. 50 § 1 (31 March).
113 Mich. Comp. Laws §  2852-4 (1872).
114 Wis. Rev. Stat. Supp. c. 86 § 1775 (1883).  
115 1887 Pa. Laws p. 411 § 1 (17 June).
116 N.Y. Laws c 688 § 40.
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law often credited with inaugurating the “race to the bottom.”117  Broadening to allow
any corporation to hold stock in any other corporation was a significant move.  New
Jersey did so in 1893.118  But even here, while New Jersey had broad language, she
was not first.  Wisconsin in 1891 allowed companies to hold stock in other
corporations with the approval of ¾ of the shareholders in each corporation.119  Other
states followed over the next several years.120  Full inter-corporate stock ownership
was less radical than it would seem taken in isolation. 
The New Jersey Law
It is clear from the evidence that the New Jersey enactments must be
reinterpreted.  This in turn requires that we make a closer examination of the timing
and sequence of the New Jersey laws.  In the 1890's New Jersey held the position as
charter location of choice for the large corporation.121  Its  role is significant in that it
was the first state that sought to attract charters from businesses that neither had nor
117 N.J. Gen. Stat. § 345 (1896).
118 N.J. Gen. Stat. §§ 260-2 (1896); 
119 1891 Wisc. Acts c. 283; Wisc. Stat. c. 86. § 1775 (1911).
120 Connecticut did not allow such corporations to vote the stock (1895 Conn. Acts 138; Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 3324 (1902)). Delaware (1899): Del. Rev. Stat. § 1991 (1915); Pennsylvania: 1895 Pa. Laws
p. 369 § 1 (26 June); 1895 Pa. Laws p. 370 § 1 (26 June).
121 The fact of the New Jersey Laws are well rehearsed in the literature.  See, notably, Chandler, Visible
Hand, 319-20;  Roy, Socializing Capital, 164-68;   Rachel Rudmose Parker, The Subnational State
and Economic Organization: State Level Variation in Incorporation Law in the United States,
1880-1904, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1993), 98-108.  Charles
McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation
Law: 1869-1903,” 53 Business History Review, 304-342;  Christopher Grandy, New Jersey and the
Fiscal Origins of Modern American Corporation Law (New York: Garland, 1993); Naomi
Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), 1; Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 83.   Lincoln Steffens wrote a
muckraking piece for McClure's that has had much influence: Lincoln Steffens, “New Jersey: A
Traitor State, Part II,” McClure's 25: 41-55.  An excellent history of the New Jersey corporation law
up to 1875 is John W. Cadman, Jr., The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics, 1791-
1875, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
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intended to have operations within the state.  But its innovation was more of
assembling provisions than creating them out of whole cloth.  
The standard interpretation is that, beginning in the late 1880's, New Jersey
accommodated pressure from New York corporate lawyers, and in particular William
Nelson Cromwell (of the Sullivan and  Cromwell law firm) for legal instruments that
would allow corporate consolidation.122  These were amendments to a conservative pro
growth corporation law written in 1875.  Cromwell’s purpose was to sidestep anti-trust
litigation against the Cotton Oil Trust brought by Louisiana.  His solution was simply
incorporate in a different state under different (specially created) laws.  New Jersey
followed with further clarifications and liberalizations in 1889, 1893, and 1896.   The
laws permitted corporations to purchase the stock in other corporations (and thus form
holding companies if they so chose), and for corporations with no business interests in
New Jersey to nonetheless take out charters there.123  The New Jersey “revolution”
inaugurated a “race to the bottom,” as states sought the fees the came from granting
charters.   
The account of the New Jersey laws has been the subject of some
misrepresentation.  Lincoln Steffens wrote a classic muckraking account for McClure's
in 1905, and famously referred to New Jersey as “The Traitor State” for its role in
122 See William G. Roy,  Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Corporation in America,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 201.
123 Rachel Rudmose Parker, The Subnational State and Economic Organization: State Level Variation
in Incorporation Law in the United States, 1880-1904, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California,
Los Angeles, 1993), 98-108.  Christopher Grandy, New Jersey and the Fiscal Origins of Modern
American Corporation Law, (New York: Garland, 1993), 39-45.  The New Jersey laws from 1888 to
1893 in regards to the formation of holding companies are also cited by James C. Bonbright and
Gardiner C. Means, The Holding Company: Its Public Significance and its Regulation, (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1932), p. 68.
119
inaugurating the movement towards liberal consolidation laws.124  As Parker notes,
Steffens got some of his history wrong.  For example, he attributed changes in 1889 to
Governor Leon Abbett (working with corporate attorney James Brooks Dill), although
Abbett was not governor until later.125  Others made less serious mistakes.  Writing in
1930, Harold W. Stoke listed the major provisions of the New Jersey law of 1896 that
he considered revolutionary.  However, this law largely a re-codified changes from
earlier in the decade.126  
Two laws of significance passed in 1888.  One included a provision that
allowed corporations to purchase or dispose of stocks and bonds of other corporations,
from other states “in the same manner and with all the rights, powers, and privileges of
individual owners of the capital stock and bonds.”127  We have seen that while this was
broader than other extant laws, it was not as radical as might otherwise be imagined.
The second contained a provision that allowed a certain classes of firms to
consolidate: those engaged in the improvement or sale of lands, in the construction and
maintenance of hotels and inns, and in transportation of goods or passengers by land or
water.128  Both Roy and Parker cite this law as a significant development.129  Not only
124 Lincoln Steffens, “New Jersey: A Traitor State, Part II,” McClure's 25 (1905): 41-55.
125 Parker, Subnational State, 98-101.
126 Harold W. Stoke, “Economic Influences Upon the Corporation Laws of New Jersey,” Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 38 , n. 5 (Oct., 1930), 572-3.   The provisions he cites include allowing the
formation of corporations for any legal purpose, allowing operations in any state or foreign country,
allowing foreign corporations to hold property, granting permission to merge, granting consolidated
companies to mortgage any property.  He also notes the tax rate (1/10 of 1% up to stock value of $3
million, and $5 for each $100,000 above $5 million).  Corporations had power to amend the charter
regarding purposes, increase or decrease capital stock, change the location of the principle office,
change common stock into preferred, and make other alterations with a vote of 2/3rds of the capital
stock of the corporation
127 1888 N. J. Acts c. 249, N. J. Gen. Stat. § 345 (1896).
128 1888 N. J. Acts c. 294;  N. J. Gen. Stat. § 346-50 (1896).
129 Roy, Socializing Capital,166; Parker, Subnational Sate, 98-9. N.J. Gen. Stat. § 345-7 (1896).
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was this not unique, it was in substance virtually identical to a New Jersey law from
five years earlier that provided similar benefits for a different set of industries (an 1883
law that permitted consolidation for ferries, storehouses, and piers or for docks, yards,
or buildings for livestock).130  
An 1889 law allowed directors of corporations to purchase “mines,
manufaturies (sic.) or other property necessary for their business, or the stock of any
company or companies owning, mining, manufacturing  or producing materials, or
other property necessary for their business” and to issue stock for the purchases.131
This both gave power to directors to make fundamental decisions, and formalized
weaker language from 1888.   
More changes followed. In 1891and 1892 New Jersey allowed the directors to
alter the capital stock, and in 1892 allowed stockholders to amend articles (with
approval of  the Governor), and to do business in or out of the state, so long as an
office was kept in the state.132  This office need not be the main headquarters, and
many firms would end up sharing space across the river from New York.   These
changes are usually missed in the literature, but other states had long permitted out of
state operations.
In 1893 New Jersey allowed firms to alter the line of business they were
engaged in.  It broadened language to allow any corporation to purchase, hold, or
convey shares in any other firm, and to vote the shares of the stock.  This meant that a
130 1896 N.J. Gen. Stat. §. 330-1.
131 1889 N. J. Acts c. 265; N.J. Gen. Stat. § 213 (1896). 
132 1891 N. J. Acts c.177; 1892 N. J. Acts c. 2, 11, 56; N. J. Gen. Stat. §§ 236, 240-244, 366 (1896).
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company did not have to be engaged in a particular line of business to purchase shares,
but could act as a company whose primary purpose was to hold stocks of other
corporations.  A new law also allowed any two businesses to consolidate.133  However,
as we have just seen, intercorporate stock ownership was not unique: several other
states allowed limited versions of this.  And Michigan's 1891 permissiveness in this
regard demonstrates that New Jersey was not alone in relaxing her law.  The
patchwork of New Jersey laws was rewritten and codified by a major revision of the
state's corporation laws in 1896.134  Such a re-codification was also not unique.  New
York had done so in 1890 and in 1892.135
Roy and Parker each note the lack of fanfare that followed the New Jersey
1888 and 1889 laws.136  I believe that this is because this particular law was
unexceptional in comparison to other laws passed before within New Jersey, and in
other states.  The New Jersey liberalizations were an inflection point in a widespread
phenomenon, not a clean break with the past. 
Changes in corporation law in the late 1880's and early 1890's were far less
radical than they would have seemed twenty or thirty years earlier.  Other states also
had also developed their corporation laws, and included liberal provisions that
antedated the New Jersey laws.  In fact, virtually every provision of the New Jersey
laws existed somewhere else at an earlier time.  However, these provisions did not
exist in the same place at the same time.  
133 1893 N. J. Acts c. 67, 171, 254 § 10;1896 Gen. Stat. §§260-62, 274, 373-80.
134 1896 N. J. Acts c. 185.
135 1890 N.Y. Laws c. 567; 1892 N.Y Laws c. 687.
136 Roy, Socializing Capital, 165; Parker, Subnational State, 102.
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New Jersey accelerated a process that was already in motion.  She did not so
much as initiate a “race to the bottom” as win that race.   Her innovation was to
assemble already existing provisions into a coherent and thoroughly liberal package.
This is an important innovation in its own right.  Nevertheless, these innovations were
an inflection point in a widespread phenomenon, not a clean break with the past.
Capital Concentration
It remains to determine the causes of the relaxation of charter law.  One way to
get at this is to compare the various state policies in 1888, the year that New Jersey
began its liberalizations.  This is shown in table 3.13.  States coded as permissive are
marked with an X; others are left blank.  Keep in mind that this is a very broad brush
of the various policies.  Nevertheless, every state had at least one restrictive policy
other than director liability.  These states used different combinations of laws to
restrain corporations, but all had some restrictive policy in place.  But also note that
every policy that existed in New Jersey existed somewhere else at the same time.
Again, it was the combination of permissive policies that was novel.
There is no obvious pattern that appears on its own to explain within-sectional
variation.  However, we can test the data according level of industrial development,
amount of agricultural output, and profile of capital concentration. 
Because the date as presented in Table 13.3 is a rather crude snapshot, I create
more nuanced measure with a series of threshold tests. These tests allow us to measure
nuances within each category.  For each category in the table, I construct three 
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Table 3.13  Summary of Policies in 1888
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State Objects Term Merge
North Connecticut X X X X  
Delaware X X  
Illinois X X X X X X
Indiana X X X
Maine X X X
Maryland X X X X X X
Massachusetts X X
Michigan X X
New Hampshire X X X X
New Jersey X X X X X X X X X
New York X X X X X X X
Ohio X X X X X X X
Pennsylvania X X X
Rhode Island X X X X
Vermont X X X
Wisconsin X ?? X
South Alabama X X X X X X X
Arkansas X X X
Florida X  X X X
Georgia X X X X X X
Kentucky X X X X X X
Louisiana X X X X X X X
Mississippi X X
Missouri X X X X X X X
North Carolina X X
Tennessee X X X X
Virginia X X X
West Virginia X X X X X X X
West California X X X X X X
Iowa X X X X X
Kansas X X X
Minnesota X X X X X X X
Nebraska X X X X
Oregon X X X
Texas X X X X
















Objects:  States silent, permitting no expansion of objects, or requireing changes to the charter are coded as restrictive, others 
are permissive
Any Law: States permitting incorporation for any legal purpose are coded as permisseve, others as restrictive.
Term: States with a maximum term under 50 years are restrictive, others are permissive
Cap limit: States with a maximum on size are coded as restrictive, others are permissive
Real Estate:  States with a hard limit on real estate holdings are restrictive, others are permissive.
Preferred Stock:  States that provided for preferred stock are permissive, others are restrictive.
Shareholder Liability:  States with labor or extra liability are coded as restrictive, others are permissive.
Director Liability:  states with some form of director liability are coded as restrictive
Holding Company: states with any form of corporate stockholding are coded as permissive, others are restrictive.
Merge: states permitting some any form of merger are coded as permissive, other are restrictive.
threshold tests, each more permissive than the next.  In each test, a law is categorized
as 0 or 1, with 1 indicating the more permissive law.  For example, in the area of
allowing corporations to expand their purposes, the three tests are: 1) Does a state
allow expansion of purposes by a altering the charter?  2) Does the state permit either
vertical or horizontal integration?  and 3) Does the state allow corporations to expand
to any purpose?   These questions test for increasing levels of permissiveness.  In all
cases, if the answer is no, the state is scored as 0, and if the answer is yes, the state is
scored as 1.  Thus a state that allows no expansion of objects will not meet any of the
thresholds and is scored as 0 for all three tests.  A state that allows changes to the
charter to allow expansion of objects receives a score of 1 in the first test, but a score
of 0 for the next two texts.  A state that allows either industrial or vertical expansion,
but not to any purpose will receive a score of 1 on each of the first two tests, but a 0 on
the last test.  Finally, a state that allows expansion to any objects will receive a score
of 3 on all three tests.  All together, I create a scale for 8 of the areas where I can create
three such tests.  One area, of director liability, is dichotomous, so I merely create one
dichotomous test for it.  The end result is a dependent variable ranging from 0-25, with
0 being most restrictive, and 25 most permissive.  Table 3.14 displays the tests.
I wish to test for the significance of capital concentration as a cause of liberal
corporation law.  The Census of Manufactures of 1905 contains data on the
composition of the manufacturing sector.137  This included a measure of the total
amount of manufacturing capital in each state, and the percentage in firms of different 
137 United States Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures: 1905 U.S., Bulletin 57, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1906), Table 4.
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Table 3.14  Construction of Threshold Values
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Table 3.2  Expansion of Objects
2a Charter or more easilly no = 0, yes = 1
2b Vertical or Industrial, (or both), or more easily no = 0, yes = 1
2c any  no = 0, yes = 1
Table 3.4  Maximum term of existence
4a 20 or more = 1, if not = 0
4b 50 or more = 1, if not = 0
4c perpetual = 1, if not = 0
Table 3.5  Maximum Level of Capitalization
5a No limit = 1, otherwise = 0
5b Limit of 10 Million or less = 0, otherwise = 1
5c Limit of 2 million or less = 0, otherwise = 1
Table 3.6 Limits on Real Estate
6a none = 1, otherwise = 0
6b soft or greater = 0, otherwise = 1
6c hard or greater = 0, otherwise = 1
Table 3.7 Power to Alter Capital Stock
7a directors = 1, otherwise = 0
7b majority or more = 0, otherwise = 1
7c supermajority or more= 0, otherwise = 1
Table 3.8 Power to Issue Preferred Stock
6a 3.8 yes = 1, no=0 (dichotomous variable) 
Table 3.9 Shareholder Liability
9a Extra (not including Labor) = 0, otherwise = 1
9b Labor (including extra)  = 0, no restrictions on labor = 1
9c Limited = 1, more than limited = 0 
Table 3.11  Merge
11a vert.  = 1, others = 0
11b horiz = 1, others = 0
11c any  = 1, others = 0
Table 3.12   Holding company
12a vertical = 1, otherwise = 0
12b horiz. = 1. otherwise = 0
12c any (includes vertical and horizontal) = 1, otherwise = 0
Table 3.10 (Director Liability) is left out due to lack of variation
sizes.  It divided firm size into five categories: under $5000, from $5000 up to
$20,000, from $20,000 up to $100,000, from $100,000 up to $100,000, and
$1,000,000 and over.  I created an index of capital concentration by simply recording
the percentage of manufacturing capital in each state controlled by firms valued at over
$1,000,000.  This statistic ranged from 0% (no large firm) to 57% (Kansas).  A state
could have a high concentration of capital by not having extensive manufacturing but
having a few large manufacturers, or it could be well developed, with lots of small
sized manufactures.  I control for three other variables.  These are per-capita value
added in manufacturing, (a proxy for industrial development), per capita value of
agricultural products (as a measure of the influence of agriculture), and the ratio of
these last two variables.  These are derived from the 1890 census.138
I test this data using a standard OLS multiple regression. The results are
displayed in Table 3.15.   The degree of capital concentration is both positive and
statistically significant at the .05 level.  This is as expected.  Value of agriculture is
negative and statistically significant at the .05 level.  This makes sense: states
dominated by agriculture were more likely to resist liberal corporation law.  Per-capital
value added in manufacturing is negative (the wrong direction) and not statistically
significant.  While I would have expected a positive result, the lack of significance fits
with my theory.  I expect states with high levels of industrial development, but low
concentration of capital to resist liberal laws.  Finally, the ratio of per-capita value-
added in manufacturing to per capita-value of agriculture is negative, but not 
138 These are derived from Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States,
1790-1970;  Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
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Table 3.15  Liberal Incorporation Law—OLS Model
Table 3.16  Liberal Incorporation Law—Extended Beta Binomial Model
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Capital Concentration        .012***
(.004)
Per-Capita Value-Added in Manufacturing -.003 
(.002)
Per-Capita Value of Agriculture    -.012**
(.006)
Ratio of Manufact. to Agric. -.015 
(.029)
Constant equation 1 -.088 
(.240)
Constant equation 2    .034*
(.018)
Standard errors in parentheses
    *significant at P < .10
  **significant at P < .05 Log Likelihood = -89.07
***significant at P < .01 N=35
Wald Chi2  =  9.64
Prob > Chi2 = .047
Capital Concentration   .102**
(.043)
Per-Capita Value-Added in Manufacturing -.027 
(.024)
Per-Capita Value of Agriculture   -.109**
(.051)
Ratio of Manufact. to Agric. -.133   
(.276)
Constant   11.31***
(2.31)  
F (4, 30) = 2.09
Prob > F = .13
Standard errors in parentheses SEE=3.38
  **significant at P < .05
***significant at P < .01 N=35
adj R2 = .114
significant.  A mere ratio of industrial development to agricultural development does
not explain the permissiveness of corporation law.  The model as a whole approaches,
but does not reach standard definitions of statistical significance.  
The dependent variable in this model is constructed from a series of
dichotomous tests.  It is both discrete (no interval values other than the discrete
numbers) and limited (to between 0 and 25.)  The appropriate procedure for a model
with discrete dependent variables is an extended beta binomial model.139  The
regression used above can be justified because the as the range of the dependent
variable increases, the extended beta binomial model approaches standard OLS
regression.  Nevertheless, it is useful to check the reliability of the OLS model with the
extended beta binomial. The results are presented in Table 3.16.  There we see a
similar patter of direction and significance.  The model as whole is more robust, with a
statistical significance at the .05 level.
Another way to analyze the data is to use a hierarchical cluster analysis.  This
groups the states according to overall similarity of data characteristics.  The groupings
can be graphically displayed with a dendrogram, shown in Figure 3.1.  Similar states
are clustered together. The greater the magnitude of the bracket, the more dissimilar
the groupings.  In this analysis the core of the metropole is clearly distinguished from
the other states.  Thus Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and New York are
grouped together, and Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island are clustered
nearby (New Hampshire is the one unexpected case in this grouping.)  The Southern 
139 See Gary King, Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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Figure 3.1  Hierarchical Cluster Analysis
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states are largely grouped together, as are the states of the Midwest.  The place of Ohio
is quite interesting; it is grouped with states at the periphery of the metropole, rather
than in the industrial core.  This is consistent with its restrictive tradition, including
double liability.  West Virginia sought to attract industrial enterprises, but its grouping
with Southern states indicates the significance of the demographic and industrial
characteristics that presented obstacles to that project.  California is grouped with the
Midwestern states of Minnesota, Missouri, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.  San
Francisco was a metropole of its own, but its location in this analysis indicates that
California's industrial characteristics were tempered with a decidedly agricultural tint.
The Western metropole at that time looked nothing like the Eastern metropole.
Finally, there is no pattern at this time that distinguished the small states from the large
states.  New Jersey is grouped in the metropole, as is Rhode Island, and Delaware is
still a sleepy outpost at the metropole's edge.
The pattern is highly suggestive for students of economic development.
Rostow's take-off theory suggests an organic process of economic growth.  Small
manufacturing, along with cultural acceptance and appropriate education set the stage
for a take-off towards rapid industrial development.140  From small firms grow large
firms.  This research indicates a more complicated process: states with extensive small
manufacturing tend to resist laws that encourage the concentration evident in the large
industrial corporation.  Corporate development in America required sister states with
distinct legal sovereignty that subverted the will of states with extensive small
140 W. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth., 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1962).
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manufacturing.   It is this characteristic that separates New Jersey from Connecticut.
Both states were near Manhattan, and thus both might be considered logical choices
for liberal incorporation law.  But Connecticut, like New York and Massachusetts, has
extensive small manufacturing.  It was not fertile ground for liberal incorporation law.
New Jersey, on the other hand, was.
The full relaxing of incorporation law required an evolution in mentalities over
what was acceptable.  For this reason, the alteration in the New Jersey law was
prefigured by evolutionary change in the preceding quarter century, at least.  By the
end of the century, there was a far more extensive and specialized code specifically
regarding business corporations than existed before.  These changes occurred not in a
vacuum, but in industrial settings that varied from state to state.
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Chapter 4
Corporate Theory and its Tradition in American Politics
America is a nation founded upon individual rights, and the legal system is
designed to protect those rights.  In this context the status of corporations presents a
puzzle.  Corporations are obviously not  “natural” persons.  Yet precisely how they
should be classified and treated has been a source of on going legal debate with real
import.  Is the corporation an entity in its own right, or is it reducible to the
shareholders who own it?  If the former, what rights do corporations have?  What
protections for individuals ought to be applied to corporations in this circumstance?
 If the latter, then corporate rights must also reduce to the shareholders.  Yet how do
we assign liability of a group to its individual members to cover the corporation's
obligations?   Existing scholarship has addressed these questions by an examination of
decisions by the bench, and by doctrine advocated at the bar.  I submit that we must
also examine the statutory record in order to understand both how the law was formed,
and why it changed.
The existing literature shows that early nineteenth century legal doctrine treated
the corporation as an artificial entity. I shall argue that this theory was used to justify
the  granting corporate rights.  By the early twentieth century this was the artificial
entity theory had become discredited.  Changes in procedures from special legislative
acts to general laws of incorporation placed stresses on the formalist construction of
the corporation as an artificial entity, because initiative for corporate creation passed to
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private individuals rather than the state.  The advent of new technologies, the spread of
railroads, and the rise of corporations also served to challenge older, static,
conceptions of property.  Industrial development created new forms of intangible
property that the old, formalist legal doctrine was unable to adequately accommodate.
The greater size with control centered in management of new corporations was also
unanticipated and thus unaccounted for by the older theories.  Changes in property
relations, according to Morton Horwitz, led to a crisis of orthodox modes of legal
thought, and thus to the reconstruction of legal doctrine.1   The nature of the
corporation was at the center of this transformation.  The doctrinal solution that gained
credence in the early twentieth century treated the corporation as a “natural entity.”  
I argue that the same pressures impacted state legislators; the crisis of legal
orthodoxy thus impacted state statutory law.  The reaction of the state legislators to
changes during industrialization these is a largely unrecognized element in the creation
of the “American system” of corporation law that dominated the twentieth century.
Legislators responded to pressures both to expand their economies and yet control
corporate excesses to the benefit of the citizenry.   
The corporate rights of the late nineteenth century were constructed in the
states under the artificial entity theory, and this view was used to justify statutory
regulation.  At times legislators mixed the artificial entity with the elements of a
1 In particular, Morton Horwitz identifies a “Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy” that propelled changes in
legal thought.   Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of
Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).  See also William M. Wiecek, The
Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886-1937 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998); David Millon, “Theories of the Corporation,” Duke Law Journal,
(1990), 201-265.
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partnership theory.  Nevertheless, the extant understandings of the corporation all
pointed to the legitimate role of the state to regulate the properties and extent of
activities of corporations.  The content of corporate rights at the turn of the 20th century
was built on this understanding.
The pervasive practice of corporate creation adds a layer to our understanding
to the operation of ideology in the American political economy.  America has a liberal
tradition based on individual rights.  Rogers Smith asserts that ascriptive traditions
have existed alongside the liberal tradition.2   The pervasive practice of corporate
construction suggests an additional, corporate tradition.  This American tradition of
corporate powers was built in statutes as well as at the bar and bench.  
Legal Theory and the Artificial Entity
The American legal system is founded on individual rights.  The privileging of
the individual in America is derived at least in part from  Lockianism, which regards
individual rights as pre-political.  Because the rights are pre-political, they may not be
violated or abridged by the state.3  Since the corporation is not a natural person, it has
presented problems for the legal system from the outset.  Pre-political rights can only
2 Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Views of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1997).
3  In this view the Bill of Rights is not a granting of rights, but codification of naturally existing
individual rights.  The assertion of the pre-political character of individual rights raises the question
of the need for a bill of rights.  In one view the enumeration of rights is a positive protection for
individuals.  In the other view there is no need to enumerate rights that individuals already have.
Furthermore, any enumeration of individual rights can never be exhaustive: even in stating great
principles, there will be some individual rights that are excluded.  By lack of foresight, the exclusion
of some principles from an enumeration may prejudice the state against enforcing rights that might
well have been considered as important as those enumerated by those who framed the extant
provisions.
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be applied to corporations if the corporation has pre-political status, or if it has rights
as a result of the pre-political rights of the individuals who compose it.  If it is to be
treated as an entity, the question then arises: what constitutional rights and protections
does the corporation have?  What logic could properly capture the problems the
corporation posed for questions of legal standing, enforceability of contracts, or
liability for damages by corporate agents?   This question ultimately is brought to bear
on what protections in the U.S. Constitution, if any, apply to corporations.  Obviously,
if protections for individuals can serve as justifications for the protection of
corporations, a host of legal doctrine that has been settled for the former can be
applied to the latter.4  
Two theories of the corporation contended in the nineteenth century, an
artificial entity theory and a shareholder theory.   Under the artificial entity theory, the
charter of a corporation created an entity distinct from its shareholders, existing in
contemplation of the law.   The corporation in this view is created by grants from the
sovereign.  It has an independent existence from its members.  Under the shareholder
theory, the corporation was merely an vehicle that represented  the shareholders.  It
could thus be reduced to its shareholders for the purpose of rights, and had no
independent existence in and of itself.  Thus the corporation was really a partnership.
This debate over the nature of the corporate entity dates from at least the early
17th century.   Sir Edward Coke addressed the issue of legal entity in the case of
4 Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 65-107; J. Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the
Business Corporation (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1970). Millon, "Theories of the
Corporation," 204-220.
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Sutton's Hospital (1612).  He noted that the hospital corporation at issue was an entity
granted by the Sovereign.  Further, the corporation by necessity existed prior to the
license to create a hospital.  The hospital corporation was, thus, separate from a mere
license to build and operate the hospital.  The King's grant resulted in the “creation of
a body Politick by way of Incorporation, to have perpetual succession, to perfect and
perpetuate so pious and charitable a work.”5  The charter itself stated that to provide
for the hospital's effectiveness “That the said persons &c. be one body corporate and
Politick, to have perpetual succession to endure for ever: We do by these presents for
ever hereafter fully and really incorporate, &c. to have capacity and ability to take
&c.”6  Note that the purpose was to promote a more effective endeavor than would
otherwise be the case.  Note also that the sovereign creates a “political body,” with
vested rights.
  Early American corporations were founded on a similar premise.  Alexander
Hamilton was an astute student of the British system of incorporation, including the
incorporation of the Bank of England in 1694.7  In his 1791 memo to George
Washington on the appropriateness of chartering a bank Hamilton emphasized that a
charter gave “legal or artificial capacity to one or more persons, distinct from the
natural.”8  Hamilton's interpretation was not materially different from Coke's.  Both
5 The Case of Sutton's Hospital, Michaelmas Term, 10 James I (1612) [First Published in Reports,
vol. 10, page 23 a], 25 a- 26 b; Quoted from Steven Shepard, ed., The Selected Writing of Sir
Edward Coke, Vol. I (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, 2003), p 354. 
6 Ibid., 355-56.
7 See Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 156-157, 295-301.
8 Alexander Hamilton, “Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank”, quoted in
Brest, Levinson, Balkin and Amar, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and
Materials, 4th Ed.  (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2000)   Emphasis in original.
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justified corporations as artificial entities that furthered the public good.
The uncertainly in the law over how to treat the corporation was evident in
Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux (1809).9  There the court ruled that for purposes of
jurisdiction the corporation was an entity distinct from its shareholders.  Chief Justice
Marshall noted that the corporation was “defined as a mere creature of law, invisible,
intangible, and incorporeal.”10  Statutory language, therefore, must be explicit in order
for the corporation to have standing: it could not have standing as a matter of mere
existence.   The question in this case was whether the owners of the corporation, as
citizens of diverse states, had the right to sue in federal court.  Despite his
pronouncement of the corporation as an entity, Marshall nevertheless also noted that
corporations “have been included within terms of description appropriated to real
persons.”11  Thus on the question of jurisdiction the court should “look to the character
of the individuals who compose the corporation.”12  This decision treated the
corporation as an artificial entity, yet for purposes of jurisdiction reduced the
corporation to its members.  However, it left open the question of how the law would
rule on corporate personality when substantive issues were at stake.13   
The nature of the corporation in regards to substantive issues came to a head in
the next decade, in the Dartmouth College (1819) case.14  At issue was whether the




13 This, we might surmise, is consistent with judicial practice of not answering a question that need not
be answered in order to settle the case at hand, thus allowing precedent to build as circumstances
warrant. 
14 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
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grant of a charter by the state could be revoked.  In ruling that the state could not
revoke a charter, Marshall provided a clear statement of the artificial entity theory:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or
as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best
calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most
important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed,
individuality; properties by which a perpetual succession of many persons are
considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a
corporation to manage its own affairs and to hold property without the
perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity of perpetual
conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly
for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities
and capacities that corporations were invented and are in use.15
The ruling in Dartmouth that grants made by the sovereign to a corporate entity
could not be taken back by the state was substantially modified by the Taney court in
the Charles River Bridge case (1837).16  There, the state had chartered a corporation,
granting it the right to build a bridge and charge tolls for use of the bridge.  The court
ruled that, in the absence of an explicit provision to the contrary in the Charles River
Bridge charter, the state could charter a nearby competing bridge without violating the
charter agreement of the Charles River Bridge.  This altered the ruling from
Dartmouth College, because in the absence of an explicit provision to the contrary, a
grant of monopoly is not exclusive.17
Despite these significant disagreements with Marshall over the state's right to
15 Ibid.
16 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
17 As a result of Dartmouth College states wrote provisions in their corporation law allowing
revocation or alteration of charters.  Only corporation chartered before such acts were exempt from
this.  However, states also wrote provisions requiring that any existing corporation that sought an
addition privilege must accept an amendment that made the charter subject to amendment, alteration,
or revocation.
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issue charters that impacted an existing chartered corporation, both Taney and
Marshall were in agreement as to the proper characterization of corporation as an
artificial entity.  This is evident in Taney's rejection of the of the partnership theory in
Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839).
Whenever a corporation makes a contract it is the contract of the legal entity;
of the artificial being created by the charter; and not the contract of the
individual members.  The only rights it can claim are the rights which are
given to it in that character, and not the right which belong to its members as
citizens of a state.18
Taney further noted that to reduce the corporation to a partnership of the stockholders
would have the effect rendering the stockholders fully liable for the debts of the
corporation.  
Thus, the artificial entity theory of the corporation was predicated on the
corporation as a grant of privileges from the state.  State legislatures made individual
grants to applicants, and passed individual charters by legislative enactment.
Originally these were for public purposes: to build a road or a bridge, or to provide
some other needed public service.  Over the course of the nineteenth century the
purposes for which corporations were granted charters expanded.  By the middle of the
century corporations were chartered for a wide variety of profit making motive, often
with no discernible “public” purpose.  A canal or railroad corporations did have a
public purpose, while a manufacturing firm did not.  
18 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519.
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The Context of the Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy
Morton Horwitz argues that the late nineteenth century witnessed a crisis in
orthodox conceptions of the law.  Classical legal thought was based on formalistic
reasoning.  This reasoning sought to render the state as a neutral arbiter of claims on
wealth.  It sought to categorical, syllogistic reasoning based on absolute principles.
Categorical reasoning conceptualized events as subject in legal decisions to “bright-
line classifications” characterized by certain logical deduction.19  It sought a complete
and closed system of legal reasoning to render decisions based on neutral principles.
This would, among other things, avoid consequentialist, results oriented decisions.
Such a mode of reasoning would avoid populistic redistribution of wealth.
The theoretical foundation of legal formalism came under an assault due to the
exigencies of an expanding economy.  The technological innovations of the industrial
age placed stresses on formalistic legal relations.  Most economic activity centered on
corporations.  As corporations grew, they drew more and more contracts.  With their
greater size, actions of corporate agents became ubiquitous.  Many actions of
negligence resulted from the economic activities of agents in the name of the corporate
entity.  Formalist classical legal doctrines were ill suited to the new industrial
conditions.  This was particularly the case in the areas of contracts, torts, and agency.
The result was a casting about for a new set of legal theories.  
At the middle of the century the prevailing theory of contract law was based
upon a meeting of the minds between the parties to a given contract.  The task of the
19 Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 17.  See also Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical
Legal Thought.  
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law was to ascertain what was meant by each party to the contract, and to render
judgment accordingly.  This was termed the “will” theory of contracts.   The problem
with such a theory is that juries were directed to search for the “will” of each of the
parties, and the results often seemed arbitrary and unpredictable.  Following the Civil
War, judges began to search for an standard that would be more predictable.  An
“objective” standard of contact invoked expected community standards of the meaning
of the terms of the contract.  This was part of a wider ranging effort to provide neutral
standards.  Objectivism was part of a movement away from a “natural rights”
philosophy with roots in the founding generation of the American political system.20  
Classical legal thought sought to limit civil torts to circumstances where
“objective causation” could be determined.  Thus “proximate” causes and empirical
“chains of causation” were needed in order to assign liability. The task of judges was
to ascertain the single cause of empirical chain of events that led to a harm.21  This
standard survived the 19th century, to come under attack by legal realists in the early
20th century.  The challenge came in the wake of challenges to the notion of simple
causation in natural sciences.  Legal scholars began to recognize that there were often
multiple causes to events, and that no one by itself would cause the event.  The result
of multiple causation was that there could be “no necessary connection between
particular causes and effects,” and assignment of blame must instead depend upon
statistical correlation between a purported cause and its result.22  Or, as Oliver Wendall




Holmes famously noted, “the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master
of economics.”23
An element of the law of agency is the extent of control and the degree of
liability a principal has over his agent.  With the rise of large corporate organizations,
the question of principal responsibility for agents conduct took on greater importance.
“There was a trade-off between, on the one hand, corporate control of the behavior of
employees and, on the other, the level of confidence that third parties would have in
the legitimate authority of these employees.”24  Could an agent bind his principal if, for
example, the agent exceeded his authority?  How would a third party know this, and
what sort of contracts would be held to be void?  In the late nineteenth century courts
promulgated a doctrine of “apparent authority,” that an agent need not have actual
authority if it was reasonable for a third party to believe that he did 25  This doctrine
was at odds with orthodox legal thinking.  Under such theory there could be no
“meeting of the minds” central to a “will” theory of contract.   
The agency problem raised the issue of corporate “will.”  What was the nature
of the authority of the corporation, and how could a court determine what the “will” of
a corporation was in delegating authority to its agents?  How could an artificial entity
23 Oliver Wendall Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” in Collected Legal Papers (Harcourt, Brace, and
Howe, 1920), 187.  Quoted in Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 59.
24 Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 39-40.
25 Horwitz contends that there was a bifurcation between theory of agency in the late nineteenth
century in legal treatises, on the one hand, and in judicial decision, on the other.  The former
theorized that a principal could only be liable for what he actually authorized, which was based on
subjective will.  Thus an agent that misrepresented himself was liable for damages, and the principal
was not.  The latter contended that an agents contracts were binding on the principal if the third party
could have reasonably expected the agent to have authority to execute a contract, whether or not the
agent did in fact have that authority.  Ibid., 40-45.
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have a “will”?  Was the will of the corporation the will it its shareholders voting in
unanimity? Or voting as a majority?  In Horwitz's terms, “The corporate form thus
forced judges to objectivize legal concepts, to look for the reliance of a “reasonable
person” rather than the actual subjective (or particular) command of a principal.”26
Thus in agency, as in contracts and torts, the development of the corporation placed
stresses on orthodox legal theory, eventually leading to the realist critique.  Corporate
development thus impacted a wide array of legal doctrine.
The late nineteenth century was a time of massive change in immigration,
labor unrest, depression, and market cartelization.  The disruptive changes of this
period induced Oliver Wendall Holmes to question subjective standards. 27  In the
advent of corporate concentration, the existing natural rights doctrine could not
provide unequivocal distinctions of property rights.  New technological advances led
to conflict over the extent of property rights and to new claims to abstract property.
Horwitz argues that “the shift from landed to intangible property exposed the socially
created and hence disputable character of all property boundaries.”28
The Crisis of the Artificial Entity Theory in the Late Nineteenth Century
There is a general agreement among scholars that the artificial entity theory of
the corporation came under stress in the second half of the 19th century.  States during
this period changed their means of creating charters from special legislative acts to




general laws.  Whereas charters made by special acts of legislatures were a grant by
the sovereign, general laws of incorporation made charters available to all applicants
that met a predetermined set of criteria.  Thus the corporation was no longer a result of
a “grant” by the state, but rather the initiative for corporate creation resided in the
actions of private individuals.  According to Horwitz, general laws of incorporation
gradually caused the demise of the grant theory.29  
With the crisis of the artificial entity theory, some legal theorists sought to
articulate a “partnership theory” whereby the corporation was merely the sum total of
its shareholders.30   As foreseen by Taney in Bank of Augusta v. Earle,31 this led to a
concern over liability.  If members were partners, then they by rights ought to be liable
for debts and for negligent or criminal actions of the corporation.  But most states had
full limited liability, double liability, or limited liability plus liability for wages of
labor.  This would not be consistent with the partnership theory.  The partnership
theory ran into another obstacle.  In small corporations owners and the managers were
typically one and the same.  In larger corporations, no one individual shareholder had
effective control over the corporation.  As corporations grew in size, management
became separated from ownership.32  The growth of the large corporation in the late
nineteenth century forced legal writers to rethink the place of the large corporation.  A
29 Ibid., 73.  See also Millon, "Theories of the Corporation," 206-211; and William W. Bratton, Jr.,
"The Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, Cornell Law Review, vol. 74 (1989),
434-36.
30 The first advocate of this was Victor Morawitz in Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations, 1st
ed. (New York: Little, Brown, 1882), vol. 1, iii.  See. Horwitz, Transformation of American Law,
90.
31 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519.
32 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means.  The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New
York: Macmillan, 1932.)
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partnership theory of the corporation is inconsistent when the management, rather than
shareholders, has control of the corporation.  Further, a partnership theory would tend
to require unanimous vote of the shareholders in order to effect major transactions.
This was impractical; many state statutes and court decisions set majority rule as an
acceptable standard.  
Despite its impracticalities, Horwitz contends that advocates of the partnership
theory paved the way for a third theory, the “natural entity theory,” by pointing out the
flaws of the artificial entity theory.  The natural entity theory would find adherents
early in the 20th century.  It rose out of German idealism, which sought to assign
natural rights to groups as well as to individuals.  In the years surrounding 1900 Ernst
Freund and Frederic Maitland each began to advance the ideas developed by Otto
Gierke in Germany that the corporation was a “real” entity.”33   They argued that the
corporation was a natural part of the political economy.  Because general laws were
available to all applicants (as opposed to the requirement of legislative acts to create a
corporation), corporation arose from the actions of private persons.  Further,
concentration was an inevitable and natural part of more advanced economic activity
that led to increased efficiency.  The corporation was a “natural entity” with pre-
political rights analogous with those of individuals.34  Treating the corporation as a
33 See Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 71 90-98; David Millon, “Theories of the
Corporation,” 211-16;  Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Translated by Frederic
Maitland), (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958);  Frederic Maitland, “Moral Personality and Legal
Personality” in H. A. L. Fisher, ed., The Collected Papers of  Frederic William Maitland, vol 3
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1911), p 304;  Ernst Freund, The Legal Nature of
Corporations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897).
34 The group rights of German Idealism was not consonant with the methodological individualism of
natural rights theories in America.   Its adaptation in the United States required stripping  the group
natural rights element foundation from this theory.  Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 70-
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natural entity dispensed with the problems associated with the partnership theory.  
The Private/Public Distinction
Lockian individualism seeks to make a sharp private/public distinction, and to
limit legitimate government actions to only the latter.  The development of a market
economy in the nineteenth century sharpened this distinction.35  However, corporation
law in both statute and in case law challenged the traditional notions of the distinction
between public and private spheres.  As Horwitz notes, the Dartmouth College case
emphasized this distinction, making the corporation a private concern rather than an
extension of the state.36  
The effort to make a bright line public/private distinction was challenged by the
practice of corporation charters.  Early corporate charters were granted to private
corporations in order to improvements for the public good.  Thus corporations were
chartered to build and operate bridges, roads, canals, public utilities, and banks.  As
the century progressed, states began enacting charters for business purposes that did
not have so obvious a public function.  States chartered municipal corporations that
had private attributes, including the ability to hold property and make contracts.  States
also chartered private corporations that were granted rights to eminent domain, and
provided public service.  These "hard cases" posed a challenge to a sharp
72.
35 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).  Morton J. Horwitz,
"The History of the Public/Private Distinction," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v. 130
(1982), 1423-28, 1424.     
36 Horwitz, "The History of the Public/Private Distinction,"1425.  Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 559, 669-73 (1819).
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public/private distinction.  Most famously, Munn v. Illinois (1877)37 sought to make a
distinction between corporations "affected with the public interest" that could be
regulated by the state.  Oren Bracha argues that the creation of  the category of quasi-
public corporation was actually evidence of an effort to clarify the split between the
private and public realms.  Thus, he argues that in the late nineteenth century public
corporations were considered to potentially have both public and private capacities,
and private corporations potentially had both quasi-public and fully private capacities.
The intermediate categories enabled bright line distinctions between public and private
to persist.38  The mode of classical legal thought that dominated judicial rulings during
the Lochner era from 1905 to 1937 was predicated on a sharp distinction between the
public and private spheres.  The legal realist critique was in part an effort to expose
this distinction as artificial.39
The principal agent problem posed a dilemma for corporate capitalism.
Orthodox concepts of principle and agent that were adequate for small partnerships,
and even small proprietary corporations, were inadequate for the large modern
corporation.  With the transformation to corporate capitalism came the need to
redefine the legal status of directors as trustees rather than as agents.  According to
Horwitz, the law was forced to change to accommodate a developing national market
characterized by impersonal relations.  The way out of the dilemma was to change the
law, and legal doctrine. 
37 94 U.S. 113.
38 Oren Bracha, "Corporate Theory, Tilt and Legitimation: The Historical Narrative Reexamined,"
(Unpublished manuscript, 7/1/03 draft), 39-52..  Citation with permission of the author.
39 Horwitz, "The History of the Public/Private Distinction," 1426.
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The Disconnect of Corporate Privileges and Immunities 
The transformation of the legal theory of the corporation required a significant
adjustment in the judicial construction of the legal status of corporations.  At issue is
whether the corporation is a “person” under specific clauses of the United States
Constitution.  There is a notable disconnect between its exclusion under Article IV and
its later inclusion under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Paul v. Virginia (1869)40 the U. S. Supreme Court was presented with the
question of whether a corporation was covered as a person under the meaning of
Article IV of the United States Constitution.  Article IV states that “The citizens of
each state shall be entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states.”  The issue in that case was whether Virginia could enact licenses and required
bonds to be posted by foreign insurance companies but not on insurance companies
chartered in the state.  Justice Field ruled that the Article IV privileges and immunities
clause did not apply to corporations.  His reasoning that the privileges and immunities
clause was intended to give citizens rights in the various states under the laws of each
state.  A privilege given by a state to citizens in that state was not intended to give
those same citizens those same privileges in another state.  It was not intended to give
one state the right to legislate operations in another state.  He noted that most business
is conducted by corporations.  If the court were to allow corporations privileges and
immunities of citizens, then “it is easy to see that, with the advantages thus possessed,
the most important business of those States would soon pass into their hands.  The
40 75 U. S. 168.
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principal business of every State would, in fact, be controlled by corporation created
by other States.”41  Field restricted this counterfactual, oddly enough, to circumstances
where all the shareholders of a corporation were from one state, doing business in
another state.  
The reasoning in Paul was predicated in part on the reasoning by Chief Justice
Taney in Bank of Augusta v. Early.42  There, the Court ruled that corporation contracts
executed in one state would have validity in another state, absent an overt restriction in
the second state's statutes.  Validity of contracts was the default rule.  The second state
retained the right to make what restrictions it deemed appropriate.  In using the
privileges and immunities clause of the Article IV to determine the true legal nature of
a corporation, Taney reasoned that if a citizen in Georgia were a shareholder in a
corporation, and the citizen had the benefits of a corporation able to operate in
Alabama, this citizen would have greater rights in Alabama than a citizen of Alabama.
This, he thought, could not have been contemplated or been expected by the founders
of the Constitution.43  Thus a corporation was an artificial entity that was not merely
reducible to its shareholders.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States passed in
1868.44  Section One included three clauses protecting the rights of individuals:
41 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168, at 182.
42 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519.
43 Ibid., 6 .
44 Precisely what might be meant by the term “Privileges and Immunities” means, irrespective of
corporation law, is not absolutely clear.  For a discussion of Congressional debates over meaning of
the term as applicable to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Brest, Levinson, Balkin and Amar, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking:
Cases and Materials, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2000),  p242-249.
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privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection.  In short order the first of
these was virtually read out of the Constitution by Justice Miller, writing the lead
opinion in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873).45  The privileges or immunities clause
states that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States.”  Parsing the text carefully, Miller noted
that the United States was characterized by dual sovereignty, and that people
potentially had citizenship both in the United States as a whole, and in the state
wherein they reside.  He interpreted this clause to prohibit States from abridging
privileges and immunities of persons only in their capacity as “citizens of the United
States.”  It did not apply to prohibitions of states abridging privileges or immunities of
citizens of their own state.  In this interpretation, that was a matter of the state's own
business.   Miller also ruled that the equal protection clause only applied to the newly
free African-Americans and not to corporations.46  
In dissent, Justice Field referred to the Article IV provision of the Constitution
to derive a proper construction of the Privileges or Immunities clause of the 14th
Amendment.47  He noted the prior history of the clause, relying on Corfield v. Coryell
(1823).48  Field's summary of the interpretation of this Article IV is that “No
discrimination can be made by one State against the citizens of other States in their
enjoyment, nor can any greater imposition be levied than such as is laid upon its own
45 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
46 Ibid., 81.
47 It is worth noting, for hyper-textualists, that Article IV refers to “Privileges and Immunities” while
the 14th Amendment refers to “Privileges or Immunities” (emphasis mine).  However, Justice Field,
in using Article IV as a means of interpreting the 14th Amendment, treats the clauses as identical.
48 4 Washington's Circuit Court, 371; 6 F. Cas. 546.
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citizens.  It is a clause which insures equality in the enjoyment of these rights between
citizens of the several States whilst in the same State.”49  He also referred to his own
opinion in Paul v. Virginia, and did not find it to be an impediment to his
interpretation in the case: “The whole purport of the decision was, that citizens of one
State do not carry with them into other States any special privileges or immunities,
conferred by the laws of their own States, of a corporate or other character. That
decision has no pertinency to the questions involved in this case.  The common
privileges and immunities which of right belong to all citizens, stand on a very
different footing.”50   In other words,  Field notes in Paul v. Virginia that a corporation
is not a person under the meaning of Article IV.  Further, if a corporation is not a
person under the meaning of Article IV privileges and immunities, it is also not a
person under the meaning of the 14th Amendment privileges or immunities clause.
In this context the well known case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad is most striking in its disconnect from prior doctrine.51  The Santa Clara case
declared that corporations would be treated as persons under the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.  This ruling was
remarkably brief, and declared without lawyer's briefs.  Chief Justice Waite  stated that
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a
State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.52
49 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U. S. 36 (1873) at 98.
50 Ibid., at 100.
51 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company (1886) 118 U.S. 394.
52 Ibid.
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Here the court famously gave no grounds for its dicta that the equal protection clause
was applicable to corporations.  It is notable that in this dicta there is no mention of the
other clauses of the first section of the 14th Amendment, namely the due process clause
and the privileges or immunities clause.  In Paul v. Virginia Field addresses the
meanings of Privileges and Immunities.  Yet here the court did not discuss whether
one of the clauses ought to apply to corporations but the others ought not.
Remarkably, there has been little if any discussion of this in the literature.
It is logical to suppose that the meaning of Privileges and Immunities in Article
IV ought to be identical to the meaning of Privileges or Immunities in the Fourteenth
Amendment.  It is also logical to suppose that the three clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment (Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection) ought to be
treated similarly as to their application to corporations; either they should all apply, or
note of them should apply.  It is interesting in this context to remember that in
Slaughterhouse the Privileges or Immunities clause was for all intents and purposes
read right out of the Constitution, and the Due Process clause was interpreted
extremely narrowly.  Yet that is no reason not to apply the three clauses to
corporations in a similar manner.  With the Privileges or Immunities clause of the 14th
Amendment already having been read out of the Constitution, the application of the
Equal Protection clause to corporations was feasible, by merely eliding the prior
history of Article IV.
If this is correct is leads to a peculiar observation.  Justice Field dissented in
Slaughterhouse, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment ought to be read broadly.
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Yet the Slaughterhouse decision, by eviscerating the Privileges or Immunities clause,
made it easier to ignore the interpretation of Article IV in Paul v. Virginia, and to
apply the Equal Protection clause to corporations in Santa Clara.  We might then
surmise that the Slaughterhouse decision was in the long run beneficial to Field's
effort to include corporations under Fourteenth Amendment protections.  Counsel in
Santa Clara could not make a Privileges and Immunities argument.  The court instead
made an Equal Protection ruling via dicta that might have seemed at odds with the
Paul v. Virginia precedent.  By making the ruling via dicta, the court was more easily
able to avoid mention of this anomaly.
It is notable that at least some contemporaries did make the connection. 53
Delegates at the Kentucky Constitutional Convention of 1890 cited the Paul v.
Virginia line of precedents that the corporation was not protected by the Privileges and
Immunities clause of Article IV.  After quoting extensively from Paul v. Virginia one
delegate noted:
“This is sufficient to show that foreign corporation can find no crumb
of comfort in article four of the Federal Constitution.  Now, when I am asked
concerning their rights under the fourteenth amendment, I do not hesitate to
say that, in my judgment, their status is not very  much improved with respect
to the matter under consideration.  I do not think they are “persons” within
the language of that amendment, unless within the jurisdiction of our State.
The language is, “no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”
But the trouble is that they cannot come within our jurisdiction unless
we consent to it.  But, as we have seen, we have the right to withhold this
53 In addition, delegates at the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1874 also made (inexact) reference
to the decisions of Paul v. Virginia ( that a corporation is a person for purposes of jurisdiction, but
not for purposes of Article 4.)  Ohio, Constitutional Convention (1873-4), Official Report of the
Proceedings and Debates of the Third Constitutional Convention of Ohio; Assembled in ....
Cincinnati.... December 2, 1873, 4 vols.(Cleveland: W. S. Robinson, Printers to the Convention,
1873-4), 2481-2, 2484. 
154
consent, almost without limit.  And until we have allowed them to come
within our jurisdiction, they cannot, by possibility, be persons within the
Fourteenth Amendment....
The result is, that we have the right to say that foreign corporations
shall not be “persons,” within the fourteenth amendment, so far as we are
concerned; and if we do, the word person becomes limited, as to us, to natural
persons, so far as non-residents are concerned.54
In the discussion there is no mention of the Santa Clara decision, suggesting that
otherwise knowledgeable lawyers were not aware of the dicta.  In any case it
demonstrates that contemporaries connected Article IV to the Fourteenth Amendment,
and thought it reasonable to apply the two sections of the Constitution to corporations
in a like manner.
In light of this, it is all the more striking in discussions of corporate personality
that no commentator I have come across connects the line of precedents through Paul
v. Virginia to the line of precedents that begin with the dicta of Santa Clara.55
Horwitz's discussion of Santa Clara centers on the contention that the natural entity
theory was not developed in the United States until the 1890's.56   Others have accepted
Horwitz on this point, at least, even if they disagree on whether the impact of the
natural entity theory in the 19th century as a legitimator of corporate capitalism.57
54 Kentucky, Constitutional Convention (1890), Official report of the proceedings and debates in the
Convention assembled at Frankfort, on the eighth day of September, 1890, to adapt, amend, or
change the constitution of the state of Kentucky, 4 vols. (Frankfort, Kentucky: E. P. Johnson, printer
to the Convention, 1890 [1891]). Vol. 3, 3673.  Emphasis in original.
55 In a footnote, Bratton notes that the corporation does not have Article IV rights, but does have
Fourteenth Amendment rights. However, he does not allude to any logical difficulty in such.  He
regards this as perfectly within the tradition in law of nineteenth century legal treatises, and suggests
that this tradition is parallel, but separate from other elements in legal discourse.  William J. Bratton,
The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History," Stanford Law Review,
vol. 41 (July, 1989), 1471-1525, n. 157 at 1503.  
56 His concern was to show that the Court could not have had the natural entity theory in mind when
Santa Clara was decided in 1886.  Rather, he argues, this decision was predicated on language
indicative of the partnership theory.  In that circumstance, individuals had equal protection rights as
a result of membership in a corporation.  Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 69-74.
57 See for example, Millon, "Theories of the Corporation."
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The Corporation as a Political Construction
An important element regarding the nature of the firm reduces to the nature of
the grant.   That question is: does it make a difference in corporate theory whether a
corporation was created by special legislative enactment or by a general law?    Under
the grant theory, a corporation charter is a grant from the sovereign.  These were made
be special legislative enactments.  With the advent of general laws, corporations were
created at the initiative of a group of individuals, meeting a predefined set of
procedures.  Horwitz asserts that general laws placed stress on the artificial entity
theory.  Because charters were available to all applicants they were no longer a
“grant.”58  There are two ways of addressing this issue: first, by an examination of
legislative intent, and second by logic.
As the next chapter will show, there is no such concern by delegates to
constitutional conventions who argued in favor of general laws; their concerns were
two-fold: first, that the granting of special favors that favored some interests at the
expense of others, and second, that the creation of special legislation was swamping
the legislature.  To create corporations by general law would save the legislature time.
The question then is whether making charters ubiquitous alters their nature as a
“grant” from the sovereign.  The legislatures clearly thought not.  There were issues
about how to treat corporations created before the general laws, as opposed to those
created after the general laws.  What they sought to achieve was uniformity in the laws
of corporations, which would create a level playing field; this, one might suspect, is a
58 See note 34, above.
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goal that would be supported by legal academics and neoclassical economists.
In most cases the law did not treat a corporation created by general laws
differently than a corporation created by special legislation.  The transition form
special privileges to uniform general laws did require a some selective treatment of the
old firms.  The firms enacted by special law sometimes had vested rights.  To
eliminate these over time states enacted provisions requiring that if a corporation
desired to take actions not previously allowed to it, that corporation must accept the
requirements of the state constitution.  This brought the existing corporation in line
with the general laws, the same as the corporations enacted under general laws.
Because corporate purposes were typically written narrowly, corporations wishing to
expand operations would have to accede to this state demand.59  Some states did seek
to regulate specially created corporations differently.   In Michigan, for example, the
state constitution did allow the legislature to grant special corporations with a two-
thirds vote, and also allowed the legislature to amend that same charter with a majority
vote.  Corporations made by general law could follow the procedures laid out in law.60
However, in other regards, there is no difference.  Laws of contracts, of tort, of agency
would apply equally to corporations created by special law or by general law.  This
indicates that the mere creation of a corporation by general laws available to all does
59 For example, the Kentucky provision stated: “No corporation in existence at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution shall have the benefit of future legislation without first filing in the office of the
Secretary of State an acceptance of the provisions of this Constitution.”  Kentucky Constitution of
1890, Sec. 190.
60 Michigan, Constitutional Convention (1867), The Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Michigan, Convened at the City of Lansing, Wednesday, May 15, 1867,
Official Report by Wm. Blair Lord and David Wolfe Brown, 2 vols. (Lansing, MI: John A. Kerr &
Co., printers to the state, 1867.)
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not eliminate the fact that the corporation is a grant.  But it is a particular type of grant,
that must be made available indiscriminately.
State legislators had to contend with the pressures that led to a crisis of legal
orthodoxy.  However, legislatures have a different mix of pressures than do courts.
State legislature, in particular, are the branch of government intended in theory to be
least insulated from public pressure.  Thus legislators had to meet the challenges to
orthodox conceptions of the law while mediating pressures to maintain economic
growth and accommodate new corporate demands without losing state authority.   
This research strongly supports the analysis of Charles McCurdy in regards to
the E.C. Knight decision of 1895.  In that case the Supreme Court made a distinction
between indirect effects of commerce and direct effects.  They ruled that
manufacturing was distinct from commerce, and that manufacturing had only an
indirect effect on commerce.  Therefore they narrowly construed the power of
Congress to regulate economic activity, and narrowly construed its power under the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.  McCurdy argues that at that time it was still
reasonable to expect that states would be able to regulate corporations via statutory
law.  To allow the federal government latitude in this area would weaken the states'
ability to do so.61
That the legislatures thought they had the ability to shape the constitutive
rights of corporations is evident from the variety of restrictions that were placed in
their corporation law.  There were two major types of concerns.  First, that individuals
61 Charles W. McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American
Corporation Law, 1869-1903”, Business History Review, 53:3 (1979), 304-342.
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not be unfairly disadvantaged relative to corporations, and second, to advance the
industry in the state.
Commentators have noted that most discussions of corporate attributes remain
separate from close analysis of corporate theory.62  Certainly not all legislators needed
to be deeply steeped in corporate theory to propose and implement either special
legislation or modifications to general incorporation laws.  This is supported by the
record of state constitutional conventions.  We see confusion among delegates at times
over what the corporation was, with some delegates propounding a partnership theory,
and others an entity theory, without necessarily recognizing the inherent contractions.63
There is no question, however, that some contemporaries were well versed in
the law.  Further, and none had any doubt over the right of the state to regulating and
in some ways control the corporate entity. The debates were over the policy of greatest
wisdom, which policies would give the economy the greatest chance for advance, and
also questions of equity.  State corporation law has a role in regulating the economy by
shaping corporation law.
How the corporation became large bears on how the state should treat the
corporate entity.  At issue in the nature of the corporation is role of the state in
regulating relations between shareholders, management, workers, creditors, and
customers.  As William Bratton notes, the state reserves the right to alter the terms of
62 See Bratton, "New Economic Theories of the Firm,” 1471.
63 This is precisely as characterized by the philosopher John Dewey in a famous 1926 article on the
indeterminacy of corporate theory.  John Dewey, "The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality," Yale Law Journal, v. 34 (April, 1926), 655-73.
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corporate creation.64  But the point deserves greater emphasis than Bratton gives it,
because it directs our attention to political influences on corporate creation.  One
obvious point is that the statutory history of corporation law developed in Chapter
Three points to choices that were taken at one point in time, but are no longer
implemented.   Greater state regulation of corporate charters is certainly well within
the laissez faire tradition of American politics.
This observation leads us to a more substantial conclusion as we seek to
appreciate the place of the American corporation in a developmental perspective.  The
liberalization of corporate charter law so that the corporation could do anything it
wanted grew not merely out of a single state responding to a robber baron's request.  It
grew through a century of state experimentation with legal forms.  These legal forms
sought to keep state restraints over the corporation while at the same time unleashing
entrepreneurial energies.  The legal code was used as a vehicle for promoting
economic growth.  The variety of economic profiles and economic interests provided
grist for legislative innovation.  States created the situations in which corporations
operated.  The context of private and public operations gave rise to the constitutional
law conundrums that confronted the Supreme Court in its great antitrust decisions,
particularly Trans-Missouri (1897), and the Standard Oil case (1911).65  
Many elements of corporation law adjudicated in the courts used to be done via
statute.  For example, David Millon traces doctrinal changes in internal corporate
governance, regulated by court decisions.  In the late 19th century a majority could bind
64 Bratton, “The Nexus of Contracts” Corporation," 445. 
65 See Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction.
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the minority only in particular circumstances, namely on the sale of assets due to a
bankruptcy; however, a series of rulings in the early 20th century allowed a bare
majority to bind the minority.66  In the nineteenth century, much of this was regulated
by state statute.  States often clearly indicated what percentage of shareholders was
necessary to effect the increase in capital stock, the purchase of another firm, or other
types of  significant market transactions.   States could still impose restrictions, and
define rights and duties.  It is a power gone dormant due first, to the dynamics of
federalism, and second to impassivity born of a forgotten legacy   It is only in the
absence of such state action hat the courts get involved in defining fundamental rights. 
The creation of corporation laws has been shaped by federalism.  The
application of a continuous application of knowledge to elements of production has
been accompanied by legislative enactment to protect economic interests and release
entrepreneurial energies.  In the United States corporations are chartered in the states.
Revenue for the right to charter goes to the state that granted the charter.  Yet the
corporation extends across political boundaries, and finds itself under the protection
not only of laws of other states (due to comity between the states), but also under the
protection of the United States government67  This allows states (now Delaware in
particular) to exact conditions on political entities outside of its political boundaries.
Debates in the legal profession have been over whether the federal system of charter
66  Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. (254 U.S. 590, 596 (1921); Metcalf v. American School
Furniture Co., 122 F. 115, 119 (W.D. N.Y. 1903); Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 10 Del Ch.
371, 378, 93 A. 380, 383 (1915).  He also notes that state legislatures by the early 1920's had
allowed mere majority approval to make fundamental changes.  Millon, “Theories of the
Corporation,” 215.
67 For example, the Santa Clara case granting corporations 14th Amendment equal protection status.
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specialization has resulted in a “race to the bottom” which has resulted in the lowering
of social standards, or a “race to the top” that has promoted economic efficiency.68
Either way, the construction of corporation law has been intricately shaped by the
dynamics of American federalism. 
The Corporate Tradition in American Politics
Legal discourse in the nineteenth and early twentieth century included debate
over the legal personality of corporations.  At issue was whether the corporation was a
"person" in the meaning of the law, whether it was an "real" entity, whether it was a
"natural entity," or whether it reduced to its shareholders.  The corporation does not
necessarily fit any such category.  It is an archetype of its own.  John Dewey argued in
a famous article that the corporation is just what the law says it is.  To put it another
way, the corporation is.....a corporation.   In  contemporary terms, it is a legal
construct.  What I then argue here is that the statutory history should properly inform
our conception of the corporation.  Its construction was not merely in courts of law or
in arguments in legal treatises, but it was also constructed in state statutes in particular
settings.  
68  William Cary initiated debate by arguing that state competition  led states to favor management at
the expense of shareholders because it is the managers who are in a position to shop among states for
the most favorable charter. William Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware,” Yale Law Journal, (1974) 83: 663-705.  Daniel Fischel argued that the resulting
economic efficiencies led to a “race to the top”, while Lucien Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell argue that
economic inefficiencies have been the result.  Daniel R. Fischel, “The ‘Race to the Bottom’
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law”, Northwestern
University Law Review, (1982) 76: 913-45. Lucien Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell,  “Federalism
and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers,” Columbia Law Review (1999)
1165, 1168.  
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To point to state capacity, and in particular, legislative capacity, is to pay more
attention to politics.  In this, there is a directional trajectory to corporation law.
Andrew Gamble has noted that power politics are predicated on domination of the
“ruling mode of production.”   He states, “A mode of production cannot be legislated
away by the government.  It is the objective structure on which the state rests, and
which the state exists to uphold.”69  The political system operates as a ratchet.  Once a
corporate privilege is won, it is taken back only with great difficulty.  Such
circumstances may occur in economic depression, or corporate scandal.  That the state
does not legislate away corporation rights is a question of politics.  Some of the most
powerful politics are those that are not questioned.  Such is the case of the corporation.
Yet it is the federal system, with competition between the states that fixed the
attendant rights and duties of the corporation, in which decisions regarding the shape
of the corporation is made.  
Legal change has at least adapted to, and possibly promoted the development of
the dominant mode of production, including accommodating the concentration of
power in a few hands.  It has interacted with entrepreneurial influences to restructure
and complicate relations to the means of production.  In order to position themselves
to leverage power, one need not be an owner.  Rising to upper echelons of
management places an individual in the position in the position of making claims on
corporate wealth.
The construction of the business corporation has had a profound impact on
69 Andrew Gamble, The Conservative Nation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).
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American politics.  This impact pervaded the political economy, and thus impacted the
nature of American ideology.  Louis Hartz argued that America is liberal because it
has always been liberal, due to irrational mass Lockianism.70  Rogers Smith has
countered that this depiction misses much of the American tradition.71  He recounts
illiberal traditions in the treatment of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.   Karen
Orren has argued that these other traditions can be better characterized and theorized
as multiple subordinations.72  She also argues that there is are significant vestiges of a
feudal component that the development of labor relations in American politics.73  Thus
there is a rich debate over characterizations of America's  ideological traditions.
America also has a corporate tradition.  It is a tradition that dates to even before
the founding of the republic.  It found life in Alexander Hamilton's successful effort to
charter the First Bank of the United States.  It found life in the many states' uses of the
charter to put into effect public improvements.  It changed over the course of the 19th
century, both responding to and giving animation to new forms of economic
organization.  This corporate tradition developed not only in antitrust, as so well
depicted by Martin Sklar.74  It existed in those elected bodies that are closest to the
people, state legislative bodies.  State legislatures altered the terms of corporate
70 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: an Interpretation of American Political Thought
Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955).
71 Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting View of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1997).
72 Karen Orren, “Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's
Traditions Got to Do with It?” Journal of Policy History, vol. 8, no. 4 (1996), 470.
73 Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United States
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
74 Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916 (New York:
Cambridge, 1988).
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existence, while the judiciary theorized and adjudicated its characteristics from within
the common law tradition, and the statutory standards promulgated by the legislatures.
It is a tradition that exists alongside, and intermixed with, the liberal tradition
of American politics.  This coexistence has at times been uneasy, because the
American corporate tradition does not reduce to Lockian individualism.  Nor is it pre-
political.  Rather, corporate rights were granted from the political system.  The
corporate practice can be traced to Tocqueville's observation about Americans
tendency to associate, and also his observation that lawyers formed the aristocracy of
the American republic.75  Corporation law formalized the organization of group
association.  It germinated in those elected legislative bodies that are closest to the
people, in the states. 




Corporation Law in the State Constitutions
It is clear from the preceding chapters that states actively regulated the
parameters of corporate existence.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to find detailed
arguments about what legislators thought about the enterprise of forming corporation
law.  Most states did not record the debates of ordinary legislative sessions, leaving us
with a paucity of records indicating actual thought regarding corporate entities.  We
know the exact language of what the state legislatures promulgated, but not the
reasoning or compromises that they made.  Fortunately, there is another source.  Most
states placed provisions on corporations in their constitutions.  Further, through the
course of the late nineteenth century many states held constitutional conventions, and
typically stenographically recorded the debates and proceedings.  These records
provide illumination of the legislative mindset.
The record leads to several observations.  First, there was deep state
involvement in regulating the role of corporations.  Delegates sought to promote their
local political economies, yet at the same time protect individual citizens.  The primary
tool was statutory law, within the parameters set by state constitutional law.  Second,
the delegates at the conventions justified their regulatory actions with the artificial
entity theory.  This  justification was used both as the basis enactment of restrictive
regulations, and also as a means to justify liberal corporate provisions.  Thus the
artificial entity theory was used to justify the statutory foundations of corporate
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capitalism.  Third, there is evidence of the impracticality of orthodox conceptions of
the law among the delegates, as well as a recognition that the new problems being
confronted could not be solved with old solutions.  Fourth, there is evidence of a
transformation in conceptions of the proper role of the state in regulating actions of
corporations within their political economy.  There is, in general, greater acceptance of
liberal provisions at the end of the century.  This liberalization includes not merely
limited liability, but also universal general corporations laws that authorize broad
purposes, fewer restrictions on term of existence and real estate, and a reduced role of
the state in regulating specifying legitimate corporate purposes.   This amounts to an
evolution in mentalities regarding the relationship of the corporation to the state.
Fifth, there is evidence of an increasing lack of ability of the states to regulate their
economies through statutory corporation law.  States became increasingly aware of the
impact of foreign corporations (those chartered in other states, or abroad) on their soil.
Foreign corporations present some difficulties right after the Civil War.  However,
with completion of the transportation network, and the building of a national market,
the impact of foreign corporations increased.  At the same time, the capacity of the
states to control the effects of foreign corporations lessened dramatically.  
Charles McCurdy argues that up to the end of the nineteenth century it was
imaginable that the states could control the corporation.  Thus he argues that the E.C.
Knight case must be understood as an attempt to preserve these state capacities.1  The
findings of this chapter largely support McCurdy's thesis.  Most actors had at least
1 Charles McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American
Corporation Law, 1869-1903.”  Business History Review, 53:3 (1979).
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some notion of a role for the state in regulating their creation.  However, state capacity
was also clearly in decline.  Further, a national market could not be built unless state
powers to restrict corporate behaviors declined.  The Supreme Court acted at key
junctures to prevent the states from restricting foreign corporations. 
The decline in state capacities resulted from the dynamics of federalism
interacting with a rapidly industrializing economy transformed by the completion of a
national transportation network.  This state incapacity at the turn of the century paved




There are both advantages and disadvantages to using the records of the state
conventions.  First, there is a limitation to the types of provisions that were discussed,
debated, and enacted.  As a general rule, only the most fundamental provisions were
written into the state constitutions, leaving other issues to be promulgated by state
legislatures.  However, the setting of the convention provided a forum for a relatively
highminded debate on principles of political economy, and the role of the states in
providing rules to regulate the corporation.  Delegates were cognizant that they were
adjusting the organic law, and that what they put in place might well last for a
generation or longer.  This led to at least the attempt to couch provisions in terms of
2 For a narrative on building state administrative capacity, See Stephen Skowronek, Building a New
American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920  (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1982.)
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fundamental principles.  It is an advantage for us that delegates discussed principles of
economic policy in the most general of terms.  
Second, delegates recognized that the fundamental principles established in the
state constitution would guide the parameters of subsequent legislation.  Thus
delegates discussed how specific provisions might impact industries or individual
companies.  The problem of predicting future courses of action was more pronounced
for convention delegates that it would be for legislators.  Constitutions conventions are
held less frequently than legislative sessions, and constitutions are more difficult to
amend than ordinary legislation.  Thus delegates recognized that mistakes or
omissions would be difficult to correct, and this led some to be wary of
constitutionalizing some provisions, while it motivated others to more adamantly insist
on establishing favored provision in the organic law.
Third, the records are not necessarily representative across space and time.
Constitutional conventions were called on episodically, not regularly.  Further,
constitutional conventions were not called solely or primarily to adjust incorporation
law  (although it was one of four major issued confronted in the California
Constitutional Convention of 1878.)   Thus although several constitutional convention
dealt with corporation law, not all of them did.  In particular, reconstruction and post-
reconstruction conventions in the South had other pressing issues at stake.  In addition,
not every constitutional convention recorded the debates and proceedings.  Because
they are not representative, a true random sample is not possible.  Table 5.1 shows
which states held conventions during the period of this study, which of these recorded 
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Table 5.1  Constitutional Conventions, 1865-1900






1865-6 North Carolina No
1866 Texas No
1867  Alabama No
Maryland Yes No




New York Yes No
North Carolina No
Virginia Yes n.a.
1868  Arkansas Yes No
Florida No
South Carolina Yes No1
1868-9 Texas No
1869-70  Illinois Yes Yes
1870 Tennessee Yes No
Vermont No
1879  Louisiana No
1871  Nebraska Yes No2
1872 Pennsylvania Yes Yes
West Virginia No
1873-4 Ohio Yes Yes
1874  Arkansas No
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1875   Alabama No
Colorado Yes n.a.
Missouri Yes Yes (n.a.)
North Carolina No
Texas No
1876  New Hampshire No
1877 Georgia Yes No
1878 California Yes Yes
1885  Florida No
1889 New Hampshire No
1890 Kentucky Yes Yes
Mississippi No
1894 New York Yes No
1896-7 Delaware Yes Yes
1898 Louisiana No
Entries are made on the issue of corporations only if the debates were recorded.










States with recorded debates on corporations that are not part of this study include
Illinois 1869, and Missouri, 1875.
Source:  Cynthia E. Browne, State Constitutional Conventions: From Independence to
the Completion of the Present Union, 1776-1859 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1973)
1 South Carolina had a short section on corporations that was passed with virtually no debate (p. 754-6).
2  Nebraska in 1871 debated provisions on banks and on subsidies to railroads, but no on corporation law
in general.
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their debates, and which of those that recorded their debates and proceedings dealt in
any significant way with corporation issues.
The analysis that follows is drawn from constitutional conventions in Michigan
in 1867, Pennsylvania in 1872, Ohio in 1874, California in 1878, Kentucky in 1890,
and Delaware in 1897.  Michigan in 1867 was on the edge of the periphery, was
dependent on mining and lumber, and in need of development.  Pennsylvania was the
most industrialized state in the Nation.  Ohio at the time was on the edge of the
metropole, but in the direct line of traffic from Chicago to New York. California was a
western state, inflamed by the populism and nativism of the late 1870's.  Kentucky in
1890 was struggling still to overcome the lack of development due to the vestiges of
its slave economy.  This made delegates there acutely aware of a need to industrialize.
Delaware in 1897 was a sleepy state on the periphery of the metropole; delegates there
were awaking to the possibility of modernizing corporation law to attract corporate
charters.
The lack of a random sample across space and time is mediated in part by the
comprehensive analysis of state policies in Chapter Three.  This allows us to place the
following debates and proceedings in context.  For example, California is clearly an
outlier on the issue of limited liability. At her convention delegates instituted
proportional unlimited liability for both shareholders and directors. We know that this
view was not representative of the nation as a whole. Yet the arguments in radical
California place the issue in its sharpest relief.  
States borrowed liberally from other states in crafting their corporation law.  In
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particular they regularly cited similar provisions in other constitutions to justify the
addition of provisions that to some delegates were sources of controversy.  The
procurement of debates and proceedings was institutionalized.  The Pennsylvania
Constitutional Convention of 1872, for example, paid for copies of all other state
constitutions, and provided access to copies of debates and proceedings of the same
where they were  available.3  Thus it was normal to refer to debates and proceedings of
other state constitutional conventions.   If another state had a positive experience with
a provision, delegates would refer to it to lend credence to its appropriateness for their
own state.  Occasionally state practices were noted derisively.  A delegate in Michigan
in 1867 asked of his colleagues “Do they not know that the State of New Jersey is a
by-word and derision among states, simply because it is ruled year by year through its
corporations?”4  Occasionally a delegate would read entire passages from other states
debates to justify an argument.  This could itself cause conflict.  Said one delegate in
jest at the Pennsylvania Convention, having been repeatedly told what Illinois has
passed three years earlier, "I think it is a great calamity to the people of Pennsylvania
that the people of Illinois have a Constitution....It is still a greater calamity they have
published their Debates.  We should have learned wisdom from their sad experience
3 Pennsylvania, Constitutional Convention (1872-1872), Debates of the Convention to Amend the
Constitution of Pennsylvania: Convened at Harrisburg, November 12, 1872, Adjourned November
27, to Meet at Philadelphia, January 7, 1873... , 9 vols. (Harrisburg: B. Singerly, 1873), v. 4 585-9,
604-5.  Hereafter referred to as “Pennsylvania, Debates (1872).”
4 Michigan, Constitutional Convention (1867), The Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Michigan, Convened at the City of Lansing, Wednesday, May 15, 1867,
Official Report by Wm. Blair Lord and David Wolfe Brown, 2 vols. (Lansing, MI: John A. Kerr &
Co., printers to the state, 1867.), vol. 1, 199 (Conger).  Hereafter referred to as “Michigan, Debates
and Proceedings (1867).”
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and should not have published ours."5   
The delegates at the constitutional conventions addressed the inevitable
problem of interpretation of their documents.  This problem was more serious than
mere legislation, because the constitution could be changed only rarely.  This problem
was highlighted at the Kentucky convention in 1890, when there was an effort to write
a strong antitrust provision.  Some delegates were concerned that the broad language
would inevitably come to include labor organizations in its ban.6   This led to the
observation that it would take a legal code to properly deal with the subject.  One
delegate suggested striking the antitrust provision entirely, because it was a matter of
detailed legislation.  
“You have it too comprehensive.  You have covered a great many things there
that ought not to be covered.  All combinations are not evil.  All associations
are not evil.  A great many of them are purely defensive.  A great many of
them are made necessary for defense against the aggregation of capital.....(I)t
is a new question, and one of the most difficult that any legislative body has
had to contend with, because the particular evil is so hidden under different
combinations—it assumes so many different forms; it lurks about in so  many
different corners—that the legislators of the present day have been unable to
reach it, almost by the most exhaustive bills on the subject, and to hope now,
with four or five lines, to reach this evil, it seems to me is absurd.”7
One Michigan delegate noted the problem of statutory construction: “I at one
time labored under the idea that those who made the law might be permitted to
construe them.  The court very properly and very wisely informed me that judicial
5 Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), vol. 4 p.593 (Cuyler).
6 Kentucky, Constitutional Convention (1890), Official report of the proceedings and debates in the
Convention assembled at Frankfort, on the eighth day of September, 1890, to adapt, amend, or
change the constitution of the state of Kentucky, 4 vols. (Frankfort, Kentucky: E. P. Johnson, printer
to the Convention, 1890 [1891], 3693-4 (Harris). Hereafter referred to as “Kentucky Official Report
(1890)”.
7 Kentucky Official Report (1890), 3700 (Straus).
174
tribunals could not construe laws according to the special ideas of those who had
drawn them; that they must be construed according to the meaning deducible from
their language.”8
Delegates often asserted that specific provisions ought not be in the
constitution, that they had characteristics of legislation.  One delegate in Ohio asserted
that such an argument was sophistry.  He suggested instead that whether or not a
provision was appropriate material for a constitution depended on whether or not one
liked the provision: “It has been said here that this is a matter of legislation.....I have
not heard any definition here of constitutional law as contradistinguished from
legislation.  I do not know where to draw the line.  Nobody has attempted to do it.  It is
legislation when they do not want it, and it is constitution when they want it thrust into
this fundamental law.”9  
The Nature of the Corporation
The dominant conception of the corporation in the mid-19th century was that it
was an artificial entity created by the state.10  This informed legislative and convention
delegate justifications for crafting provisions that would impact the shape of the
corporation.  The statements of the artificial entity theory were employed to
characterize the corporation right up through the end of the century.  Thus a delegate at
8 Michigan, Debates and Proceedings (1867), v. 1, 199 (Conger).
9  Ohio, Constitutional Convention (1873-4), Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Third Constitutional Convention of Ohio; Assembled in ....Cincinnati.... December 2, 1873, 4 vols.
(Cleveland: W. S. Robinson, Printers to the Convention, 1873-4), 2388 (Page). Hereafter referred to
as “Ohio, Official Report (1873-4).
10 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal
Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 4.
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the 1897 Delaware convention noted:
A corporation is an artificial body, created by law, having perpetual
succession, or succession for such period as the act preceding and creating it
shall limit; it can sue and be sued by a name which is given to it; and it has a
corporate seal.  Those three qualities are such as, to my mind, limit and mark
them as distinctive character.  What we mean by a corporation having
perpetual succession is thus: As in contradistinction from every association of
individuals owning property or carrying on business.  If two or more persons
carry on business under any name (as they have a right to do) other than their
individual names, and one of them dies, that entity does not go on to exist;
that interest descends, if it be real estate, to the heirs at law of the person
deceased, or is distributed among the general representatives; whereas in the
case of a corporation, the stockholders, their interests, are not transferred to
the heirs at law or to their personal representatives, but their ownership in the
concern is represented by stock and the ownership continues in the entity.11
This clear articulation of the artificial entity theory was typical of many such
statements.  Nevertheless, delegates often connected the existence of the corporation to
the shareholders, and often justified corporate rights based on the fact that shareholder
rights needed to be protected.  Thus they reduced the corporation to its shareholders.
An example is in Michigan in 1867, where already corporations dominated much of
the state economy.  Said one delegate:
 “Corporations as they become wealthy and powerful, become haughty and
arrogant and exacting.  And no class of powers ever created by the States or
the nation have ever been looked upon by the people with more jealousy than
the class of powers exercised by corporations.”
“What is an act of incorporation?  It is simply the conferring upon a
number of class of persons authority to do what an individual may do.  And
where is the necessity for a departure from the principle in relation to the
rights and immunities that are extended to individuals, if it is not for some
nefarious purpose of giving these corporations some advantage over the
people?  I take it that so far as a corporation is concerned, it should not have
any more rights or privileges, when undertaking to perform a particular thing,
that an individual would have if he possessed the capital and means for the
11 Delaware, Constitutional Convention (1896-7), Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Delaware, Reported by Charles G. Guyer and Edmond C. Hardes, 5 vols.
(Milford, DE: Milford Chronicle Pub. (for) the Supreme Court, State of Delaware, 1958), vol. 2,
851-2 (Spruance).  Hereafter referred to as “Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7).”
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purpose....”
Now, I think the idea of conferring upon corporation any
extraordinary powers different from those which individuals possess is all
wrong.  I believe it would be a departure from the fundamental principles of
our government.  It would be a departure from the principles upon which our
laws should be based.”12
The artificial nature informed opinions on the propriety of legislature
regulation.   A delegate in Michigan in 1867  argued that natural persons and
corporations be treated equally.  Some adjustment, however, had to be made to
account for the special characteristics of corporations.  In his view, "a corporation is a
collection of natural persons, who by that connection become a legal body or persons.
Instead of acting separately and individually, they act together in a corporation, which
is regarded as a legal person."13  He felt a 2/3 vote to create a special corporation
would be a protection against bribery for special privileges, but that a majority vote
should be all that was required in order to amend the special charter.  "The cardinal
principle with me is this: after a legal person has been created, that legal person must
stand upon the same level with a natural person.  Otherwise we create a corporate
aristocracy; we bring into existence a set of legal entities who have superior powers
and capacities over ourselves as natural persons."14
The conceptions of the corporation were not always clear and consistent.   For
example, a Michigan delegate stated “It may be said that these corporations are
creatures of the law, that they exist by virtue of the law, and they should be so
constructed and regulated as to induce capital to come into the state...”  Either his view
12 Michigan, Debates and Proceedings (1867), vol. 1, 204 (Divine).  
13 Ibid.,  603 (Ferris).
14 Ibid.,  604.  
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of the nature of the corporation influenced his view of the propriety of the law, or
perhaps his view of the propriety of the law influenced his view over the nature of the
corporation.   “Now why should we give to these capitalists these additional
inducements, unless something is to be taken from the people to be given to them?
They cannot demand it of us with any more reason than they can demand it at home.  I
can see no good reason for taking any right whatever from the people and giving to
foreign capitalists.”15  Another delegate in the same debate had a different view, one
that  reduced the corporation to the individuals that compose it.  Said he: “A
corporation is nothing more or less than a collection of individuals to accomplish a
certain purpose, which would be impossible for any one individual to accomplish.”16
Whether the delegates were aware of that the two views were inconsistent is not clear
from the record.  Delegates used these arguments to justify their positions, but did not
refute views inconsistent with their own.  
The artificial entity theory was used to justify state limits on corporate powers.
Economic growth was a reason to charter corporations, but the the state maintained the
right to place restrictions.  As an Ohio delegate noted,  "it is economical to allow the
joining together of different individuals with portions of their fortune in one
association, in one created artificial person, for the purpose of giving greater freedom
and economy in the transaction of business.”17 However, 
“Over and above the general proposition that different kinds of business
ought not to be transacted by the same monopolizing company, that there
15 Ibid., 203 (Williams). 
16 Ibid., 211 (McKennan). 
17 Ohio, Official Report (1873-4), 2349 (Tuttle).
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ought to be a limit upon it; that the Legislature ought to keep that limit in its
hands, and that when the Legislature has for a series of years frequently
determined in what cases corporations may be formed, and thereby created a
rule of polity, it is proper, I think, that it should be regarded as such.”18
Delegates in Ohio used this sort of argument to justify chartering of corporations is
specified areas, but not allowing a corporation to engage in just any sort of business.  
The right of the state to regulate corporate existence via the charter law was
held widely by delegates.  The chairman of the committee on corporations in Kentucky
in 1890 noted that “Throughout the whole report we have endeavored to carry out this
idea, that corporations were simply artificial persons, and should always be amenable
to the law, not any more severely or critically, but just the same as individuals; and
whether property shall belong to corporations or individuals, should it be necessary
under this right to take it away, the State shall have, and continue to have, the right to
do so.”19  Those who vehemently opposed corporations (especially in California, 1878)
argued that because corporations were in their nature void of the moral responsibility
that restrained actions of individual entrepreneurs.  
(G)od alone could give us soul, and a spirit, and a conscience, but man has
never given conscience, nor soul, nor moral honesty to a corporation yet, and
never will.  As the law creates it, so it has got no conscience.  It has no rule of
right, except that which is made by the letter of the Constitution and the
statutes.  The purpose then, sir is this, that we should lay down a rule here
with our twenty thousand corporations, by which the people shall be
protected in the future against the thieving and knavery and highway robbery
that has been practice wholesale for twenty years upon the people of this
State.20
Corporations were disconnected from the moral force of personal accountability that
18 Ibid., 2352.
19 Kentucky, Official Report (1890), vol. 3. 3638 (Clardy).
20 California, Debates and Proceedings (1878-9), 41
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connects to a persons character as a private citizen.   One delegate at the 1872
Pennsylvania convention stated:  
Corporations have more rights in this country than individuals have.
It is useless to say men are free and equal while we are creating artificial
bodies that have rights which individuals do not....
Corporations have advantages by means of the association of capital,
by means of their long life, by means of their lack of individual and of moral
responsibility, and they stand opposed to the efforts of individual in this
regard.
Its moral responsibility is gone; he is not acting as an individual; he is
acting simply as the agent of a machine.  It is well known truth that
corporations neither have souls to be damned nor a proper place to be
kicked.21
A similar sentiment was expressed in eighteen years later in Kentucky:
The building up of corporate wealth is the creation of a force in our midst to
exercise its influence upon our business, political and social relations,
without personal responsibility.  The owners of these franchises hide their
personalities behind a corporate name and organization, and thus shield
themselves from political, legal or moral responsibility for their misdeeds; yet
the power they exercise for evil is the greater on account of the want of
individuality.22
Many delegates found it difficult to justify granting corporate rights,
particularly limited liability, when individuals or partnerships did not have the same
privileges.  
[I]n the management of all the ordinary lawful business of the country, this
creature would be superior to the creator!  We should set an institution above
ourselves having greater privileges and advantages than would come to a
private citizen in his individual pursuits after life and comfort.23
The counter argument focused on the property rights of the individuals that owned
corporate shares:
21 Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), vol 7,  765 (Dodd)
22 Kentucky (1890), Official Report, 3646-7.
23 Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), vol. 7, 769.
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I believe that capital and property should be secured; that it should be
secured in the hands of a corporation as well as of an individual,
because a corporation is composed simply of individuals; and when you
are protecting corporate enterprises against unjust and improper attacks,
you are simply protecting individual wealth against unjust, anarchical
and communistic attacks...24
This delegate reduced the corporation to its shareholders.
The Public/Private Distinction 
Early in the nineteenth century corporations were chartered exclusively for
purposes that would further the public good.  Thus charters for schools, charities, and
public works were justified, but charters for mere pecuniary profit were not.  This
changed as the century progressed; states, slowly at first, but then more regularly,
granted charters purely for profit making.  It took time for legislators to adjust and
accept this change in mindset.  Said a Pennsylvania delegate in 1872:
You remember well, sir, and so do I, the time when the only plea for
corporate powers was the necessity to accomplish great ends which could not
be met by individual enterprise, such corporation as were largely public in
their character, public roads and great works where it was impossible to raise
the necessary amount of capital by mere individual means.  Now we propose
to go entirely to the other extreme, and make corporations superior to
individuals in all business opportunities.25
This would continue in the conventions up to 1890.  Delegates offered amendments
accompanied by impassioned speeches that corporations ought not be granted special
privileges except as they are beneficial to the public.  Some of the most radical
proposals were made at the 1878 California convention.  One delegate thought the
24 Kentucky (1890), Official Report,  3726 (Mackoy).
25 Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), vol. 7, 769.
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appropriate distinction was to limit corporate creation to those purposes where
eminent domain needed to be exercised.  He saw corporations being established for all
sorts of businesses that, to his mind, did not need it:
 Let us not lend the dignity of the State of California to an incorporation
organized for the purpose of gathering swill in the street and feeding pigs; let
us not lend the dignity of the State to an incorporation for the purpose of
establishing henneries to hatch chickens; but if we do make corporations, if
we must have corporations for some purposes, and combined capital, then let
it be for a purpose for which we can lend the dignity and the authority of the
State to exercise the right of eminent domain, and let the right of eminent
domain go hand in hand with corporations who are authorized to exercise
these great powers of the State.”  All other businesses can be done with
partnerships.  Things are too impersonal, it and it would be better if there
were personal responsibility.  The state is too paternal, and it should become
less so.26
Nevertheless, state practice had changed.  Corporations would be chartered for a
greater variety of purposes.27  
Some delegates saw the need to justify state restrictions on corporate practices.
They were concerned with protecting the right of private property, while still
protecting the right to the state to regulate its domestic political economy.  In 1867 at
the convention in Michigan, a delegate made the private/public distinction as follows:  
The rights of the corporation in regard to the manner of using its capital
may be affected by legislation; but if a corporation has $10,000, or
$50,000, or $500,000, invested in a particular way, not one dime of that
money can be touched by any legislation.  A law that should attempt
this would be an interference with the right of property.  But as to the
manner in which a corporation shall, under a general or special law, be
authorized to use its capital, the corporation is subject to the right of the
people of the State, acting through the Legislature, to control them as
they control the natural persons of the state.28
26 California, Debates and Proceedings (1878-9), 397 (Wyatt).
27 See Chapter Three, Tables 3.2 and 3.3, and accompanying text.
28 Michigan, Debates and Proceedings (1867), vol. 1, 178 (Pringle)..
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By 1890 the calls for the protection of corporate property were ubiquitous as were
calls for continued regulation.  A delegate in Kentucky sought to justify regulation of
corporations on the same basis as the state regulated natural persons.  
“A natural person is not exempt from the time he enters the world until he is
put into his grave.  The relations of the infant to his parents are regulated by
statute, which fixes the time when he comes of age; how he may acquire title
to his estate; how he shall gain entrance into any of the professions; in what
manner he may contract marriage; how he shall have a remedy for wrongs
done him by his neighbor; on what terms alone he may recover for keeping an
aged or afflicted parent; at what rate he shall lend his money; when he may
hunt or fish; what dividend he may receive if he invests in the capital stock of
a turnpike or a bridge; what he shall charge if he keeps a ferry or tavern;
when he is bound for is obligations; fixes his fees if he is made a servant of
the people; says on what terms he may peddle; forces him to be vaccinated;
fixed the limit to which he may go in controlling his own beast; lays down his
tools if he owns a grist mill; sets a limit to the rates in the case of public
warehouse; says when and how he shall cast his vote; takes his property for
the public use; compels him to become a soldier in time of war; and provided
for depriving him of his liberty if he will not engage in any pursuit and
become a vagrant.  All these things are matters of regulation by law, and the
laws of the land can regulate the management of railroads.29
Legislative Control
The shift from special acts of incorporation to general laws of incorporation
was a topic of debate at the 1867 Michigan convention.  Two types of arguments were
offered here.  One was that special charters led to special favors, and thus led to an
inherent unfairness.  The other was quite simply that writing special charters took up
an enormous amount of the legislature's time.  Some delegates estimated that the
legislature spent up to 1/3 of its time writing and passing special charters.  As they
contemplated eliminating special charters, many delegates sought to promote the
economic development of the state, yet not concentrate power in too few hands.  They
29 Kentucky (1890), Official Report, 3714 (Beckner).
183
voiced concern that special grants were in effect monopoly grants. 
Once the decision was made to require corporations to be organized according
to general laws, the next question was whether the legislature should be permitted to
offer special charters at the same time, and if so, under what conditions.  There was a
concern that under a regime of general laws there would be particular types of
corporations that would not be able to be chartered.  Thus there would need to be a set
of provisions to allow corporations to be created by special enactment.  The debate
was over whether special charters should be passed by a legislative majority or by a
supermajority.  The task in the minds of some delegates then turned to trying to
discern how each option would affect subsequent practice.  Were a mere majority vote
needed, would it be more likely that the legislature would restrict corporations at will
(and possibly idiosyncratically), or would it rather be more likely to be co-opted by
corporations seeking special favors?  One delegate ventured that applications to extend
corporate rights outnumbered those to restrict corporate rights by a ratio of 20:1.  Thus
he favored a supermajority rule to prevent abuses.  After some contentious debate the
convention settled on a rule that allowed the legislature discretion to grant special
charters, but only with a 2/3 vote.  This, it was thought, would help in preventing
abuses where the legislature was bought by special interests. 
This led to a remarkable six day debate over whether modifications of existing
special charters could be made by a majority vote, or if they would also require a 2/3
vote.  At issue was the problem that a corporation could be awarded by a general law,
and then it could be amended in favor of the corporation at the expense of other
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corporations.  A two-thirds rule would make it more difficult for a corporation to
control the legislature and extract an unfair advantage.  At the same time, however, it
would make it difficult for the legislature to remedy grants that turn out to have been
abused.  
One delegate was concerned that “corporations should only be formed for the
benefit of individuals and should “never transcend in its organization the interests of
the body politic.”30  In his view, this meant that the legislature should maintain control
over corporate charters, and consequently should be able to amend such charters by a
bare majority vote.  The 2/3 rule, he maintained, was divergent from “the great
principle of republican government.”  This view was in contrast to those who thought
that treating corporations differently from individuals set a troubling precedent:
The question we have to decide is—shall we make distinctions in
regard to rules for legislation, and have special rules for one class or
branch of legislation, and a general rule for all other branches?  Shall
we provide in this organic law that the moment a question comes before
the representatives of the people affecting corporate interests, there
shall operate a rule entirely different from that which operates upon
those questions coming before them which affect private, personal
rights?  Shall we provide greater protection and safeguards for
“corporations other than municipal,” that we throw around the private
citizen in his rights of person and property?31
It seemed to this delegate that a 2/3 rule would protect corporate interests from the
reach of the legislature.  This was made more forcefully by the Chairman of the
committee on corporations:
....we subject in great measure our most essential rights to the judgment of the
people as expressed through their Legislature.  There are to be found, of
30 Michigan, Debates and Proceedings (1867), vol. 1. 185 (Burtch).
31 Ibid., vol. 1, 180 (Williams).
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course in our Constitution, limitations upon the power of the Legislature with
respect to personal rights; but individuals are constantly controlled by the
general laws enacted by the Legislature.  Why should corporations require
greater security in this respect than is enjoyed by individuals?  I am opposed
to empowering corporations, if they can control a few men or a few votes in
the Legislature, to resist successfully the adoption of any reform which may
be proposed in a general law.  I believe that our general legislation with
respect to corporations has not yet attained the character of a fixed policy;
and I do not deem it wise to require a two-thirds vote for the amendment of
such general laws, believing that the interests of both the citizens and the
corporation will be best protected if questions of this sort be left to the good
sense of the people as expressed through the Legislature in the ordinary
way.32
He thought the legislature was less likely to take away privileges and rights of
corporations than it was to grant them additional rights.33  Another delegate  touched
the heart of the controversy: “this power of amending charters is a two-edged sword,
and a 2/3rds rule would mitigate against new restrictions on corporations as much as it
would provide protections against unfair special privileges to be granted to a particular
corporation.”34
The Michigan convention decided to pass the 2/3 rule, in the form that
whatever majority was needed for the original charter was necessary for legislative
amendment or alteration of the charter.  It is worth noting that this act of the
convention took away a substantial portion of the legislature's activity.  It also took
away a substantial portion of its power to dispense favors.  Incorporation by special act
was a practice that was being phased out, but the phase-out caused great concern.  
This issue, so prominent at the middle of the century,  would not be repeated in
later conventions, with one notable exception.  Delaware continued the practice of
32 Ibid., vol. 1, 178 (Pringle).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 182 (Norris).
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special legislation up to its convention of 1897.  At that juncture the delegates at the
convention chose to end the sleepy status of Delaware corporation law.  Said one
delegate that supported general laws along with a prohibition on special acts:  “It will
certainly prevent one very great abuse and very great evil; and that is the lobbying of
wild-cat schemes and corporations through the Legislature that would never have been
given at the hands of the Court under a proper corporation law.”35  In addition, it
would “shorten the term and expense of the Legislative session.”36
Delaware delegates still sought to control their state economy at that relatively
late date.  A pro-corporate delegate argued against having a general law for all
purposes, arguing that the legislature was competent in such a small state to to pass on
desirability of proposed corporations.  “Ours is a very small State.  The Members of
the Legislature are familiar with all parts of it; and it seems to me they are quite as
well prepared to judge as to the desirability of these proposed corporations as any
other tribunal.”37  He noted that in large states with diverse interests, this is not
possible, and that the provisions forbids the legislature from granting corporations that
might bring a particular industry to the state. 
We have no more important question which will engage the attention of this
Convention, either in the committee of the Whole, or otherwise, than the
question of corporations...I believe that the very best tribunal to pass upon
these matters is the Legislative.”38
35 Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7), 2100, (Burris).
36 Ibid.




No one disagreed with the provision that a corporation could only engage in
activities clearly authorized in its charter.  These purposes were typically very
narrowly drawn.  Thus, as noted in Chapter Three, a corporation chartered for the
purpose of mining iron ore could not also smelt the ore without a change in the charter.
Without the amendment, the corporation would be subject to quo warranto legal
actions.  The corporate consolidation that occurred at the end of the 19th century would
require that corporations be allowed to engage in any otherwise legal business.  
It is notable then that there were two attempts at the 1872 Pennsylvania
convention to allow precisely that.  One would have allowed any number of persons to
associate for any business purpose, with limited liability.39  Supporters thought it
would help the formation of small corporations.40  Interestingly enough, there was
opposition both from anti-corporate and pro-corporate proponents.  The former were
concerned that it would disrupt and confuse settled law on liability.  The language of
the provision would apply to both wealthy corporations and small corporations.  It
would allow the wealthy to gain if a risky venture succeeded, but avoid the costs of
failure.  Limited liability, it was thought, should be up to the discretion of the
legislature, and would be a monstrosity if applied to all businesses.  It would abrogate
liability provisions that gave laborers a lien on the corporation for work done.41  The
39 "Section 21.  Any number of persons, upon making such publication as the Legislature may by
general law prescribe, may associate themselves together for business purposes, with several
liabilities proportionate only to their individual investment."  Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), 635.
40 Ibid.,  689 (Whetherhill).
41 Ibid., vol. 4, 638-9 (Buckalew)
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objections by pro-corporate delegates was that if the state were to make individuals
liable for amounts beyond what they originally invested, it would drive capital from
the state.  The individual must be liable to the corporation, and the corporation liable
to the creditors, but not the individual shareholder to the corporation creditors.  It
seemed to these delegates that the latter situation might obtain under this law.  Thus
the section had little support, and after a rather lengthy debate, failed.42  These
questions about liability kept delegates from passing a section that would allow a
general law for any purpose.  
The second attempt came later in the session.  A section that allowed any two
or more persons to associate for any legal purpose, with limited liability, had been
added on a second reading of the section.  Thus it survived an initial vote on the floor.
Intriguingly, the stated purpose of this bill was to aid labor.  The provision would
bring capital to the state, and allow men freedom of association.  The partnership law,
it was asserted, was inadequate to this task.  Allowing any two or more men to
incorporate would further the development of the nation, and also to solve the problem
of capital and labor:
Why, sir, the great question of this age, not only in this country but in
Europe, is the question between capital and labor.  It is the most fearful and
most interesting question now agitating the public mind all over the civilized
world.  The proper solution of that question is the very system which we
propose here.  Capital and labor are not antagonistic.  They have got into
antagonistic positions; they fancy that their interests are conflicting; but they
are not.  They are the natural allies of each other.  Capital can do nothing
without labor; labor can do nothing without capital.  They are natural allies,
and the most effective way that I can image to solve this question is to furnish
42 Ibid., vol. 4, 637-642.
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facilities for uniting capital and labor.43
Delegates claimed that this was standard practice in New England, and one delegate
read extensively from laws of Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio in support of
passage.44  It is worth noting, however, that while the proposal before the convention
would allow incorporation for any lawful business, the provisions of the other states
read by this delegate were for restricted purposes.  Further, New York had double
liability.  In any case, it is notable that this effort, too, failed.  The time when it would
seem legitimate to allow corporations to engage in any line of business was still in the
future.
Pennsylvania limited corporations to the operations specified in their charters,
and to hold only such real estate as was “necessary and proper” for those specified
purposes.  The delegates inserted a provision allowing corporations to hold real estate
to satisfy debts honestly contracted, and required courts to pass judgment on whether
this was done in specific cases.45  It is notable, however, that no one contested the
notion that a corporation ought to be limited to purposes clearly stated in its charter.
This would change as the century progressed, as general laws of incorporation
encompassed greater and broader objects.  Nevertheless, even near the end of the
century corporate advocates did not necessarily believe that there should be a broad
general law for such.  Said one such delegate at the 1897 Delaware convention, “I
don't believe there should be a general law to incorporate everything.”  In particular, he
43 Ibid., vol. 7, 775-6, (Calvin).
44 Ibid., vol. 7, 764, 766, 770-1.
45 Ibid., vol. 4, 610.
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felt the state should jealously guard its power of eminent domain.46
Term Limitations and Real Estate Limitations
There were few discussions regarding limiting the term of existence.  In the
Pennsylvania convention the committee on corporations reported a section that would
limit the term of existence of any corporation to 20 years.  Only two delegates spoke,
both against it.  One argued that many firms had large sums invested in enterprises,
and an arbitrary twenty year limit would force them to shut down, or to apply to the
state again for a charter.  This would cause inconvenience.  The second delegate
argued that the legislature in the prior year had nearly granted any number of men to
associate for any legal purpose, with no time limit.  He noted approvingly the actions
of New York, of the New England states, of Ohio, and of England.  The section was
quickly rejected.47  Thus although delegates recognized that corporations would
otherwise have perpetual life, they declined to institute this restriction.  This is striking
when placed in contrast to stated reasoning for placing restrictions on real estate.  It
was perpetual corporate life that justified some real estate restrictions.
To the 18th century mind, land and wealth were nearly synonymous.  The
creation of intangible property eventually led to the removal of land from its privileged
perch.  Nevertheless, in the middle to the nineteenth century, land was still largely
equated with wealth.  No other form of corporate right was more emphatically or
literally a property right.  States placed different forms of restrictions on the right of
46 Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7), 3103-4.
47 Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), v. 4, 608-9
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corporations to hold real estate, and justified their positions.  There was general
agreement that corporations should not be allowed to hold real estate beyond what was
essential to their business.  Otherwise, there was greater likelihood of  the
concentration of economic power.  However, this led to a problem.  Real estate was
often accepted as payment for debts, and the question then recurred to how long the
corporation assuming ownership of the property would be allowed to hold it.
Defenders of corporations noted that in a depression it might be difficult to unload
property, while others noted that without the limitation corporations could hold land
off of the market for the purposes of speculation, to the detriment of the citizenry.48
The committee on corporations in the 1867 Michigan convention proposed to
restrict the length of time which a corporation could hold lands that were outside of its
purposes to ten years.49  This policy found several supporters.  One delegate asserted
that the policy of the country was "against perpetuities."50  Corporations were different
from natural human beings.  Natural persons perished, and with this, their property
would naturally become dispersed among the inheritors.  Corporations by contrast did
not die.  Thus theoretically they could accumulate landed property without limit.  The
purpose of the real estate restrictions was to remedy this difference between
individuals and  corporations.  The accumulation of land in a few hands was
detrimental to republicanism.  Early experience of concentrated wealth, suggested one
delegate, revealed "certain evils which induced our forefathers to believe that it was
48 Kentucky, Official Report (1890), 3652-5. 
49 Michigan, Debates and Proceedings (1867), 210.
50 Ibid., 210.
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more democratic, more republican, more consonant with the interests of the people,
that lands should be subdivided into comparatively small tracks; that large masses of
land should not be concentrated into the hands of a few individuals."51
Delegates were concerned with corporate practices that were seen as adverse to
the development of the state.  Railroad companies, especially, had been granted
extensive lands.  In Michigan, at least, they sometimes held onto land, speculating that
it would increase in value.  Because this kept land off of the market it retarded
development, and this was seen as a public problem.52  This was seem by some
delegates as adverse to good policy.  Others saw it as necessary in order to induce
railroad development.  Some argued, for example, that 10 years was not enough
because often railroad building projects underwent years of delay before they were
able to be completed.  Such was the effect of the financial crisis of 1857-58, and such
was the case with the Civil War.53  Further, the reason why lands had increased in
value was precisely due to the prospect of railroad construction.  Some argued that it
was impossible to force a corporation to sell, and that they would just find some legal
device whereby the land was held in trust, to be sold later.54
Delegates were keenly concerned with how state industries would be impacted,
and sought to ameliorate the effects for specific industries.  One delegate noted that
iron companies had need for a great deal of wood, in order to make charcoal for the
51 Ibid., 213.   Some delegates sought to limit ownership of land to individuals as well as corporations.
52 This was very much the same sort of issue that Hurst notes in his study of the timber industry in
Wisconsin during this same time period.  James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The
Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1964).
53 Michigan, Debates and Proceedings (1867), 220.
54 Michigan, Debates and Proceedings (1867), 220-1 (Hold).
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smelting process.  It would need to hold those lands for a much greater period than ten
years.  His concern was that such lands would not be permitted under the proposed
amendment to the state constitution, to the detriment of industry in the state.  The issue
here was in part constitutionalization of the policy, and also the enactment of
provisions that would be adverse to the economic development of the state.55  Others
were simply were opposed to any such restrictions, terming it class legislation.
Cumulative Voting
Cumulative voting is the practice of requiring more than one directors seat to
be voted on by the shareholders at one time, allocating to each share as many total
votes as there are seats open, and then allowing the shareholders to allot their votes as
they see fit.  Thus a holder of 100 shares in an election of 4 seats would have 400
votes that could be “cumulated” and applied to any one seat.  This increases the odds
that minority shareholders will have a seat on the board of directors.  Without
cumulative voting, 51% of the stock could control 100% of the seats.  
It is important to remember that corporations were relatively closely held at the
time.  Shares of most corporations were not sold on stock exchanges, but rather were
exchanged at offices of the corporation.  Thus, while corporate shares were traded, it
was much more like the modern day exchange of an automobile title, where there is a
definite buyer and a definite seller.  The purchasers of stock took a partial interest in a
firm, and were often more closely connected with it than as mere passive investors.
55 Ibid., 212 (Mussey).
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The firm held an important part of his property in trust, and delegates thought it was
important to respect the holder's property rights.  Impersonal markets came later, with
merger movement at the turn of the twentieth century.
The propriety of constitutionalizing cumulative voting proved to be one of the
most discussed and contentious issues regarding corporations at the Pennsylvania
convention of 1872.  The idea was clearly novel to delegates, and they often did not
understand how it would work in practice.  To some it seemed undemocratic, and
inappropriate: "It is a principle to constitutionalize the idea that the minority should
govern."56  Supporters, by contrast, thought that placing minority representation on the
board of directors would be a way to check the Fisks and the Vanderbilts.57
Some delegates thought cumulative voting was a matter of public interest.
They thought it would open up the otherwise secret deliberations of the board of
directors.   They felt that many of the abuses of the board resulted from the secret
activity.  The logic of cumulative voting was expected to give a minority of
shareholders access to the deliberations of the majority.  In this there was a conflation
of private and public domains.  The minority of the shareholders were generally not
representatives of the state (the state by then invested in few corporations), but rather
were private citizens acting in their private capacity.  Yet the state was depending on
these minority shareholders to open up, and thus prevent, the otherwise secret actions
that constituted an abuse of public policy.58  Said one delegate:
56 Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), vol. 4, p. 606.
57 Ibid., vol. 4, 759. 
58 Ibid., vol. 4, 604-6.
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"These corporations have become very numerous.  They are organized for
carrying on a great variety of employments and business in our State; in fact a
large part of the disposable capital of the State is embarked in corporate
companies of some sort, and their management and administration, therefore,
becomes a question of immense magnitude and consequence in our State.  It
is to the interest of the public, it is to the interest of the people in common
that these corporations should be conducted upon sound principles, and with
every guard which can be provided by the government against their abuse."59
The opposing side denied that this public concern would function as thus
described.  The public, rather, could protect themselves by initiating quo warranto
legal actions; remedies could be found in the courts.  Beyond that, the legislature had
the power to amend, alter or repeal a charter, and this was sufficient protection for the
public.60  
Another concern was whether the state would be able to control certain private
corporations in which it held minority shares of stock.  One delegate noted that both
the state of Pennsylvania and the city of Philadelphia owned shares in the
Pennsylvania Railroad, and each elected a portion of the directors.  With cumulative
voting, it was thought that the Pennsylvania Railroad could become the tool of a
political machine, particularly in combination with other minority shareholders.  The
reply was that cumulative voting guaranteed representation on the board, but the state
would not be able to control the corporation merely due to cumulative voting.  When
votes are cumulated on one seat, the remaining seats will be uninfluenced by that
minority.61  Supporters asserted that cumulative voting was not appropriate for a
political democracy, but nevertheless could be justified or corporations.62  In
59 Ibid., vol. 4, 605 (Buckalew).
60 Ibid., vol. 4, 607.
61 Ibid., vol. 5, 762-5.
62 Ibid., vol. 5. 759.
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democracies, it was thought, single member district voting would insure minority
representation, something that might not occur in corporations.
 Finally, some delegates suggested that cumulative voting would be abused by
corporations that would more easily be able to engage in intra-industrial espionage.  A
corporation could place "spies" on the board of a rival corporation by merely
controlling a small fraction of the stock.  This, it was felt, would destroy unity of
action and paralyze the administration of the affected company.63  Proponents
countered this by arguing that the rival corporation could protect itself: it need only
place spies on the corporation that had placed spies on it.64   The notion of promoting
inter-firm spying struck opponents as a ludicrous public policy.  It is significant in
retrospect for indicating a lack of awareness or concern yet for interlocking
directorships.  Delegates in 1872 saw firms as competitors rather than colluders.   
Cumulative voting passed in Pennsylvania, as it would two years later in Ohio.
Interestingly enough, 16 years after that in Kentucky it still had to be explained to
some of the delegates, despite nearly two decades of practice on which to draw.  By
contrast, in 1897 in Delaware, the cumulative voting section passed with no debate.65  
 
Limited Liability
Limited liability was a major concern at all conventions in this study through
1890 (it did not arise at the 1897 Delaware convention.)  However, the liability issues
were different at the different conventions.  California, in 1878, was the most radical
63 Ibid., vol. 5, 766.  
64 Ibid., vol. 5. 759.
65 Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7), 2143.  
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of the states, imposing proportional, unlimited liability on shareholders.  Limited
liability seemed unjust to some, because it was a way of avoiding responsibility for
debts.  Further, a corporation with limitations on liability had advantages over
individuals.  The various proposals on liability were amongst the most contentious of
the sessions on corporation law.  
Pennsylvania had a limited liability provision prior to 1872, but it is worth
noting that there was a proposal to impose double liability at the convention in that
year.66  It would make stockholders liable for debts at the time they held stock, even if
the default came well after they had sold their shares.  Only one delegate spoke on this
provision, before it was killed.  Making liability perpetual, he thought, would be a step
back; constitutionalizing such a provision would be going back to the middle ages.  He
noted the prior history, that limited liability had commenced in Massachusetts,
followed by New York and Ohio.  England had passed a law that people might
incorporate for any legal purpose, with the proviso that if it were a limited liability
company, the word "limited" had to be in the name of the company, and on all
correspondence and contracts, so that those contacting with it knew the status of the
entity with which they dealt.67  He argued that the state had suffered in comparison to
other states, and that only in the past session that the legislature got rid it.  While it
was essential to require disclosure the limited liability status for all who might make a
66 "Section 8.  The stockholders of every corporation doing business in this State shall be individually
liable for its indebtedness to an amount equal to the par value of the stock held by them respectively
when such indebtedness was incurred; and this liability shall not be held to be a penalty, but shall be
taken to be a part of the contract under which such corporation may transact business in this State."
Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), vol. 4, 589. 
67 Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), 589.
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contract, he asserted that "Limited liability is the road to civilization."68  
In light of the Pennsylvania proceedings, it is notable that a major topic of
debate at the Ohio constitutional convention was the double liability provisions that
had been placed in the state constitution since 1851.  Some delegates argued that it had
retarded development in the state.  They compared favorably the economic success of
the more industrialized Pennsylvania, where many corporations had been chartered
with limited liability, to Ohio's more agricultural economy, where double liability was
the rule.  Supporters claimed that it was easy to avoid the double liability requirement
via manipulation, and that it would thus be better to require simple limited liability and
thus eliminate the inducement to shady dealings of this type.69  Further, the original
purposes for double liability no longer operated.  Said one delegate, double liability
was inserted in the 1851 constitution for purposes of
 “rendering corporations more liable to the public for the debts that they
might contract, and to take away, so far as possible, any means by which they
could, as it was said, swindle the public out of the debts which they justly
owed, as it was contended, was largely done by corporations under the old
Constitution, and under the old system of doing things in Ohio.”70  
In his judgment, it did not work, and did in fact hinder development.
There was clearly and a lack of reliable data on the impact of limited liability.
Thus there was a disagreement over what the future might hold.  Proponents of double
liability typically denied it hurt the economy.  One even claimed that local
businessmen were in favor of double liability, because it gave them greater assurance
68 Ibid.
69 Ohio, Official Report (1873-4), 2366 (Alexander).
70 Ibid., 2367 (Dorsey).
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that the businesses they dealt with were solvent, and because double liability would
concentrate the minds of operators to avoid having to pay for losses, thus inducing
them to run their businesses better.71  A proponent thought that limited liability had
been a hindrance, but that this was a good thing, because people would be less careful
without the double liability.72    
Delegates connected double liability to the problem of information acquisition.
Said one delegate: “I believe, that with a well-guarded law which would require,
instead of the liability of stockholders, that there should be an ample amount of stock
paid up, and a system of published reports, there would be far better protection to the
people of Ohio.”73  Reports made under oath, with the potential punishment of perjury
for false statements were seen as an appropriate substitute for double liability.74  The
proponents of double liability discounted the possibility of getting accurate reports
from corporations.
 It is just as impossible to compel corporations to a full, fair and complete
disclosure of their affairs in a way that will let the public know or the people
that are not fully conversant in the matter, how they stand, as it is to make
them understand Sanscrit.  It never was done and never can be done in any
judiciary, to complete the disclosure of the affairs of corporations.75 
Further, double liability would protect creditors.  Shareholders had some idea what
was going on in the corporation; at the very least they had voting power.  Creditors, on
the other hand, were in the dark, and double liability could protect them against
71 Ibid., 2372-3.
72 Ibid., 2371 (Voris).
73 Ibid., 2341 (Herron).
74 Ibid., 2366 (Alexander).
75 Ibid., 2369 (Tuttle).
200
fraud.76  It would also protect the ordinary person.
The longer I live the more I am convinced that there is a large class of
persons who, through ignorance of weakness, are not capable of protecting
themselves against hard and dishonest men.  Those who are wiser, richer and
stronger than the mass of humanity, owe protection to those who are less
fortunate than themselves.  Society ought not to be conducted like a bank,
with the sole view of making the largest sum of money out of a man, but it
ought to be conducted with some regard to the weakness of human nature.77
By contrast, the more radical California convention of 1878 went further.
There it was proposed that shareholders should be individually and personally liable
for the proportion of debts incurred at time he was owner of the stock.  In other words,
liability would not end with sale of stock:  
It is not joint and several liability, and so a shareholder that had paid
once, would not have to pay again.  In practice, many stockholders are
insolvent at the time of corporate insolvency, and this will protect creditors;
just because one is insolvent does not mean that others do not have to pay.
Rather than drive capital out of the state, it will encourage responsible capital
formation, likely at smaller amounts, with a reserve fund set up within the
corporation in order to protect the stockholders.  The corporation will act
more responsibly.78
Twelve years later, in Kentucky, double liability was again debated
vociferously.  Delegates even at this late date did not see how one could justify having
treating a corporation differently than a partnership.79  Proponents of liability argued
that many corporations are speculative, and that additional liability was a way to
protect creditors.80
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., 2387 (Page).
78 California, Constitutional Convention (1878-9), Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of California: Convened at the City of Sacramento, Saturday, September
28, 1878, E.B. Willis and P.K. Stockton, official stenographers, 3 vols. (Sacramento: State Office,
1880-1881), 383 (Webster).  Hereafter referred to as “California, Debates and Proceedings (1878-
9).”
79 Kentucky, Official Report (1890), 3739-40.
80 Ibid., 3737.
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But we do ask that these gentlemen shall stand upon the old common
law liability of partnerships.  Is not that honest?  What is a corporation?  A
corporation is a combination of individuals with certain franchises granted by
the State, and when you come to its liability, why should not the individuals
composing that corporation, be as liable for the debts as the individuals who
compose a partnership.  That is not requiring anybody to go security.  It is
simply requiring them to put up their estate as security, as every other
individual puts up his estate when he engages in an enterprise, or when a
combination of individuals engage in a business as a partnership.81
Despite such arguments, the provision was not successful.  Opponents of double
liability argued it would retard development in the state.  As to why Ohio has double
liability and Kentucky ought not, an opponent noted, “The State of Ohio stands with
the Ohio river on one side and with the lakes on the other, and the great traffic of the
nation has had to pass within that narrow limit of two hundred and fifty miles.  It is
because she has the means of development that Kentucky has not had......Her
geographical position is superior to ours.”82
In Delaware, in 1897, a proposed section to the Constitution would have
required, when stockholders had paid a portion of subscription, and the corporation
could not pay its debts, that the shareholder be liable up to the full amount they had
subscribed.  The language was somewhat unclear, so that it could have been
interpreted to require stockholders to pay over and above the amount of stock
subscribed.  There were objections to limiting the legislature, which was fully
competent to deal with the topic.  The delegates decided on this last course.  Extra
liability on shareholders did not survive the century.83
81 Ibid., 3745 (Straus).
82 Ohio, Official Report (1873-4), 3744 (Young).
83 Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7), 2144-9
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Director Liability
The debates on shareholder liability directly impacted debates on director
liability.  The delegates tied the issue of liability to the question of information, and
noted the advantages directors had over shareholders in collecting information about
the inner workings of the firm.84  At the 1874 Ohio convention one delegate noted that
British law granted limited liability to shareholders so long as official papers identified
the firm as “Limited” (Ltd.).  This was combined with unlimited liability for directors.
This delegate argued that the British model should be copied in order to insure
directors remained true to their fiduciary duty.85  The law of Great Britain, the greatest
commercial nation on earth, was an example Ohio ought to emulate.86  Director
liability, then, was a way to ensure responsible management.  Nevertheless, it did not
make it past the proposal stage at that time.
Director liability was by far the most contentious issue at the 1878 California
convention, one on which a significant proportion of the delegates spoke in a debate
lasting several days. The proposed section would make directors and trustees jointly
and severally liable for moneys “embezzled or misappropriated.”  The word
“misappropriated” caused particular concern.  It could be interpreted, some thought, as
making directors liable for actions of subordinates.  Cashiers could commit fraud, for
example, and the directors would be personally responsible.87  The chairman of the
84 See, for example, California, Debates and Proceedings (1878-9), 389 (Rolfe).
85 Ohio, Official Report (1873-4), 2374 (Voris)
86 Ohio, Official Report (1873-4), 2374-2375 (Hoadly)  Cites Justist, volume VIII, part 2, 1862, pp. 83
and 84, Statutes, 25 and 26 Victoria.   Also, 30 and 31 Victoria, Chapter 131. (Brius. Stats., 30 and
31 Vict., 1867, pp. 1372 and 1373.
87 California, Debates and Proceedings (1878-9), vol. 3, 396.
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Committee on Corporations vehemently opposed it, as it would make an innocent man
responsible for the crimes of the guilty.88  Another delegate argued that directors are
mere agents of the shareholders, and that it was unjust to make them responsible for
actions of subordinates.89  Furthermore, while the rule might make sense for a small
private business, it could not work to make directors personally liable for employees
actions in large firms.90   It was, in their view, a thinly veiled attempt to outlaw all
corporations, period.
Proponents of director liability argued that directors, not shareholders, were
responsible for abuses, and thus should be made to pay for those abuses.  Further,
directors were in a position to know what was going on in the firm, including the
actions of employees.  Thus these delegates effectively treated directors as principles,
rather than as agents of the shareholders.   The innocent shareholder ought not have to
pay what the trustee was designated to prevent.91  The directors were not, and never
could be, “innocent.”  Thus the “Sword of Damocles” ought to discipline both
minority and majority directors alike.92  With unlimited director liability the
corporation would be more responsible, figureheads on the board would be eliminated,
and the fleecing of widows and orphans would stop.  Those who appointed the
cashiers ought to be responsible for their actions.93
Those who urged moderation wanted it only to apply to directors that had
88 Ibid., vol 3, 404 (Estee).
89 Ibid., vol. 3, 407-8 (Edgerton).
90 Ibid., vol. 3, 396.
91 Ibid., vol. 3, 406 (Freeman), 411 (Reynolds).
92 Ibid., vol. 3, 407 (Johnson).
93 Ibid., vol. 3,  397, 404.
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committed wrongs.  Thus one proposal was to strike out the word “misappropriated,”
which could be interpreted broadly, and include only the word “negligence,” which
would indicate responsibility.  This would protect the honest director who discovered
fraud and brought it to light, and who might otherwise be liable under this provision.94
Nevertheless, the efforts to moderate this section failed, and the directors were held
responsible for moneys “misappropriated.”  
Twelve years later a similar argument was tried in Kentucky:
I believe that those who manage these corporations ought to be held to a
higher liability than the general stockholder, whether it be a joint stock
company or a corporation for the transaction of a mercantile business or any
business of that sort....I believe it is our duty to check that character of fraud.
If it can be checked it ought to be checked, and I think, in making those who
manage the concern liable more heavily than those who do not manage, we,
in some measures, check that system of gambling in corporations.95 
There was little debate, and the proposal fell far short of a majority.  Yet out of the
California debates we see nascent beginnings of the shift where directors  would be
treated as trustees rather than as agents, and shareholders would be treated as investors
rather than as owners.  This paradigm shift would a key element of the twentieth
century model of the corporation.  It is ironic that the most vehement opponents of the
corporation made this argument.  They justified it as they sought to impose unlimited
liability on the directors.
Liability of the Corporation
There is a third area of liability germane to corporations, that of the liability of
94 Ibid., vol. 3,  405.
95 Kentucky, Official Report (1890), 3777.
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the corporation itself.  In Pennsylvania the committee on corporations reported out a
section that would designate the franchise, rolling stock, and all other movable
property as personal property, and thus liable to execution and sale for corporate
debts.96  This led to significant opposition from delegates who were convinced it
would be the end of all corporations.  A creditor could sue, have the sheriff seize the
railroad cars, locomotives, or track of a railroad corporation, and thus cripple its
operations.  This seemed absurd to many members.  The franchises would be
worthless without the constituent parts of the operation.97  This led to a long speech by
the Chairman of the Committee on Corporations, Mr. Woodward.  This speech is
revealing of the mindset of the proponents of this section:
How government shall deal with the debtor portion of the community
has always been a question in political science, and is presented now in the
form of this section.  The community consists of natural and artificial
individuals; of persons and corporations.  The government deals with natural
persons after this fashion: In the original charter of William Penn lands where
made chattels for the payment of debts; all interests of the citizen where made
liable for his debts; but the government in its humanity exempts a very small
portion of the individual's possessions.  It leaves a man a bed, a cow, a stove
and a Bible; and it does not leave him much else....
Now, the question is, how shall it deal with those artificial
beings with the production of whom the Almighty had nothing to do,
whom we have made, the creatures of our own hands?  Shall we subject
them to the same rule to which we subject other people, black and
white, male and female; or shall we lift them up to a higher plane and
exempt all their available property, because of the good they are
supported to do for the community in their corporate character?
I suppose the committee of which I have the honor to be
chaiman....in recommending this section intended to put corporations
upon the same level as human beings, and to subject all their property
to execution for  their debts, not thinking it work while to make that
sort of exemption that is made in behalf of other poor debtors.....
96 Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), vol. 4, 611. 
97 Ibid., vol. 4, 612-14.  
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Now, what is the answer to it?  Pay your debts, and then your
property will be safe.  Pay your thirty dollar debt, if you owe a man
thirty dollars honestly and fairly.  There is no more reason, in the nature
of things, why a great railroad company should not pay that creditor
than there is why I should not pay my creditors... 98
The reply to this was that corporations mortgage property, and thus promise
that property to creditors, who have the first claim on it.  Such a provision might
conflict with this.  Thus, corporations are liable for their debts, but the methods of
collection must thus necessarily be different.  At the end of the day delegates balanced
the proposition of treating individuals and corporations the same with the counter that
railroad development in remote areas of the state were more likely if the corporations
were protected.  All could appreciate the remarkable advance that railroads afforded.
It enabled development of the interior of the state that otherwise would have been
impossible.99  The section did not survive.100
Foreign Corporations
“Foreign” corporations, in the 19th century, referred to corporations chartered
in other states, as well as those in foreign countries.  States permitted foreign
corporations to operate within their state by the practice of comity.  They did so with
the understanding that corporations chartered in their own state would reciprocally be
allowed to operate in the other states.  The precedent for comity occurred before the
98 Ibid., vol. 4, 617 (Woodward).
99 Ibid., 620-624.
100 A related provision would have made all corporations liable for injuries resulting the actions of their
agents and employees.  Some delegates commented that it merely replicated the common law rule.
Others commented that the  provision replicated a section elsewhere in the proposed constitution,
and it was rejected in fairly short order.  Ibid., vol. 4, 590-2.
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wide practice of cross state corporate operations.  It was impractical to refuse capital
that sought to be productive within the state.  
Foreign corporations presented special problems for state legislatures.  These
problems grew as the transportation infrastructure needed to build a national market
grew.  One set of problems had to do with foreign corporations that did business the
state.  Delegates were concerned that citizens of the state be able to sue that
corporation, but to do so citizens first had to know where to find the corporation.  In
1872 Pennsylvania debated a section that required foreign corporations to have a
known place of business in any county or city in which said business operated, along
with an agent upon whom process could be served.101  Some members objected to this
as overly burdensome.  Insurance company salesmen, for example, traveled from town
to town, and it would be uneconomical to have an agent in every city.102  The purpose,
of course, was to insure that foreign corporations could be served with process within
the state, insuring that citizens of the state did not have to leave to state to sue.  The
question then was, how many authorized agents should each corporation have?  The
convention chose to require at least one, but leave it to the legislature as to how many
agents would be required.103  Another provision at the same convention would have
required firms chartered in the state to have a majority of its directors be residents of
the state.  Without it speculative foreign corporations from other states could “come in
here, form companies under our mining law, carry away our coal, manufacture  iron,
101 Ibid., vol. 4, 609.
102 Ibid., vol. 5, 770.
103 Ibid., vol. 5, 775.
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and appropriate our resources, contract debts, and when we pursue them into their own
States meet us with some technicality....and defeat the honest creditor of
Pennsylvania.”104  Opponents suggested it would lead to “straw men” on the Board.
For a foreign corporation, establishing and paying for an authorized agent with
a known place of business could lead to considerable expense.  Many delegates
thought all foreign corporations should do so, and this provoked debate at all of the
conventions, including the Delaware convention of 1897.   The issue surrounded in
part whether the state could and should protect domestic manufactures by restricting
foreign corporations, and the extent to which the people of the state benefited from the
increased competition from corporations chartered outside the state.  Delegates agreed
that requiring there to be an agent on whom process could be served made sense for
insurance companies, but not necessarily for a number of other companies, many of
which were small, or which irregular operations within the state.105  
Individuals, of course, did not need an agent. A person could act on his own
account, but corporations could only act through their agents.  Further, corporations
derived special benefits which the state could regulate.  Said on delegate:
 “Private people can do as they please and take their own chances.  But here
we have given certain privileges to corporations, and we withhold certain
privileges from corporations located in this State; that is, the domestic
corporations are subject to be served with process while the foreign
corporation having no agent here cannot be served with process in this State.
I do think it is a great hardship for the people of this State that they cannot
have that poor privilege of somebody against whom they can bring suit, if
they have been wronged.”106
104 Ibid., vol. 5, 771 (Woodward)
105 Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7), 2153-5.
106 Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7), 2158.
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The presence of foreign corporations impacted state economies.  This became
an issue in 1874 at the Ohio convention.  Two issues arose here.  One concern was the
influence of these corporations in extracting the wealth of Ohio, and sending it
elsewhere.  The second was that some foreign corporations were able engage in
activities that Ohio corporations could not:
They incorporate themselves in the State of Pennsylvania, and the
State of New York, and the State of Connecticut, and all the States of the
Union, if you please, and beyond the great ocean; and then they send their
agents—they don't send their boards of directors—but they send their agents
and establish agencies in all our cities and towns....(They) engage in the
general transaction of business, just exactly, to all intents and purposes, as
they are at home, and just as our own corporations are, with the single
exception that they are not subject to our laws in any respect, that is to say,
those that are peculiar to corporations.  They enjoy all the privileges of
foreigners, all the benefits of being created by foreign law only, and at the
same time every benefit that they could have if they were incorporated in this
State.107    
The most pressing issue was venue selection for legal disputes.  A citizen of Ohio
could sue an Ohio corporation in Ohio.  Foreign corporations, however, could remove
the case to federal court.  All delegates who spoke on the issue conceded that state
courts were more timely, convenient, and cost effective than federal courts.  Further,
the federal courts were only in the big cities, such as Cleveland and Cincinnati, and
travel to those cities could be a considerable hardship for a citizen in an outlying area
of Ohio.  Thus many members wished to make sure that foreign corporations
consented to suits only in the state courts.  The problem was exacerbated by the
behavior of some foreign corporations.  They as a regular practice escaped payment of
damages by removing disputes to the more cumbersome and costly federal courts.
107 Ohio, Official Report (1873-4), 2352 (Tuttle).
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Thus, foreign corporations stood, in the estimation of several delegates, on a “higher
plane” than domestic corporations.  This seemed to them a patently perverse policy;
the state should be favoring domestic corporations, not foreign corporations.108  
Foreign corporations sometimes acted outside the authority of the state.  One
example cited was a railroad corporation that had been chartered in Ohio and had
condemned lands using powers of eminent domain granted by the state.  It abused
these powers and was sued by the state in a quo warranto action.  The corporation
escaped prosecution by dissolving the Ohio corporation, and selling the assets to a
much larger foreign corporation.  It then continued to do business in the State.  In
another case, the Pennsylvania Company acted as a holding company for the
Pennsylvania Railroad,  both chartered in Pennsylvania.  It controlled rates in Ohio,
and was more able to “corner” segments of freight markets, and manipulate them to
gain excess profits.109 Delegates sought to control such abuses via statutory law.110
Many delegates asserted that the state had the authority to decide whether to let
a foreign corporation in at all.  The state, they asserted, could make the requirement
that foreign corporations consent to the jurisdiction of state courts as price to be paid
for being permitted to do business in the state.
108 Note, however, that this same dynamic would also work in every other state that had efficient state
courts in comparison to inefficient federal courts.
109 Ohio, Official Report (1873-4), 2352-5.  “Corner” here means not merely to have a large market
share, but to “corner” shippers at key times in order to charge rates much higher than otherwise
customary.
110 The solution to this voted in the new constitution was to allow foreign corporations to do business in
the state, such that foreign corporations shall be “subject to the same regulations, limitation and
liabilities as like corporation of this State; and shall exercise no other or greater powers, privileges or
franchises than may be exercised by like corporations of this State; nor shall they have power to
condemn or appropriate private property.”  Ohio, Official Report (1873-4), 3554; 1873 Ohio Const.
Article XII, Section 7. 
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Now, the power being conceded that the State of Ohio has the right to
prevent any foreign corporation from doing business in this State, the
question then arises, have we not the right to determine when we shall
exercise that authority, and under what circumstances?  It seems to me that it
is not the business of any other State of this Union as to what the reasons are
or what the policy is which shall induce us to exercise that power; and
whenever we shall determine that we will exercise it, no other power has the
right to interfere or say aught against it.  It is left to us entirely to determine
that question.  And when we shall say to any corporation doing business in
the State, you do this thing and your power to do any business in the State of
Ohio will end, have we not the right to do so?....I ask if this is not a good
reason why we should compel no citizens of the State of Ohio to go outside
of their own counties for the purpose of enforcing his rights against these
corporations?111 
This ran into potential conflict with Article III of the Federal Constitution, which
provided that federal jurisdiction extended to “controversies between a State and a
citizen of another State; (and) between citizens of different States.”  For jurisdictional
purposes, corporations had been treated as “persons” under Article IV protections ever
since the 1809 Supreme Court decision of  Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux.112  Further, the
Supremacy clause of Article VI made federal law superior to state law when the two
were in conflict.     Were states allowed to force corporations to give up the right to
sue in federal court, it could have impaired building a truly national market.  One
delegate cited a Michigan district attorney's report where he asserted it would almost
certainly ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the Unites States: “Let, then,
any  State apply to all the business within it, a like law, and there results, under this
doctrine, a wavier of a right to sue in the Federal courts, nothing comparatively would
111 Ohio, Official Report (1873-4), 2492-3.
112 The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux et al., 5 Cranch 61 (1809).  In Paul v. Virginia  75 U. S.
168 (1869), corporations were not considered to be persons within the meaning of the privileges and
immunities clause of Article IV of the Constitution.  Nevertheless, they had the right to have cases
adjudicated in federal courts.
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be then left, and the several State Legislatures have practically terminated the national
judiciary, as a court of civil jurisdiction for private suitors.”113  The Supreme Court
was the final protector of the national market, and the limit of state power would be
defined there.
The limits of state capacity to control foreign corporations grew as the century
progressed.  Even as early as 1874 the Ohio convention note that a coal company with
a Kentucky charter, had been created entirely for the purpose of engaging mining coal
in  Ohio.  It was a fraud, but Ohio already had passed a law allowed certain specified
types of mining companies to “take, hold, and convey such real and personal estate as
is necessary for the purpose for which it is incorporated; and may carry on its business,
or so much thereof as is convenient, beyond the limit of this State, and there hold any
real and personal estate necessary for conducting the same.”114  By thus allowing Ohio
to “spawn” corporations in other states, Ohio was not on good legal grounds to restrict
other states from doing the same.  By 1890 the problem was more acute.  A delegate at
the 1890 convention in Kentucky noted that
 “the law of West Virginia is liberal with reference to corporations, and there
are corporations doing business in Ohio under West Virginia charters.  There
is one very large corporation in Ohio formed under the laws of New Jersey.
Its object in going to New Jersey in incorporate was this: After looking over
the state laws of the various States, the persons proposing to form it found
that, under the law of New Jersey, by paying a certain tax or license for the
privilege of becoming a corporation, the corporation would be exempted from
tax thereafter on its franchise.  It was a certainly as to what it had to pay.”115 
This sort of logic then impacted many arguments.  It was invoked by those
113 Ohio, Official Report (1873-4),  2496-7.
114 Ibid., 2376 (Hoadly).
115 Kentucky, Official Report (1890), 3738 (Mackoy).
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opposed to to limits on real estate acquisition by foreign corporations in Pennsylvania
in 1872 (“this is a relic of barbarism”),116 and by those opposed to extra liability in
California in 1878, and in Kentucky in 1890.  As one California delegate noted,
additional liability requirements in California would place domestic corporations at a
disadvantage relative to foreign corporations: “We would discriminate against
ourselves.”117
In 1897 Delaware was still a sleepy backwater at the edge of the
industrial metropole.  Delegates were aware, however, of practices in nearby
states, including her neighbor directly to the north, New Jersey.  New Jersey by
that time had begun her policy of seeking to attract corporations to take out
charters even when they had no operations within the state.  Delegates at the
Delaware convention argued that a liberal corporation policy would be good
for to the state:
The wisdom of this liberality of the laws toward corporations is shown most
strongly in this New Jersey case.  I imagine there is no state in the Union that
has laws more favorable to corporations than the State of New Jersey—not
only corporations which do business in the State of New Jersey go to Trenton
for charters, but corporations all over the country are operating under New
Jersey charters;”118
Suppose New Jersey did not get this nine hundred and fifty-seven
thousand dollars a year from its corporation taxes and franchise fees, where
else would it come from?  It would have to come out of the pockets of New
Jersey.  The people would have to pay it if these outside, and domestic
corporations did not pay it....
I want our State to reach the highest possible point of development.  I
do not want to give unjust powers to corporations.  I want the Legislature, or
whatever tribunal has the granting of them, to use reasonable and proper care.
116 Pennsylvania, Debates (1872), vol. 4, 609.  
117 1878 CA CC 384 (Wilson)
118 California, Debates and Proceedings (1878-9), vol. 3, 384 (Wilson).
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But if corporations can be induced to come to our State to take out their
charters and pay their money into our State Treasury and relieve our people
from taxation....I would like them to come here. 119
Delaware would copy the New Jersey law in 1899, two years after the constitutional
convention.  She would offer laws similar to New Jersey, but at a lower price.  That
was only possible with the relaxation of restrictions on corporations that occurred at
the 1897 convention.  Delegates argued that a liberal policy might contain some risk,
but held out the possibility of a significant reward.  The exchange of the following two
delegates, both proponents of liberal incorporation, is instructive.  
Robert W Dasey:  If we undertake to go too far, there is danger of driving
capital out.  Capital goes where it can invest under the most advantageous
terms.  Capitalists are not so philanthropic as to invest for the benefit of
communities, unless they can realize some benefit therefrom.
If we can be liberal and protect our citizens to the same extent as they
do in New Jersey and make it so that people can  come here and get acts of
incorporation and pay for the privilege, through and by which we can
replenish our treasury, I do not know but it is a very good thing to take some
little risk; for I think we are going to need some  source to draw from.  A
continual draft from a limited supply will eventually exhaust the source.
William Saulsbury: We could afford our penitentiary then.120
A blunter statement of state purposes in a federal setting would be difficult to find. 
Decline of State Capacities in a Changing Political Economy
The impact of tradition on the construction of political economic regulations
troubled many minds.  Delegates recognized the role of the state in the creation and
regulation of economic affairs.  They sought to justify practice as it has been handed
119 Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7), 2135-2136 (Saulsbury).
120 Ibid., 2139.
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down, and to justify too new regulations to be promulgated.
These laws are the outgrowths of the business experience of long years.
Law is not absolutely created or carved out of the head of any man.  It
grew from the customs and usages of merchants long preceding
adjudication by the Courts.
Take by way of illustration the rules and regulations of mines.  These
mining rules and customs grew from necessity, from the progress and
industry of the State.  The miners made their own rules and regulations, and
afterwards the Legislature adopted them and crystallized them into law, and
the Courts administered them and proclaimed them law.  Take the customs of
merchants in all the different branches of grade, and the same thing appears,
for all these customs and usages contribute to the making of the law.”121
The questions that arose in the political economy were pressing and new.  “The
great railroad questions of the nation are of recent origin—nothing old, nothing
historical.  There are no precedents that are not of the living present; we can see it all
around and about us.  We don't go to any old musty tomes to find out what the
opinions of our fathers were as to railroads, for they had none.”122  Mr. Estee, the
chairman of the 1878 California convention committee on corporations noted
We are aware, sir, every thoughtful man everywhere must be aware, that at
this time the wagon, the old state coach, the old time-honored means of
transportation of freight and passengers, have passed away forever.  That a
new era has dawned upon the country, almost without our knowledge and in
less than a generation....The political and financial power of railroads in the
United States are immense, and have become a grand imperium in imperio—a
government within a government, a power within a power, greater than the
mightiest, grander and more colossal than any other financial institution
hitherto known in the history of civilization.123
A new mindset was needed.  Estee argued that combination and monopoly were
inevitable, and that government could not stop them.  Further, competition could also
not exist.  Following Charles Francis Adams, he argued that regulated monopoly was
121 California, Debates and Proceedings (1878-9), vol. 3, 384 (Wilson).
122 Ibid., vol. 3, 379 ( Estee).
123 Ibid., vol. 3, 377 (Estee).
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replacing unbridled competition.  Therefore the only practicable solution was
governmental regulation.124  Yet the legislature was not competent to deal with these
issues.  It only met for a short time every other year.  A commission could be staffed
with specialists that could inform themselves properly.  Further, a commission was
less likely to be influenced by money, which would inevitably tempt legislators.
Legislators had proven to be incapable of questioning businessmen, and the new
business man crossed party lines.  Or, as he quoted of Jay Gould (from Adams'
Chapters of Erie)  “In Democratic districts I am a Democrat; in Republican districts I
am a Republican; in doubtful districts I am doubtful: but I am always for Erie.”125  A
new model was needed, and new procedures enacted.
States had authority to regulate corporations through their police powers, and
most delegates recognized this.  The police powers were broad, and most delegates
contented that they could be exercised without infringing on corporations vested
rights.  Mr. Estee, the chairman of the corporations committee at the 1878 California
convention cited Munn v. Illinois (1877)126 as definitive that the state indeed could
regulate corporations via the police power.  It was appropriate for the state to regulate
the corporation.  However, he noted that while the legislature had the right to regulate
railroad rates, it was not equipped to do so.  The only solution he considered viable
was a permanent commission.127  The regulatory solution began first with railroad
124 Ibid., vol. 3, 378 (Estee).
125 Ibid., vol. 3, 379-80 (Estee).
126 94 US 113 (1877).  Munn v. Illinois upheld states rights to regulate grain elevators, as they were
businesses “affected with the public interest.”
127 California, Debates and Proceedings (1878-9), vol. 3, 379 (Estee)
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regulation, but as a general rule did not extend to all corporations until the twentieth
century.  
Twentieth century regulation, however, would not be based on state
incorporation law.  Rather, it would be based on federal antitrust law.  Antitrust law is
reactive, and as a general rule, does not threaten corporations with their very existence.
Just as importantly, the federal government was a limited government of assigned
powers.  The extent of its antitrust authority had to overcome both a tradition of
limited government, and the oversight of the Supreme Court.  Federal activity was
halting.  The Sherman Act was interpreted narrowly in the Trans-Missouri case of
1897 by not making distinctions between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of
trade.128  This limited federal capacity to permit reasonable, but not unreasonable
restraints.  The court retained this interpretation of the rule of reason until the
Standard Oil129 and American Tobacco130 cases of 1911, thus broadening the
application of the Sherman Act.131  The conflict over the extent of federal regulatory
authority under the Sherman Act was conducted in the wake of a decline in state
capacity to regulate the corporation via statutory law.
Old conceptions of value as static gave way to the new economic reality.  In the
latter years of the century delegates were concerned with fraudulently inflated stock
values that were dumped on unsuspecting purchasers.  Part of the problem was
128 U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290.
129 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 76.
130 American Tobacco v. United States, 221 U.S. 179.
131 See Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916.  (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 127-154.  Hans Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy:
Origination of an American Tradition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955).
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discerning the true value of intangible objects.  One solution adopted by states was to
forbid corporations from issuing stocks or bonds, except for money actually paid in,
labor actually done, or personal property acquired.  This led to several objections at the
1897 Delaware convention, though it had been relatively uncontroversial before.  One
complaint was that it would restrict corporations from making using their credit to
make purchases for goods designated for future delivery.  A railroad, for example,
might want to make a contract to purchase a railroad car scheduled to be delivered in
the future, and wish to issue their credit to make payment for it.  The problem is that
the car is not yet made, and the law required actual property to be received.  To meet
this objection, delegates removed the words “bonds” out of the section, although
stocks were still included.132 
More fundamentally, however, was the problem of setting values on intangible
objects.  That included the value of stocks themselves.  Many delegates had a notion of
a fixed value for a good or service, and a fixed “par” value for the shares of a
corporation.133  Speculation was considered to be unjust market manipulation.  The
legislators were confronting a challenge to orthodox modes of valuation, and of
placing value on intangible assets.  The change in mindset that from one of fixed
valued to that of value dependent on vagaries of the market was not yet complete, but
in Delaware in 1897 we can see examples of an evolution of mindset to a modern
conception of property:
A great many things that a company needs and are essential for its
132 Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7),  2128 (Bradford).
133 Kentucky, Official Report (1890), 3654-7
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operations, have no market price.  That is almost without exception
applicable to the whole subject of patent rights.  Patent rights have no
market value—not one in a million has market value....It is a thing that
is not to be sold on the market.  The only thing that can have a market
value is a thing that is customary to be sold in the market.  Each patent
right is separate.  This patent may be worth one million of dollars, ant
that patent right may be worth one dollar; one may be worth one
million dollars intrinsically if you work it, but nobody knows about
that, and it is impossible to have any market price placed upon it.  If
you put in “market value” there is a vagueness of the words, “actual
value.”
I sympathize with the object of my friend from Milford....has in
preventing the dealing out of stocks and bonds for things at fictitious
prices, or fictitious values....That is the thing we want to abolish; but in
doing it, do not let us fall into the error of saying that they shall buy
nothing except at its market value.134
The solution amounted to state restraint in the valuation of goods.  It could legislature
against fraud, but its creation, the corporation, was moving beyond the states capacity
to legislate in this area, despite the proclaimed right of states proclaimed to do so.  
Conclusion
States were deeply involved in regulating their local political economies in the
nineteenth century.  The debates in the constitutional conventions over the propriety of
various regulations is a testament to this fact.  Delegates sought to promote the
economic condition of their state, while still maintaining state control.  They justified
state action with the artificial entity theory.  
The problems delegates faced at the end of the century were different from the
problems they faced in 1867.  In 1867 legislatures were able to control domestic
134 Delaware, Debates and Proceedings (1896-7), 890-1 (Spruance).
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corporations via statutory limits.  By the time the national market was constructed at
the end of the century, foreign corporations had great latitude to impact domestic state
economies.  The states capacity to discipline foreign corporations was limited.  A
national market for corporate charters increased the number of foreign corporations
and further reduced state leverage.
When the Supreme court confronted orthodox legal doctrine that no longer
functioned in the modern corporate economy, it searched for a new doctrine under
which to operate and adjudicate disputes.135  When the states confronted the same
economic transformation, the exigencies of federalism led to the decline of state
authority to discipline the corporation.  Instead, authority over the corporation
removed to the federal government.  Corporate regulation would depend on federal
capacity and federal will.  The vagaries in the enforcement activity of the various
administrations from one Roosevelt (Theodore) to another (Franklin Delano) are
witness to this dynamic.  In any case, antitrust enforcement activity by the federal
government had to proceed without the use of statutory law as a weapon to threaten
the corporation.
135 See Horwitz, Transformation in American Law; William M Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical




Ceilings: The New York Investigations of Corporate Abuse
 
The American states gradually, and then more rapidly, transformed their
corporation law.  Pressures inducing them to do so were competitiveness of their
individual political economies and the pressures towards charter liberalization as a
result of state competition in a federal system.  Yet states also resisted a complete
capitulation, and sought to restrain some corporate activities.  The states were not
simply tools of the business class; they sought to maintain their own authority to
regulate their political economies.  This led to conflict with some business interests
that sought to push beyond the limits that the states sought to impose.
To understand the dynamics of political economic development requires that
we address this conflict.  How did corporations respond when states sought to impose
ceilings on their behavior?  What tools did the states have to impose limits, and how
did corporations seek to evade or otherwise circumvent the limits that would tend to
hamper their business plans?  This chapter begins to address these questions by an
examination of antitrust investigations in the state of New York, from 1888 to 1897.  
To date there have been anecdotal descriptions of episodes when corporations
encountered ceilings.  One example is the creative use of special legislative charters.
In the late 1860's the Pennsylvania legislature routinely issued special charter with
special privileges to speculators that held them in their pockets.1  John D. Rockefeller
1 Pennsylvania, Constitutional Convention (1872-1872), Debates of the Convention to Amend the
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purchased one such charter in 1871 that permitted corporations to hold stock in
companies outside of the state.  He used this to vehicle to consolidate oil pipelines.2  
The formation of the trusts was an effort to evade state restrictions.  A trust is a
combination of corporations that have sold all of their shares to a central trust office,
in order to evade state restrictions on mergers and holdings.  The central trust
organization was not incorporated itself, but the constituent companies usually were.
Thus it amounted to a partnership of the constituent corporations.3  Standard Oil
formed the first trust in 1882 to coordinate production output and price; six other trusts
copied this strategy during that decade.4   The Cotton Oil Trust, which operated in
Louisiana, was prosecuted by that state on the basis that it had no legal standing. When
prosecuted by the state, officers dissolved the company and incorporated it it in Rhode
Island (and then later New Jersey), and then informed Louisiana state prosecutors that
the firm they were prosecuting no longer existed.5
The successful prosecution of the North River Refineries Company in New
York in 1888 highlighted the difficulties faced by state legislators in regulating their
creations in the new national market.   The North River Sugar Refineries was a New
York company that sold out to the newly formed Sugar Trust.  New York prosecuted
the company for violating its charter when it jointed the Sugar Trust (they asserted it
Constitution of Pennsylvania: Convened at Harrisburg, November 12, 1872, Adjourned November
27, to Meet at Philadelphia, January 7, 1873... , 9 vols. (Harrisburg: B. Singerly, 1873), v. 4, 581-3.
2 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press., 1977), 323.
3 Ibid., 319.
4 Ibid., 321-.
5 For a narrative, see William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Corporation in
America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press., 1997), 199-203.        
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had no power to do so.)  As a result of the successful prosecution, the Sugar Trust
incorporated itself as a New Jersey holding company.  The E.C. Knight Company was
a subsidiary of the newly formed American Sugar Refineries Company.  E.C. Knight
was prosecuted by the Cleveland Administration under the Sherman Act, but the
merger of these different companies was upheld in the E.C. Knight (1895) decision.6
There the Supreme Court ruled that manufacturing was distinct from commerce, that
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution authorized congressional
regulation of the latter but not the former, that the American Sugar Refining was a
manufacturer, and that therefore the U.S. Government did not have authority to
regulate it.
Despite these episodic narratives, we lack a systematic account of corporate
action in the face of state limits, as well as state efforts to restrain corporations that
sought to push through the ceilings.  This examination of the New York State
Legislature's efforts to investigate trusts contributes to this task.7  It also contributes to
our understanding of how legislators viewed the role of the state in regulating
corporations.  It may be no coincidence that provisions discussed by delegates at the
state constitutional conventions did not directly address corporate mergers.  Most of
the convention, after all, preceded the merger movement of the late 1890's.  In the
investigations that took place in New York from 1888 to 1897, by contrast, there was
no more pressing issue.
6 United States v. E.C. Knight & Co. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).  See Roy, Socializing Capital, 207-213.
7 Examination of Ultra Vires cases (those where a corporation is prosecuted for acting beyond its
charter) is another method of such investigation.
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Legislators were forced to confront the same issues that led to a crisis of legal
orthodoxy at the bar and bench.  Like the judiciary, legislators had to address pressures
of economic competitors seeking sanction for their favored abstract property rights.
The reactions of the legislators would be different from those of the judiciary for at
least three reasons.   First, under an orthodox conception of law legislatures make law
while courts interpret law. The pretense of impartiality while legislating preferences
from the bench was not an issue.  Second, the outcomes decided by legislators need
not pretend to be logically consistent.  Rather, votes counted as much, if not more,
than persuasion.  Third, while courts address legal facts prevalent in disputed cases,
legislators have the opportunity to consider more broadly relevant social facts.8  The
broad concern over social facts was evident in the New York investigations.
Elements constituting the crisis of orthodoxy in the New York Legislature
involved the failure of competition in the face of monopoly, the relationship between
principle and agent, the setting of boundaries between public and private spheres, and
the valuation of new intangible assets.  Corporations controlled their books, and states
had problems getting information from them.  The innovation of Moody in evaluating
the financial condition of corporations was not yet established (although Moody was
already advocating this).   Thus investors were often blind to inner corporate workings.
The states were similarly nearly powerless in gathering information, despite their
avowed right to inspect corporate books.  As a result, they were also nearly powerless
in crafting legislation to control the corporation.  In the new industrialized world, with
8 Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977).
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a national market, the states had largely lost control of their creation, and had thus also
lost the control over their local political economies.
The New York Investigations of Trusts
New York investigated trusts on five occasions from 1888 to 1897.9   During
the investigations the legislature had to mediate popular demands to restrain the
concentration of economic power with corporate pressure to permit combinations.  In
these investigations the legislative committees subpoenaed and questioned witnesses
with full stenographic recording of the proceedings.10  The timing of these
investigations is fortuitous.  The first two occurred in 1888 and 1889, after the creation
of the Standard Oil Trust in 1882.  The 1888 investigation occurs before New Jersey’s
law sanctioning the Cotton Oil consolidation, and the 1889 investigation occurs before
New Jersey more generally liberalized its law later that year.  The next investigations
occur in 1891 in response to the horizontal consolidation of the Sugar Trust that year,
and in 1893 in the aftermath of a coal monopoly.  These happen after the passage of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, but before the decision of E.C. Knight in 189511 which
limited its application.  They were also clearly limited by the small amount of time
given to them to conduct hearings and report back to the full Senate.  The 1891
investigation sought to remedy this weakness via focus on the Sugar Trust only, with
9 The Senate also investigated the coal monopoly in 1893, which I do not address in this paper.  New
York (State), Legislature, Senate,  Testimony taken before the Special Senate Committee Relative to
the Coal Monopoly (Albany: J.B. Lyon, 1893).  
10 This is fortuitous because of the paucity of good records in New York.  New York’s library burned
down in 1912; many documents were destroyed.  New York did not establish an archive until the
1970’s. 
11 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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the intent of generalizing its findings to other industries.  The final investigation was a
high profile effort in 1897, after the Knight decision that gave horizontally integrated
companies had gained the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.  The 1897 investigation
was arguably the most successful of the investigations in shedding light on practices of
industry, yet by this time many large corporations had already achieved national
dominance via horizontal merger.
Market Consolidation and Legislative Dilemma
In order to address the issues that arose in the trust investigations it is necessary
to discuss some basic elements of economic theory that drove business strategies.  It
was, after all, these strategies that concerned legislators.  Under idealized conditions of
perfect competition, with unlimited entry of competitors, companies will not make a
profit.  If identical substitutes for a good can be provided by a limitless supply of
competitors, the profit margin in the long run will tend towards zero.12  Actors at the
time understood this.  Under conditions of high fixed costs, companies will be induced
to sell below long-term costs.  Companies thus sought ways to preserve their pricing
power, which essentially reduced the firm's price elasticity of demand.  They pursued a
wide variety of strategies to do so.
One method of preserving pricing power was product differentiation.13  This
strategy involved selling high quality goods, often branded.  These could sometimes be
12 James K. Galbraith and William J. Darity, Jr.  Macroeconomics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994).
13 Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1900  (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 16-18.
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reinforced with patents and trademarks.  Another strategy was mass production of
marginally differentiated products at a low cost.  To pursue this strategy required
erecting barriers to entry.14  An firm with a dominant market share could limit
competition on price as long as it maintained the lowest cost of production.  Under
these conditions it could then act as dominant firm, setting the price and forcing
competitors to follow.   So long as the firm remained the lowest cost producer it
retained the power to discipline rivals that might otherwise be tempted to cut prices in
order to boost output.  The dominant firm will do so by engaging in a price war that
will severely harm the less efficient rival firms.
Another strategy was collusion or combination.  In the 1870’s and 1880's this
involved cartels that set target prices and divided the market share among the
participants.  At the time cartels were not illegal, but they were also not legally
enforceable in courts of law.  With artificially high prices, participants had an
incentive to overproduce.  As a result most cartels failed in short order.  In order to
control price and output a way had to be found to legally bind the disparate parties.  To
accomplish this, the trust device was  introduced in 1882 by New York lawyer A.C.
Dodd.  He designed it to consolidate the oil industry under the control of John D.
Rockefeller.15  The trust combined a number of (usually) incorporated companies as a
“partnership” of companies (again, the trust itself was not incorporated.)  Each
constituent firm was run separately, but with decisions on pricing and output made at
14 Ibid., 27-37, 160-1.
15 Rachel Rudmose Parker, The Subnational State and Economic Organization: State Level Variation
in Incorporation Law in the United States, 1880-1904  (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California,
Los Angeles., 1993), 30
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the central office.  Profits of each unit were funneled to the central trust, and then were
distributed on a percentage basis to each of the members of that trust. By the end of
that decade, its use had spread to cottonseed oil, sugar, and elsewhere.  The Sherman
Act outlawed the trust, although the phrase “antitrust” remains with us, usually
referring to monopoly or oligopoly.
Factor and rebate agreements were more successful at reducing competition.  A
jobber, wholesaler, or factor that wished to trade specified goods was required to sign
a contract with terms that set a minimum allowable price for selling the manufacturer’s
goods.  Often they would be excluded from selling similar goods manufactured by
competitors below the set price (and in some cases, from selling competitors goods at
all.)  Those who met these terms would receive a rebate of perhaps ten percent, and
this was often the distributor’s entire profit on the items.  In practical terms, those who
did not abide by the agreement could not survive in the trade.  Because the rebate was
given after the sale, the manufacturer had a means of enforcement.  Some goods, such
as sugar, were of such importance that if the wholesaler did not carry it they would not
be able to survive; retailers required these goods.  Legislators had to consider the
propriety of these practices, and sought levers to control the abuses.
The Natural Law of Supply and Demand 
For members of the legislature of New York  the “natural” law of supply and
demand was the foundation of accepted economic theory.  Yet there were disputes
over the nature of markets, and no generally accepted understanding of market failure.
229
The joint committee report of 1897 addressed the issue directly:
 “it is a situation which seems to be the natural evolution growing out of the
fierce contest for supremacy in the fields of commerce and finding a
reflection in almost every department of human activity.  That it is a natural
evolution seems clear from the fact that it is the universal concomitant of
progress, marking in fact, to a very large extent, the progressive stages of
commercial development created by the natural impulse toward better
conditions, and in its turn creating that complex system upon the proper
adjustment of which the welfare, comfort and prosperity of the people so
largely depend.”16
The report argued that just collections of capital move “with the natural law”, while
unjust trusts and combinations “operate against the natural law.”17  Defining exactly
what this meant in practice would be the legislature’s charge, and would be contested
throughout.
The process of Schumpeter's creative destruction was well understood by
contemporaries, even if economists had yet to synthesize the phenomenon into a
coherent theory.18  The 1889 committee report stated 
[t]he aid of laws for the prevention of trusts is usually invoked to protect the
weak individual against the strong combination, and yet every day in the
world of commerce the weak individual is overcome by his strong
competitor, who had more money, better credit, or other greater advantages
than he.  In a world of nature everywhere this rule prevails—the weak are
overcome by the strong, and nothing lives or thrives but at the expense of
something else which was in some measure its competitor.19  
Creative destruction was often in fact predatory destruction.  This included
16  New York (State),  Report and Proceedings of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly
Appointed to Investigate Trusts  (Albany: Wynkook Hallonbeck Crawford, 1897),   8.  Hereafter
referred to as “New York (State), Report and Proceedings (1897).”
17 Ibid., 10.
18 Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital,
Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (New York: Oxford University Press 1961[first published
1911]).
19 New York (State), Legislature, Senate, Report of the Senate Committee on General Laws Relative to
Combinations Commonly Known as Trusts [Document 64] (Albany: Troy Press, 1889), 5.  Hereafter
referred to as “New York (State), Report of the Senate Committee (1889).”
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factor and rebating agreements that effectively shut out a wholesaler or jobber who
refused to abide by the proffered arrangements.  In this case a wholesaler who sold a
competitor’s brand at lesser price could be shut out, and their business effectively
ruined.  In 1896 the Arbuckles company decided to offer packets of sugar with their
coffee distribution.  American Sugar Refineries Company threatened them, then
purchased a rival coffee distributor and underbid Arbuckles on price.20  Farmers who
tried to circumvent the Milk Exchange were overtly threatened with ruin.21  Such
competition was ruthless, and raised the question of whether such behavior merely
reflected healthy competition, or whether it reflected the abuse of monopoly or
oligopoly.
The perils of interfering with the market were made apparent in the 1889
investigation.  In 1888 the legislature mandated a (lower) rate for unloading grain to
elevators in Buffalo.  Before passage elevator operators had included five days free
storage with the charge for unloading.  After passage the grain elevators formed an
agreement whereby they automatically charged for the first ten days automatically.
The result was to make the bill a “dead letter;”22 most witnesses felt the bill was
counterproductive at best.  A boat operator, for whom the bill was designed to benefit,
claimed that the bill “is legislating no money into the boatman’s pocket.”23  The
market seemed to defy legislative interference.
Market imperfections were recognized in the identification of individual
20 New York (State), Report and Proceedings (1897), 145-8.




problems, but not as a theoretic construct that would supply a rationale for systematic
government supervision of markets.  Nevertheless, the members of the legislature
confronted behavior that seemed to contradict the natural law of supply and demand.
Members of the state Senate felt the need to consider the regulation of industries
dominated by monopoly.
Monopoly & Price Fixing
Price fixing was a central concern of all investigating committees.  Firms
combined, bought out competitors, and raised prices. The difficulty from a theoretical
perspective was distinguishing the right to contract with the abuse of economic
position.  That two individuals could agree to join forces was recognized as perfectly
legitimate.  The difficulty came when companies with high fixed costs made contracts
to join forces and monopolize markets.  In that case the law of supply and demand
would be “repealed.”  Determining where to draw the line was the dilemma the
legislature faced.  In theory the state had leverage over incorporated business to the
extent that those businesses required state permission to combine.
The 1888 investigation was the first, and as a result in some ways the most
interesting.  Henry O. Havemeyer was chairman of the Sugar Trust.  He claimed that
each plant in the trust was run as a separate entity, and that members of the trust did in
fact compete with one another on price of raw material and for the best price on the
finished product.  Better managers received “moral credit” in comparison with
232
managers at sister plants.24  The same was claimed by the John Scott of the Cotton Oil
Trust: 
It is not function of the trust to control the operations of the refineries, and
they do not control the operations of the refineries; the refineries are separate
and distinct corporations, with a president, vice president, board of directors,
and set of officers; and they manage their own businesses.25  
This claim was not made in later years.  By 1889 the Havemeyers and other witness
were increasingly likely to evade questions.  Havemeyer and others obfuscated how
the board of the trust controlled member plants, essentially denying that there was
centralized control.  They claimed to have no record as to how the constituent
companies that went into the trust were valued before combining, even despite the fact
that closed plants shared in profits. Much of this information would not be exposed
until the 1891, and especially 1897 investigations.
The 1889 committee report noted that ancient activities of forestalling,
regrating, and engrossing were originally misdemeanors in common law.26  Although
the legislature saw these laws as anachronistic, members struggled with determining
what sorts of anti-competitive behavior were against “natural laws.” Appleton Sturgis
was part of a “loose” combination of seeking to control the distribution of cotton
24 New York (State), Legislature,  Senate. Report of the Senate Committee on General Laws on
Investigation Relative to Trusts (Document 50; New York: State Printer March 6, 1888), p57.
Hereafter referred to as “New York (State), Report of the Senate Committee (1888).”
25 New York (State), Report of the Senate Committee (1889), 241.
26 The 1889 report described these as follows:  “Forestalling the market was declared by statute to be
“the buying or contracting for any merchandize or victual coming in the way to market or dissuading
persons from bringing their goods or provisions there, or persuading them to enhance price when
there, which practices make the market dearer to the fair trader.”  Regrating is described by the same
stature to be “the buying of corn or other dead victual in any market and selling it again in the same
market or within four miles thereof.” Engrossing was “the getting into one’s possession or buying up
large quantities of corn or other victuals with intent to sell them again.”” New York (State), Report
of the Senate Committee (1889), 7.
233
bagging.  When his organization was referred to as a trust, he protested that “[t]here is
no trust about it; it is simply a corner.”27  Before passage of the Sherman Act the
attempt to corner a market was, if not perfectly legitimate, at least perfectly legal. 
Industrialists often made references to the need for reasonable profits.  The
sugar combination claimed its intended purpose was to prevent prices “from being
lowered to a disastrous extent.”28  Perhaps the bluntest statement was by Franklin
Woodruff, a grain elevator operator.  He said of competition: “[w]e want to destroy it
all we can; competition is a bad thing.”  He was not alone in this sentiment. 
Investigators were concerned that the consumer was hurt when prices rose as a
result of combination.  The 1897 joint committee found that while prices might be
more stable than before combination, the price level was higher than previously.  The
industrialists consistently denied this.  Charles Flint of United States Rubber Company
justified the merger on account efficiencies from centralization and economies of
scale.  Flint claimed that they  “are enabled to compete with the pauper labor of the
densely populated countries, owing to the fact that they use labor saving machinery.”29
Nevertheless, even when U.S. Rubber had excess capacity it bought up competitors
and proceeded to shut them down.30  Other combinations followed similar strategies. 
The Principle-Agent Problem
In the investigations of 1888, 1889, and 1891, corporate officers often claimed
27 Ibid., 66.
28 New York (State), Report of the Senate Committee (1888), 60.
29 New York (State), Report and Proceedings (1897), 532.
30 Ibid., 521.
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to not have the authority to release information.  Legislators sought to pierce the veil
of secrecy that witness sought to create.  John D. Rockefeller of the Standard Oil Trust
claimed in 1888 that the trust agreement was between individual shareholders, not
corporations.31  Thus he argued that the information was not his to divulge.  He also
refused to hand over minutes of trustee meetings, and did not disclose the existence of
a proxy book with details on certificate distributions.32  Under pressure from the 1891
investigative committee, Theodore Havemeyer of the Sugar Trust claimed that despite
being a senior officer he had no power to gather documents of the constituent
members of the trust, or even from the consolidated American Sugar Refineries
Company.33
Rebating and factor agreements were used by a great variety of industries.
Rebating contracts were fixed the price of goods, sometimes stipulating that no
competitor’s prices would be sold at all, or at least that the competitor’s goods could
not be sold at a lower price.   The wholesaler or retailer would be guaranteed a rebate
as long as the conditions of the contract were met.  The result was to prevent
competition on price.  This also meant that the established company, familiar to the
public, would have an inherent advantage over any upstart competitor.  Manufacturers
blamed the wholesalers for instigating rebating contracts, while the grocery
wholesalers claimed credit for the agreements.  Both defended the practice.  
31 New York (State), Report of the Senate Committee (1888), 442.
32 Ibid., 577.
33 New York (State), Legislature, Senate,  Report of the Committee on General Laws Relative to Trusts
and Sugar Trusts (Albany: 1891), 705-6.  Hereafter referred to as “New York (State), Report of the
Committee (1991).”
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The 1897 committee report viewed factor agreements as fictional
consignments.  These agreements ostensibly treated the factor as an independent
operator, while at the same time controlling his actions.  The rebate was the only profit
allocated to the consignee.  The committee saw this as a means to control prices, and it
the Sherman Act appears to have had little impact on the practice.  The use of factors
was a way to try to avoid charges of monopoly while still maintaining price control.34
The voluntary control over the factors pushed prior limits of the principle-agent
relationship.
The Public/Private Distinction
Legislators occasionally demanded that a given corporation open its books by
invoking the fact that the state had granted the corporation its charter. That had indeed
been the purpose when writing the statutes, but in these investigations the legislators
had at best limited success.  When asked in 1891 if  “this partnership of stockholders,
whose interests aggregated to $50,000,000, carried on business two years and did not
keep any record of their proceedings,” John Searles, treasurer of the Sugar Trust
replied: “they kept no formal record.”35  Records were not required to be kept, were
claimed not to exist, and were moved to undisclosed locations.  Even when witnesses
acknowledged corporate books to have existed, they often claimed not to know where
they were. 
 John Parsons of the Sugar Trust argued in 1888 that the state had no right to
34 New York (State), Report and Proceedings (1897), 22-28.
35 New York (State), Report of the Committee (1991), 680.
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delve into private business matters.36  He and other officers of the Sugar Trust took
pains to obfuscate the manner in which the different “independent” members of the
trust combined together. Envelope manufacturer John Q. Preble objected to divulging
information about payments from his individual firm to the envelope trust.  As a
Massachusetts corporation he felt the New York legislature had no authority to
examine these details of his operations, even though he did business in New York.37
The wholesale grocers simply claimed they did not collude, as did virtually every other
combination called before the committee that year.  The conflict over these boundaries
would persist through the 1897 investigation.
Much investigative time was devoted to determining what books were
maintained and where they were kept.  Elihu Root acted as a general counsel for a
variety of witnesses in the 1888 and 1891 investigations, and also for the Sugar Trust
in the 1891 investigation.  He repeatedly claimed that information that the committee
wanted to see was private, and did not have to be given to the committee.  For
example, in trying to limit the books the committee would see stated that “[t]he trouble
is in separating the matters as to which you have no more right to inquire than any
other number of private gentlemen have from the matters as to which it is your duty to
inquire in the public interest.  It is very difficult to separate the two things, and if you
lump a lot of things in, they will come together.”38  Further questioning requesting
three sets of records is illustrative:
36 New York (State), Report of the Senate Committee (1888), 19.
37 Ibid.,  332-3.
38 New York (State), Report of the Committee (1991), 695.
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Mr. Root.—I submit to the committee that the last two of these are wholly
beyond the province of this committee.  It is not part of the duty nor within
the power of the Senate of this State to inquire into the question whether the
stockholders of a corporation or the certificate holders of a trust may be
having all the profits or the property to which they are entitled properly dealt
with or properly accounted for.  That is a question for which our judicial
system is established, and the courts are open to all persons to assert and
defend their private rights in accordance with the established procedure of
judicial tribunals; and to undertake to assert the right of the certificate
holders, or to inquire in the duties of them, on the part of the Senate, would
be a usurpation totally foreign to its duties.
Senator Erwin.—Would it if it were a fraud?
Mr. Root.—I think it would.
Senator Coggeshall.—That is a corporation doing business under the laws of
the State.  Do you say they should have no right to investigate as to the rights
of certificate holders or stockholders?
Mr. Root.—I say this, you have no to right to it; absolutely none.....
Senator Erwin.—I, myself, have supposed that we had the right to have these
books, and to examine them to show whether you made your profits or not;
because the public are the people who have bought your stock, and the stock
that you had, and that you have given to the public; and if it was wind, and
was not paid for, this committee have the right to know whether it is a fraud
or not.39
The legislature was moderately more successful at opening up stock company
books in 1897, using what leverage they had to extract information. The United States
Rubber Company tried to assert that capitalization information was private.
Committee chairman Clarence Lexow stated: “we regard this question of capitalization
as one of the important questions of this investigation, and whether your company be a
New Jersey corporation or a New York corporation you do business here and your
system affects the economic condition of our State, and we are entitled as a legislative
committee to know it.”40  The use of the charter as leverage would continue after the
39 Ibid., 699-700.
40 New York (State), Report and Proceedings (1897), 493.
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investigation.  New York Governor Benjamin B. Odell in 1901 justified the taxation of
corporations on the basis of special rights gained: “corporations receive from the State
certain rights,” and thus  “should pay a tribute…for that which they have received.”41
Nevertheless, the state was ineffective in procuring information it felt it had a right to
get, and threating to revoke the charter was becoming an increasingly ineffective
weapon in gathering the same.
Intangible Property
Values place on capitalization and the watering of stock were pervasive
concerns of the investigative committees in all years.  Legislators were concerned that
the public being offered the stock was being deceived and fleeced by overvalued stock.
Witness in all investigations tried to avoid revealing how individual and consolidated
manufacturing companies were valued.  None of the members of the Sugar Trust
claimed to be able to locate or recall details of papers that would explain how the
constituent companies were valued.  Charles Flint of United States Rubber (formed in
1892) was asked about $26 million in stock issued by 1893, but could not explain how
much was distributed to each of the constituent companies that were bought up.42
Various practices raised the suspicions of the investigators.  John Searles
acquired assets of $350,000 and that same day sold them for double that amount,
minus fifteen percent.  The entities formed into the American Sugar Refineries
41 Quoted in Richard L. McCormick, Shaping Republican Strategy: Political Change in New York
State, 1893-1910 (Yale University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1976), 367.
42 New York (State), Report and Proceedings (1897), 478.
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Company were separately valued at around $7 million, but then issued stock
amounting to around $50 million.43  In the investigations of 1888, 1889, and 1891
officers of the Sugar Trust stonewalled, for the most part successfully.  In 1897, after
E.C. Knight, the committee was slightly more successful in getting these documents.
By then American Sugar had the imprimatur of the U.S. Supreme Court for its
existence.  Legislators also struggled (unsuccessfully) to distinguish “speculation”
from “legitimate” stock market investment.  The acceptance of market based prices for
intangible assets is a staple of 20th century economic practice, was still gaining
acceptance.  Many still thought it immoral.
 Charles Flint of the United States Rubber Company made a better answer to
the question of stock watering.  Flint asserted that the value of a company could be far
greater that the amount of capital stock that the company held.44  Rather, the valuations
of the constituent companies were made with a view towards “future earning
capacity.”45  The justification was in part that profits were piled back into the business.
Flint also explicitly explained the value of stock certificates circulated by the trust not
only relegated to plant and other hard assets, but also “the value of patents, trade-
marks and business franchises.”46   More to the point, however, Flint asserted that
“$20,160,000 of stock was issued exclusively for what is called “good will.””47  







of the principal items of value.”48  This was capitalized by the issuing of stock. When
asked to explain this further, he explained: 
I mean to say that in this business the consumer is dependent upon the
trade-mark; the trade-mark represents the integrity of the manufacturer,
or it represents the reverse; the successful manufacturers—those
manufacturers that have stood the test of time over the forty years down
to the present day, have made honest goods for a period of fifty years...
I will say this: During the past, say five years prior to the organization
of the United States Rubber Company the greater part of the capital
which was used in an endeavor to establish new trade-marks was lost.49
The best answer to the question of valuation came from Henry Burn, of the
National Wall Paper Company.  Burn stated that common stock was issued for good
will, patents and trademarks.  To arrive at a figure Burn stated that “we calculated the
value of a business by its earning capacity; we multiplied the net profits of a certain
year by 16 and that became the total issue of stock to the concern for its business; from
that total we deducted an amount for tangible assets; from that we issued debenture
stock and for the balance we issued common stock.”50  The company consolidated its
market, bought out competitors, insuring a profit.  It then issued stock calculating a 6
percent annual return, with a multiple of 16.  “Good will” was the difference between
tangible assets and the value of the earnings.  Thus was the concept of a price-earnings
ratio introduced into the debate over what had been considered stock watering.
Obviously the original organizers, if successful, could make huge sums of money by
selling stock to outsiders after the consolidation.  “Good will” was a familiar concept,





explanation of stock values only in the 1897 investigation.  Legislators at the time
remained skeptical: to them it was all watered stock.  Practice in the 20th century, of
course, would ratify the new market valuation of intangible assets.  
Investigative Impact and the Incapacity of the State
The legislature of the State of New York had the task of legislating in the face
of changes in the practice of industry.  The industries they sought to regulate were
those that affected the public in their state.  These industries adopted practices that
would push the limits of prior understandings of the appropriate boundary between
private contract and “unnatural” combinations, the nature and value of intangible
property, and the relation between principle and agent.  It sought to combat this in part
with subpoena of documents that were considered private, subjecting corporate
practices to some minimal level of public oversight.  The agenda placed before the
state was determined in part by the types and structure of industry in the state. 
The companies being investigated were more inventive than the legislature's
ability to create institutional structures to regulate them.  The various legislative
committees were largely ineffective in their attempts to delve into the details of
individual businesses.  All investigative committees met for short periods of time,
never more than three weeks.  They were temporary committees, dissolved after the
reports were filed.  The 1888 committee report decried this problem, but the 1889
repeated the same procedure.  The 1891 investigation attempted to remedy these
inadequacies by holding hearings focused solely on the Sugar Trust, with the overt
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intention of applying its findings to the trust problem in general.  It nevertheless failed
to open the books of the trust, or to determine how the capital stock constituent
corporations was calculated.51  The 1897 investigation was more aggressive, but this
report too complained about the inadequate resources devoted to a problem of such
magnitude.  The institutional mechanisms were inadequate to the challenge.
The remedies recommended were limited.  The 1889 committee report noted a
judgment against the North River Sugar Refining Company from earlier in the year.  It
expected that “these questions are safely in the hand of judicial tribunals,” and
recommended no legislation.52  The 1891 committee report suggested legislation that
would, first, either prevent the formation of trusts or create a supervisory board;
second, require corporations chartered outside the state to pay a tax for the privilege of
doing business in the state; and third, require corporations doing business in the state
to keep books within the state, subject to inspection by the Attorney General.53   
The 1897 Joint Committee report argued that the state should refrain from
engaging in a “race to the bottom” by liberalizing its law:
We do not believe that the State of New York, for the mere purpose of
securing colorable incorporations here and receiving annually a pittance
for permission to avoid those reasonable and salutary requirements
which our laws impose, should alter its system so as to meet the
competition of any other State for this kind of corporate organization.
We cannot afford to offer our corporate charters to be trafficked in by
those who refuse to submit to reasonable restraints and search the land
over for the most complacent jurisdiction which holds its corporate
franchises so cheaply that they may be had for the asking on the
payment of a trifling tax by those who shun regulations devised to
51 New York (State), Report of the Committee (1991), 4-7, 11-12.
52 New York (State), Report of the Senate Committee (1889), 14.
53 New York (State), Report of the Committee (1991), 11-12.
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secure honesty of management, resent visitorial powers exercised by
the State for the benefit of the people, and avoid provisions designed
for the safety of the investing public and the security of creditors.54
The legislature passed laws that abolished combinations for the purpose of monopoly,
and required corporations to keep books in the state and file annual reports with the
Secretary of State.  How monopoly combinations would be distinguished from other
combinations was not defined.55
Conclusion
The investigations evince a common pattern: the non-political world is agile
and changes continuously, while the political world is more reactive and changes only
slowly, until pressures build up and force a jump shift in political organization.56  Self-
seeking entrepreneurs created markets, facilitated by property rights granted by the
state.  The state had limited capacity to examine corporate documents, items that today
would be public.  It conducted hearings, but did not have a regulatory agency to
monitor and adjust to changing circumstances.  Regulatory agencies did exist for
railroads and coal, which were considered “public” utilities.
The state was powerless to prevent companies from taking charters in New
Jersey.  Witnesses admitted to being drawn by the low taxes in New Jersey, but
generally denied New York’s laws were inferior.  While there were hostile questions
54 New York (State), Report and Proceedings (1897), 22.
55 New York (State), Report and Proceedings (1897), 54-59.
56 The theoretical import of the comparatively static development of the American state in relation to
developments in the political economy is developed by Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections
and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970).
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asked of company officers about their taking out New Jersey charters, no sanctions
were contemplated.  Without the ability to credibly impose a sanction, the authority of
the state over the corporate creation was limited.  Corporations required the state to
exist, and received their rights and obligations due to state law, but in a practical sense
they were no longer answerable to the state.  
The growing acknowledgment of intangible property is evident in the record,
even as it troubled many minds.  The 1897 committee report concluded  “[t]here could
not be prosperity without confidence that “every person, natural or artificial, shall have
the enduring protection of just and equal laws.”57  Of course a corporation itself is
intangible and incorporeal, but legislators had dealt with corporations for decades.
The legal devices of corporate capitalism had to be accepted as well.  Such were
corporate shares, traded impersonally and subject to the vagaries of market fluctuation.
Such also were copyrights, patents, and trademarks.  Perhaps most controversially,
such was the case with the capitalization of corporate “good will.” It is of no small
significance that its advocates were the lawyers of the businessmen.
57 New York (State), Report and Proceedings (1897), 12.  This reference was made the same year
Ernst Freund introduced the idea of the corporation as a “natural” (Horwitz 1992, 71).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: A New Political Economy
States in the nineteenth century sought to regulate their political economies via
statutory corporation law.  In doing so they created the situations which gave rise to
the large industrial corporation.  State statutory practice was an essential component of
the historical context and  material conditions that led to advent of corporate
capitalism.  Thus the new form of the industrial corporation was a constituent part of a
new economic system situated at the leading edge of economic development.  The
outburst of entrepreneurial energies that became corporate capitalism was predicated
on changes in state law.  
The law is an essential element of the conditions necessary for development.  It
arises out of practices in given institutional settings, with given institutional dynamics.
The American innovation of corporation law that supplanted the British system as the
dominant form of corporate organization in the world was built within the context of
federalism.  
States crafted their laws to suit the political imperatives of the state's economic
topography.  These imperatives were slightly different for each state.  Nevertheless,
states large numbers of small producers were more likely to resist liberalization that
tended to allow large size.  In this regard, a system of federalism was crucial in the
development of liberalized corporation law.  States experimented with provisions to
improve their local economies, but were not in a position to resist impositions of their
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sister states.  The Supreme Court acted as the last bastion of defense against overly
aggressive state localism that might tend to inhibit building a national market.
The rise of corporate capitalism in the early twentieth century was built upon
innovations of the nineteenth century.  The New Jersey laws ought not be
characterized as a “big bang” that accommodated the interests of corporate lawyers.
Rather, they should be characterized as an inflection point on a trajectory that was well
in motion.  This observation has great significance for political economic theories of
economic development.  It is indicative of a deeply ingrained practice of enabling
corporate development.  Despite Lincoln Steffens' protests to the contrary, it was a
standard process for states to adjust and liberalize their corporation law.1  The New
Jersey innovations were less radical than Steffens thought; many states had been
relaxing their corporation law over the course of the century.
The consequences of statutory laws may well not have been anticipated by
those who crafted them. States that broadened their general laws may not have
recognized that they were setting precedents for laws that would permit a corporation
to engage in any activity.  States that passed general laws appear not to have
considered that the advance of general laws would generate a crisis over the nature of
the corporation among academic legal theorists.  It is unlikely that the Supreme Court
ruling in E.C. Knight, which sought to protect states' regulatory authority, had been
anticipated by them.  Just as important, it is unlikely that states intended to weaken
their own capacity to regulate their economies when they liberalized their laws to
1 See Lincoln Steffens, “New Jersey: The Traitor State,” 25 McClure's, 41-55 (1905).
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allow corporations wider leeway to engage in economic activities.  Nevertheless, state
practice created the historical conditions under which the great constitutional debates
over the relation of the state to the corporate political economy took place.
State legislators were acting in a setting where economic conditions were
changing rapidly.  Old conceptions of property gave way to a new economic reality.
Legislators faced the same pressures on orthodox modes of thought that led to a crisis
in doctrine at the bench and among legal academics.  However, the impact on the
states was different than on the judiciary.  The price for the states was not the
accommodation of a new set of property relations to judge legal decisions.  Rather, the
prices for the states was a decline in their ability to regulate their political economies
in the face of a new national market.
There was a qualitative difference between state regulation in the nineteenth
century and federal regulation in the twentieth.  Federal regulatory policy was built
upon the politics of antitrust.  The states still gave the corporation its attributes; the
federal government, as a limited government of assigned powers, was still limited in
its capacity to grant charters.  Theodore Roosevelt in 1908 maneuvered to have a
federal law of incorporation proposed in Congress.  The Hepburn Bill of 1908 crashed
upon conflicting views of legitimate federal action.  So did Roosevelt's more radical
proposals for strong administrative corporate regulation made during the election of
1912.  Federal regulation took place via the courts in the Taft administration, and via
the regulatory action of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act during
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the early Wilson Administration.2  These federal actions took place after a corporation
was granted attributes in the states.  Federal regulation thus proceeded the leverage of
statutory law, the stronger of these two regulatory traditions.
The evolution of business corporation law adds to our understanding of the
development of American politics.  Burnham argues that the election of 1896 was
about the success of the metropole over the periphery.3  A great turning point in
American political history, it portended a transition away from a predominantly
agricultural society.  It also signaled the decline of true participatory democracy, and
the rise of oligarchic rule.  The politics of this transformation cannot be properly
understood without an appreciation of the transformation of the political economy,
something for which Burnham is acutely aware.  The decline in state capacities to
regulate their economies provides a crucial element of the context of national political
change.
In this regard there is great irony.  Richard Bensel argues that there were three
major political economic policy areas that confronted the political parties and the
national government in the late 19th century.  These were the gold standard, the tariff,
and building a national market.  He suggests that building a national market was the
most essential of these three areas.  The responsibility for protecting this policy came
to reside in the Supreme Court, the branch of the government most insulated from
2 Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
3 Walter Dean Burnham, “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe,”  59 American
Political Science Review, 7-28 (1965).
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political pressures.4  
There was another element to the policy of building a national market, and this
was the state-based law of corporations.  These powers were constitutive, in that they
enabled corporate existence and defined its attributes.  The great irony is that state
legislatures are the government institutions that are the least insulated from public
pressures.  In this regard it is crucial to note that activity to untether the corporation
from restrictive state statutes occurred in far more locales than merely New Jersey:
innovations were made in many of the states.  This is an strong indication that the
liberalization of statutory corporation law was not merely the fault of a corrupt
legislative process, as was charged by Lincoln Steffens in 1905.  It was, rather, a
process deeply ingrained in the practice of state legislation.  There is no question that
at crucial moments the Supreme Court did come to support national market building
by protecting against state policies that sought to discriminate against foreign
corporations.  But nevertheless, the constitutive structure of corporation law developed
in the states.  This was a necessary element in the building of the national market.
Skowronek contends that building national administrative capabilities as a
response to industrialization involved more than mere creating a more efficient state.
Rather, he argues, it involved creating a qualitatively different state.5  The struggle to
shape a new national state apparatus had to contend not only an entrenched laissez
faire ideology, but also a well entrenched Supreme Court that saw itself as the
4 Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900  (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
5 Steven Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative
Capabilities, 1877-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 4.
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protector against national administrative capabilities.  In addition, the struggle over
building national state capacities in economic regulation, at least, was conducted on
the shoulders of shattered capacities of the several states.  The policy of Theodore
Roosevelt of regulating corporate action via state structures is made more intelligible
when we recognize the state origins of corporation law, and the recent inability of the
several states to regulate their creation.
The American corporate tradition presents a striking counterpoise to debates
over the liberal tradition in American politics.  The irrational mass Lockianism
identified by Hartz, and the ascriptive traditions identified by Rogers Smith have co-
existed by a uniquely American, and equally important tradition, a tradition of
corporate group rights.6  The subjugation of African Americans in antebellum slavery
and post-bellum apartheid involved racist subordination as well as supporting an
economic system dependent on slave or peonage labor.  The corporate tradition is
fundamentally a political-economic tradition.  It requires class differentiation,
including the institutionalization of corporate capitalists as the ultimate bourgeois
class.  
 The class differentiation would come to subordinate the position of lawyers
(and nearly everyone else) in the American polity.  Tocqueville characterized lawyers
as America's aristocracy.  Lawyers now became the servants of the business class.  At
6 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought
Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955). Rogers Smith, “Beyond de Tocqueville,
Myrdall, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America,” American Political Science Review, vol.8,
no. 3 (1993), 549-566.  Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting View of Citizenship in U.S. History
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
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the same time, they took ascendancy as leaders of the new professional class that
emerged in the Progressive Era.7  Ironically, the lawyers of the businessmen were
promulgators of legal rules that supported corporate capitalism.  The corporate
capitalists, after all, could best afford the best legal minds.  
The findings of this study are very much in accord with Horwitz's analysis of
legal transformation.  Horwitz argues that the natural entity theory was not advocated
until the late 1890's.  No one in this study articulated a natural entity theory, much less
justified a particular provision or approach to the corporation problem with it.  They
did, however, justify their creation with the artificial entity theory.  Because this was
the time of the fundamental transformation to corporate capitalism, the artificial entity
theory should inform our understanding of corporate attributes.  John Dewey ended the
debate over the corporation as an entity (until the topic was again revived by Horwitz).
The corporation, he argued, is just what the law says it is.   He showed that a given
theory could be used to justify both pro-corporate and anti-corporate positions.8  The
corporation as a rights-and-duties-bearing-unit was a construct of the legal system.
What is ironic, however, is that the artificial entity informed state construction of legal
rights, including the relaxation of those rights.
The American tradition of corporate organization is deeply rooted.  It is a
uniquely American invention, shaped in the context of American political economics.
We can trace justifications for corporations to before Hamilton advocacy of the First
7 See Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920  (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).
8 John Dewey, “The Historical Background of Corporate Personality,” Yale Law Journal, v. 35, p.
655-73 (1926).
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Bank of the United States.  The legal system accommodated state innovations in
corporate organization at key moments in development.  The courts gave corporations
standing at the bar, treated it as an entity in itself, and eventually gave it Fourteenth
Amendment rights to equal protection before the law.  Concentrated group rights
gained constitutional standing.  Lockian individualism was made to accommodate
corporate capitalism.  The states and the courts mediated the demarcation between
public and private spheres to further political economic advancement.
The corporation has had an immense impact on the operation of the American
political economy.  The great differentiation in wealth and thus class in not formalized
in a post-feudal manner, and social mobility between classes remains a core element of
both the American creed and indeed, American practice.  Some individuals inevitably
work their way into the corporate class, and vice versa.  Nevertheless, the Madisonian
observation that one's means of subsistence will deeply influence one's political views
remains.  Preferences in the political system are largely dependent on one's relation to
corporate capitalism.
Karl Marx treated the state as the tool of the ruling class.  The legal system
existed to serve the imperatives of the capitalist class.  The social structures that
developed did so as a result of the crisis of an existing system of productive relations,
and their synthesis into a new system.  Capitalism followed feudalism, and the
capitalism class dominated this system of production necessarily.  The social structural
setting was one of preferences imposed from the top down: the ruling ideas of liberty,
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equality, and property are the ideas of the ruling class.9  Max Weber, by contrast, saw
modern social organization as rational, legal, and bureaucratic.  The development of
technical expertise was essential for the development of bureaucratic control.  The
consequences of bureaucratic control include a tendency towards a leveling of classes
in the interest of technical competence, and a plutocracy based on lengthy formal
education.10  Weber consciously considered himself to be the anti-Marx.  Weber
recognized the influence of the law in legitimating social and corporate organization,
even as he framed a rational legal bureaucratic set of structures that evolve from
ingrained traditions, from the ground up.
Business corporation law is situated at the very center of legitimate social
organization for both modes of analysis. The promulgation of corporation law
accommodates both top-down and bottom up modes of analysis.  In the promulgation
of corporation law, Marx and Weber meet.  State legislatures mediate interests of the
business class with interests of the wider electorate; they are the branch of government
least insulated from popular pressures, but must also respond to the larger structural
forces impacting the local political economy.  They construct laws that legitimate
Weberian social organization; the result of that organization establishes a means of
production whereby individual preferences form.  
There are several implications that follow from this work.  The first has to do
with the connection between property rights and efficiency.  North underspecifies the
9 See for example, “The Communist Manifest” and “The German Ideology,” in Karl Marx, Selected
Writings (Lawrence H. Simon, ed.) (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994).
10 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Talcott Parsons, ed.)(New York:
Free Press, 1964 [1947]), 328-341.
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role of the state in facilitating property rights.11  In his view, efficiency comes from
proprietary inventiveness facilitated by clear and stable property rights.  A good
property rights regime directs profits to owners, such that private returns more closely
approximate social returns.  This is ownership in the Coasian sense.12  Corporate rights
are also property rights.  They facilitate decentralized ownership with centralized
control of productive assets.  They also set a rational legal mode of social organization
in the Weberian sense.  The political process of legal change is thus a mediating
variable for economic growth.  
Coase, like North, does not seem to think the substantive character of property
rights has an impact on efficiency: so long as the law is both clear and stable, the
content of those rights will not affect the overall social product (although it will have
distributional consequences.)  Berle and Means were concerned with the law, and with
shareholder control over their property, but efficiency was not their primary concern.13
The Chandlerian imperative suggests that business is more efficient if Berle and
Means' shareholders don't have control, but are merely investors.  Against this
background, I argue that the corporate form of economic organization allows
Chandlerian efficiencies, and further, that corporation law must permit this. Changes
in the law are necessary in order to achieve the Chandlerian emergence of the large
corporation.  The law does impact the overall social product.  With laws enabling the
11 Douglass C North, Structure and Change in Economic History, (New York: Norton, 1981).
12 R. H. Coase,  “The Problem of Social Cost,” 3 The Journal of Law and Economics (1960),1-44.
13 Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,  and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New
York: Macmillan, 1932).
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large corporation, there can be greater efficiency than otherwise.14  This is the case
even if some firms achieve great size primarily as a result of power rather than
efficiency.  As long as some significant proportion of firms provide efficiencies due to
size and managerial coordination, the relation of the state to the increase in social
wealth remains.
This critique impacts our understanding of free markets.  A central tenet of
neoclassical economics is that the state should interfere with markets as little as
possible.   Yet state promulgation of corporate rights indicates a constitutive role for
the state in economic development.  When economic growthis dependent on corporate
capitalism, state action and sanction is essential.  Polanyi argued long ago that markets
are not natural.  Neither, I submit, are the players when it comes to corporate
capitalism.
As a result, this critique can also be used as a justification for remedial action
from within a natural rights individualist perspective. One possible remedy to state
sponsored concentration of wealth is taxation of the beneficiaries.  Double taxation of
corporate profits is often decried as unjust; the state taxes income once when declared
by the corporation, and a second time when declared by the shareholder.  The criticism
of double taxation might make sense under a partnership theory of the corporation, but
it cannot be justified under any conception of the corporation that includes state
14 One interpretation of the Coase theorem is that it operates under conditions of perfect information
and zero transaction costs.  If one is to adopt this view, of course, then it cannot be applied to real
world situations of positive information and transaction costs.  Also, under zero information and
transaction costs there is no need for a firm under Coase's theory, because the very rationale of the
firm is to reduce transaction costs.  Note that for Chandler, by contrast, managerial coordination is
more efficient than market transactions, both because of the reduction in transaction costs but also
because of the superior efficiency of centralized coordination and planning.
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granted rights.  The theoretically justified remedial action need not merely be double
taxation, of course.  Other sorts of remedial action could be proposed and justified as
well.  The appropriate remedy is most likely to be a function of the political process,
just as are corporate rights themselves.  From within the liberal tradition of sacrosanct
property rights, we might not be able to theoretically specify the most appropriate
remedial action, but we most certainly cannot exclude a welfare state.
Of course, we need not remain within the strictures of modern conservatism to
analyze the propriety of state action in relation to economic development.  McCloskey
noted that founders did not have the same notion of privileging property rights that
was later implicated to them by conservative thinkers.15  This is supported by Hartz's
study of economic policy in Pennsylvania before the Civil War, and by the Handlin's
parallel study of Massachusetts during that same time.16  But in any case, the statutory
foundations of corporate capitalism must inform our analysis of economic
development.
A second implication is directed to efforts by some neoclassical scholars who
have sought to treat the corporation as merely a  “nexus of contracts.”17  In the “nexus
15 Robert Green McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise: A Study of William
Graham Sumner, Stephen J. Field, and Andrew Carnegie. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
16 Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860 (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1968 [1948];: Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth, A Study
of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861 (New York: New
York University Press, 1947).
17 See for example, Steven N. S. Cheung, “The Contractual Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Law and
Economics, v. 26, n. 1 (April 1983), 1-21; Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial
Economics, v. 3 (1976), p. 305;  Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, “Separation of Ownership
and Control,” Journal of Law and Economics, v. 26, n. 2 (June 1983), 301-325;  Oliver Williamson,
“Corporate Governance,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 93, n. 7 (June 1984), 1197-1230.  For a critical
appraisal see William W. Bratton, Jr., “The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal,
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of contracts” view the corporation is a contractual entity, and all shareholders,
managers, directors, and employees make contracts in exchange for their services.  In
this they reduce all corporate interests to individual interests.  The advent of this
contractual theory of the firm began with a 1972 article by Alchian and Demsetz,
which treats internal corporate transactions as identical to market transactions.  They
argue that “Telling an employee to write this letter rather than file that document is
like telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.  I have
no contract to continue to purchase from the grocer and neither the employer nor the
employee is bound by any contractual obligations to continue their relationship.”18
The central figure of the firm can not impose authoritarian control, but rather makes
contracts that others agree with because it leads to more efficient production.  Thus
firms are the central nexus where individuals contract with each other.19  This line of
analysis draws on Ronald H. Coase's “The Nature of the Firm,” from 1937.20  There,
Coase argued that the existence of firms could be explained by a theory of transaction
cost reductions: firms exist when they can operate with lower transaction costs than
would otherwise occur with market transactions.
In this perspective the market is natural.  The firm is an artificial creation that is
reduced to the individuals that compose it, each seeking individual utility
Cornell Law Review, v. 74, p. 407-465;  1989, William W. Bratton, Jr., “The New Economic
Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, Stanford Law Review, v. 41 (1989), 1471-
1527; and David Millon, “Theories of the Corporation,” Duke Law Journal, (1990), 201-262. 
18 Alchian and Demsetz,  “Production, Information costs, and Economic Organization”  American
Economic Review 62:777 (1972), p777.
19 Bratton identifies two distinct strands of new economic theory, a "neoclassical" variant, and an
"institutional" variant.  William W. Bratton, "The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal," Cornell Law Review, vol. 74 (1989), 407-465, at 417-23.
20 Ronald H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” 4 Economica (1937), 386.
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maximization.  The pre-political right to contract among independent actors  is
preeminent legal relationship.  Shareholders are owners, managers are specialists at
organization, and the corporation is nothing more that a contractual agreement among
participants to seek efficiency.  If workers are unhappy with their condition, they can
negotiate a new contractual relationship, elsewhere if necessary.  Shareholders can
trade shares if they are unhappy with management, and purchasers can select other
goods that that offered.  Separation of control from ownership results from
specialization in risk-bearing by owners, and specialization of decision making by
management.21  
This picture of the firm is one of private actors.  Government appears to have
no role except as enforcer of contracts.  The key analytic move for this set of theories
is the assertion of free choice by actors to their place within the corporate nexus.  Yet
as Bratton notes, contract theory includes relational aspects as well as mutual consent
notions.22  In addition there are also contractual issues such as the problem of
imperfect contracts, contractual misunderstandings, unforeseen circumstances not
accounted for in the contract, and dynamics in long-term relationships that cast doubt
on the notion of consent.  
The nexus of contract theory elides the history of statutory construction in the
states.  Corporations received rights and privileges in particular settings in the states.
A legal environment within the American political system provided those rights.  State
21 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control,” Journal of Law
and Economics, v. 26, n. 2 (June, 1983), 301-325;  
22 Bratton, “The "Nexus of Contracts” Corporation," 448-451. 
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construction of corporation rights has led to an increase in overall social wealth,
combined with a concentration of that wealth in relatively few hands.  The sharp
distinction that nexus contract theorists make between the private and the public
spheres erodes under the dynamic of state-aided wealth accumulation.  Further, as
inequality increases, not all parties to a bargain have similar leverage over contract
negotiations.  Thus the  nexus of contract theory is also subject to the same criticism
made by critics of the Lochner23 decision, namely that disparities in bargaining power
can lead to subordination.
A third implication concerns a recent debate in comparative political economy
that has questioned the trajectory of corporate governance structures.  The “Varieties
of Capitalism” approach distinguishes Liberal Market Economies (LME), typified by
the American case,  from Coordinated Market Economies” (CME),24 typified by the
German mode.  The former are characterized by the use of market mechanisms to
coordinate industrial relations, relations to finance capital, education relations, and
labor relations.  Inter-firm relations are governed by an antitrust tradition, with a
diffusion of ownership.  The CME model is characterized by coordinated industrial
relations, financial relationships, education relations, and labor relations.25  Crucial
debates concern the comparative advantages of each system under various conditions.
For example, CME systems have lower transaction costs while LME systems are better
23 Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
24 Also called “Organized Market Economies” (OME).
25 See in particular the introduction by Hall and Soskice, but more generally the entire edited volume
Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of
Comparative Advantage (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).  Note also that the OME
model has not been performing well lately.
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capitalized and are more adept at allocating capital to newly productive areas.26
One area of debate is whether these systems are converging or diverging in the
new global economy.  A second area of debate concerns the sources of variation in
organization.  Peter Gourevitch, for example, suggests that the German and American
models looked more similar in 1890 that they do today, pointing to political and legal
acts that pushed the United States closer to the LME model.27  My point in addressing
this debate is simple: an analysis of the origins of the American system of corporate
organization must take into account the statutory foundations, as well as the federal
structure of the American system.  The future trajectory of legal rights necessary for
rapid economic development may be informed by the leading trajectory from the past.
The American experience in the states suggests an analog for the “Varieties of
Capitalism” debates.  The American system then operated under the understanding that
the federal government was a limited government of assigned powers.  The federal
government as a result involved itself in two ways.  First, any federal regulation would
be the antitrust variety.  Second, the Supreme Court acted to protect the national
market, and limit federal intervention in the economy.  The result was a roughly
anarchical system that parallels elements of the modern anarchical economic system in
important ways.  There is no central authority, and thus states seek to position
themselves according to their local political and economic conditions in the absence of
that.  Rather than building a national economy, the current effort is to build a global
26 See Peter Gourevitch, “Corporate Governance: Global Markets, National Politics,” in Miles Kahler
and David A. Lake, Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press: 2003), 305-331.
27 Id., 318-9.
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economy.  Obviously, there is greater variation in politics, economics, and culture than
existed in late nineteenth century America.  There is also a far greater capacity for
communication.  The parallel is obviously inexact, but includes similarities enough to
give us pause.  The extent to which the modern state must give up control over its
national political economy in the face of globalized markets is and will be a source of
political contention for the foreseeable future.  It in itself portends a crisis of political
economic orthodoxy in the face of transforming market relations.  A change in mindset
will be a likely result.
The concentrated capital thesis remains to be tested in relation to contemporary
economic practice.  Nevertheless, the findings already point to possibilities for
research in comparative political economy.  Rostow's analysis of economic growth
suggests an organic process that begins with small proprietary capitalism, followed by
a germinated period that leads to industrial take-off.28  Small manufacturing, along
with cultural acceptance and appropriate education set the stage for a take-off towards
rapid industrial development.  From small firms grow large firms.  This research
indicates a more complicated process: states with extensive small manufacturing tend
to resist laws that encourage the concentration evident in the large industrial
corporation.  In Rostow's analysis each nation is hermetically sealed from its
neighbors.  This analysis suggests one important way in which cross border influences
disrupt any such organic process.   Corporate development in America required legal
“cousins” that subverted the will of states with extensive small manufacturing.  States
28 W. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1962).
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with extensive small scale manufacturing may not want an economic powerhouse to
dominate the local economy, unless it provides markets for the local producers. Yet a
nearby state can subvert state sovereignty under otherwise free market conditions.
Organic growth following a germination period need not occur.  It is possible this
analysis may inform studies of import substitution industrialization strategies
attempted in a developing countries.  Whether patterns of development in these
countries are impacted by the prior concentration of industrial production may be an
intriguing line of research. 
Finally, debates in the legal profession have been over whether the federal
system of charter specialization has resulted in a “race to the bottom” which has
resulted in the lowering of social standards, or a “race to the top” that has promoted
economic efficiency. William Cary initiated debate by arguing that state competition
led states to favor management at the expense of shareholders because it is the
managers who are in a position to shop among states for the most favorable charter.29
Daniel Fischel argued that the resulting economic efficiencies led to a “race to the
top.”30  By contrast Lucien Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell argue that economic
inefficiencies have been the result.31  This dynamic has taken on an international tone
as many U.S. corporations have located their place of incorporation to Bermuda.  This
contemporary dynamic is best understood with knowledge of how corporate rights
29 William Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,” Yale Law Journal,
(1974) 83: 663-705.  
30 Daniel R. Fischel, “The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware’s Corporation Law”, Northwestern University Law Review, (1982) 76: 913-45. 
31 Lucien Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell,  “Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect
Managers from Takeovers”,  Columbia Law Review (1999), 1165, 1168. 
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evolved in history.
The variety of corporate legal rights in the statutory record and their alteration
over time sheds light on the foundations of corporate capitalism.  It suggests potential
tools for control of the corporation by the state.  The raises the question of whether a
federal law for incorporation would facilitate greater state regulation.  It is possible,
for example, that the U.S. Federal Government might have greater leverage to with
federal charters.  In this I am a pessimist.  Corporate capital can influence federal
policy as well as it can Delaware policy.  
In practice, access of foreign corporations to domestic markets is probably just
as important is access of foreign companies to domestic markets.  The United States
would seem to have one of the most attractive markets in the world (if not the most
attractive), and thus might seem to have leverage, for example against corporations
chartered in Bermuda.  Yet politics in the contemporary scene insulates legislators
against popular pressures on issues that tend to lack in depth media coverage.
Legislators are obviously susceptible to influence from corporate money.  One
suspects that a federal system of  charter laws would be about as effective in
controlling corporate abuse as tax law has been in reducing the number of charters
taken out in Bermuda.  In any case, it appears that the time for statutory control of the
corporation has long past.  A new system of economic organization is emerging, and it
is not likely to be anything that anyone intended.
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